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 CEOs have long been considered the grand architects of firm strategy. Research 
not only supports their pivotal role in strategy making, but also suggests that CEOs 
directly influence outcomes of strategy. CEOs are often blamed for corporate failure and 
credited for corporate success. What is less clear is how CEOs influence strategy. 
Although research attributes the CEO’s influence on performance to demographics, 
personality and previous experience, how a CEO influences the firm’s strategic trajectory 
over time is less clear. 
 This research investigates the role of CEO strategy narratives on the firm’s 
trajectory. Grounded in organizational path dependence theory, the thesis analyzes how 
CEO narratives, produced for both internal and external consumption, influence strategic 
direction. 
 Organizational path dependence theory argues that the future is influenced by the 
past and that, over time, through a series of incremental decisions, options are reduced 
and outcomes are constrained. Core to the argument is the theorized existence of rent-
seeking self-reinforcing social processes that may eventually lead the organization 
towards rigidity and an inefficient locked-in organizational state.  
 Narrative in strategy is considered a primary means of sensemaking for 
organizational stakeholders. Narratives both represent and construct organizational reality 
by giving meaning to the past and setting expectations of the future, while creating and 
reinforcing organizational identity through the communication of norms, values, and 
beliefs. Strategy narratives focus on creating a discourse of direction to represent the past 
and influence the behaviour of organizational members. 
 This thesis joins theory on organizational path dependence and strategy narratives 
to investigate the influence of CEO narratives on strategic lock-in. Through a historical 
document analysis, the thesis presents a case study of a Canadian-based multinational 
firm (Nortel) using strategy texts authored by the company’s four Chief Executive 
Officers from 2002 to 2010. The texts include public documents (shareholder letters, 
news releases, media articles, and analyst conference calls) along with a unique data set 
consisting of 168 CEO all-employee emails.  
 Findings indicate that, collectively, CEO narratives act as a self-reinforcing 
process that encourages the adoption of other firm-level processes. CEO narratives 
represent a discourse of direction and a discourse of behaviour, to encourage both the 
understanding of firm strategy and the implementation of associated processes. Although 
the CEO narratives initially create benefits, over time they are constrained by what was 
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The Influence of CEO Narratives in Organizational Path Dependence 
CHAPTER 1.   Summary of Thesis 
 This chapter serves to provide a summary of the thesis, beyond the abstract. The 
theory and research questions of the thesis are presented, along with an overview of the 
methodology, results, and contributions.  
1.1 Background on Path Dependence 
 History tells us that organizations get stuck; they get stuck in what they do, in the 
markets they serve, in the strategies they use (Carroll & Mui, 2008). In growing and 
prosperous industries, where there is plenty of market to share, some firms cannot escape 
themselves; they fail to meet customer needs, manage their resources, or find a 
competitive advantage. In shifting industries, where change is inevitable, many 
organizations manage to change their strategies and move with the times. But some, 
again, get stuck, locked-in by who they are, the decisions they have made, and the ways 
in which they work, such as Eastman Kodak, who resisted the transition to digital 
technology for years (Carroll & Mui, 2008).  
 ‘Getting stuck’ on a particular path, in academic terms, refers to a body of 
research dealing with a concept known as path dependence. Path dependence theory was 
born from evolutionary economics and Paul David’s (1985) analysis of the persistence of 
the QWERTY keyboard. Although initially focused on the economics of why certain, 
albeit less effective, technologies may win out over other inventions (e.g. Arthur, 1989), 
the notion of path dependence has, over the years, been referenced throughout the field of 
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strategic management. The concept of path dependence is often used to explain the 
persistence of institutions, technology standards, and capabilities; path dependence is 
often referenced in areas such as institutional theory, the resource based view, the 
dynamic capability view, transaction cost economics, and theories of innovation (Vergne 
& Durand, 2010).  
 Recently, researchers have taken an interest in path dependence, specifically in 
the area of organization and strategy (Vergne & Durand, 2010). Research argues that path 
dependence can be applied to organizational becoming, influenced by not only history 
(initial conditions) but also positive self-reinforcing processes that lead to an increasingly 
narrower set of options (Sydow, Schreyögg & Koch, 2009).  This thesis is grounded in 
and contributes to knowledge of organizational path dependence.  
1.2 Theory and Research Questions 
1.2.1 CEOs and Strategy 
 Chief Executive Officers have long been considered to have a significant and 
distinct influence on strategy and strategic decision making (e.g. Andrews, 1971; Ackoff, 
1970; Ansoff, 1965; Barnard, 1938; Child, 1972; Selznick, 1957). In a recent review 
article, Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst and Greger (2012) state that “an increasing body of 
theoretical and empirical literature has since recognized the CEO as the principal leader 
and architect of the firm, as the individual ultimately responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of company strategy” (p. 730). With such a significant role in strategy 
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work, this thesis proposes that the CEO has a critical role in the development and 
persistence of the self-reinforcing processes attributed to organizational path dependence. 
1.2.2 Organizational Path Dependence 
 Theory on organizational path dependence is relatively new. In an effort to move 
beyond the ‘history matters’ argument, recent research focuses on the processual nature 
of the phenomenon and, in particular, causality. Although earlier cases on technological 
path dependence identified how a series of decisions may lead to a particular outcome 
(e.g. David, 1985), they do not explain the conditions under which path dependence will 
occur. Scholars of organizational path dependence attempt to unravel the process that 
leads to lock-in, with a specific focus on the underlying temporal processes. 
 Organizational path dependence is defined “as a rigidified, potentially inefficient 
action pattern built up by the unintended consequences of former decisions and positive 
feedback processes” (Sydow et al., 2009: 696). It is considered a process that unfolds 
over time, through three phases: preformation, formation, and lock-in. During formation, 
positive self-reinforcing processes that involve the search for increasing rents lead to 
dominant solutions and an increasingly narrower set of options.  
 The rent-seeking characteristics of these processes lead the organization towards 
an ever-increasing rigid state, where alternative options are reduced, resulting in potential 
lock-in. At the centre of these processes are organizational actors who either explicitly 
carve out the path or implicitly participate in the path dependence without clear 
knowledge. However, who these actors are and how they influence the process has not 




 Barry and Elmes (1997) suggest that strategy can be interpreted through a 
narrative lens, where “organizational stakeholders create a discourse of direction 
(whether about becoming, being, or having been) to understand and influence one 
another's actions” (p. 432). Strategy discourse is used by organizational actors to 
persuade and legitimize change, and to ultimately influence the trajectory of the 
organization (Fenton & Langley, 2011). Texts, in particular, may shape the firm’s 
operations by representing intentions, mediating conversations, directing attention, 
disciplining behaviour, and linking disparate practices (Kuhn, 2008). This research looks 
at the role of narrative in organizational path dependence. 
1.2.4 CEO Narratives in Organizational Path Dependence 
 Given the roles of both the CEO and narrative in strategy work, this thesis 
explores the role of CEO strategy narratives in organizational path dependence. More 
specifically, this thesis asks: what is the influence of CEO narratives in the 
organizational path dependence process? In particular, the research investigates CEO 
narratives for the presence of a narrative infrastructure – “The evolving aggregation of 
actors/narratives in their material and social settings that enables and constrains the 
possible stories, actions and interactions by actors” (Deuten & Rip, 2007: 75) – and 
analyzes the influence of this infrastructure on the organizational path. Additionally, the 
research investigates the role of initial conditions and self-reinforcing processes, along 
with the influence of multiple triggering events.  The objective of the research is to 
understand how a CEO communicates strategy to organizational stakeholders and how 
5 
 
these texts participate in the firm’s strategic path. Do CEO strategy narratives simply 
reflect the firm’s strategy work or are they central to how strategy unfolds?  
1.3 Methodology 
 Due to its temporal and processual nature, empirical research on organizational 
path dependence lends itself to qualitative methods (Bennett & Elman, 2006; Sydow, 
Windeler, Müller-Seitz & Lange, 2012).  This thesis takes an historical approach through 
the use of a deductive embedded case study (Yin, 2003). The sample is taken from a large 
Canadian-based multinational firm (Nortel), over 8 years, from April 2002 to March 
2010. The primary unit of analysis is the organization, with the CEO narratives as the 
embedded unit of analysis. The source of narrative data included 389 texts produced by 
the CEOs throughout their respective tenures, both interorganizational texts (Analysts 
Call Transcripts, Letters to Shareholders, News Releases, and Media Interviews) and 
intraorganizational texts (168 CEO Emails issued to all employees). 
 The research design is an elaborate process that that first tests for path 
dependence and the existence of a narrative infrastructure, and then investigates the 
influence of the narrative infrastructure on the organizational path (see Figure 1). 




 The design calls for an additional set of event data and the use of path constitution 
analysis to test for organizational path dependence and lock-in. Drawing on over 2000 
documents (including material filings, industry reports and media articles), an event data 
base was constructed to write the case history and characterize the constitution of the 
organizational path. Following, a narrative analysis using grounded coding was 
performed to characterize the narratives and the narrative infrastructure. The two sets of 
results were brought together to investigate the role of CEO narratives in organizational 
path dependence. 
 As an adjunct to the research, a textual analysis was performed on the CEO 
Emails, given their unique nature. The findings of this analysis, which were used in the 
thesis, can be found in Appendix G. 
1.4 Results  
 The investigation identifies CEO narratives as a self-reinforcing process in the 
organizational path dependence process. Through textual relationships, the CEO 
narratives form a narrative infrastructure, from which a dominant narrative emerges, 
encouraging the understanding and implementation of firm strategies. As a self-
reinforcing process, the CEO narratives initially offer benefits through coordination, 
complementarity, learning, and adaptive expectation effects; through sensegiving they 
encourage the adoption of other self-reinforcing processes at work within the 
organization. Over time, however, the narrative infrastructure limits strategic options, as 
CEO narratives are constrained by earlier narratives and initial conditions. Although 
rhetorical history is available to the firm to disentangle the narratives from the past and 
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broaden strategic options, it must be positioned in context with the firm’s larger strategy 
and firm resources and capabilities.  
1.5 Contributions  
1.5.1 Academic  
 The research contributes to the literature on both strategy-as-narrative and 
organizational path dependence. First, in terms of strategy-as-narrative, the research 
demonstrates that the influence of narrative on the trajectory of the firm is related to the 
narrative infrastructure created through textual relationship between narratives. The 
narratives themselves are influenced by not only the ongoing persistence of this 
infrastructure but also firm resources and capabilities. This finding connects theory on the 
resource-based view (Barney, 1991) with narratives and, in particular, the role of 
narratives in strategy. 
 In the theory of organizational path dependence, this research provides an 
elaborated model of the constitution of an organizational path by emphasizing the 
recursive interaction between actors at multiple levels. The research also highlights the 
temporal role of self-reinforcing processes, specifically between those that exist initially 
and those that are created over time. Additionally, the research defines initial conditions 
in terms of resources and capabilities, thereby connecting the resource-based view with 
path dependence theory, and presents the necessity to consider both tangible and 
intangible resources, some of which are brokered with actors outside of the organization. 
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The thesis also tests a relatively new research methodology, path constitution analysis, 
using historical documents; a unique application of the method to date. 
1.5.2 Practitioner  
 The research highlights the need for managers to understand the relative 
importance of CEO narratives in the strategy process. The authoritative nature of CEO 
narratives leads to the persistence of the narratives over time and space. If CEO 
narratives are used to give sense to stakeholders in order to shape behaviour, marshal 
resources, and gain capital, then CEO narratives must be managed as a resource 
themselves. Managers, and in particular CEOs, need to consider how CEO narratives 
may influence and eventually constrain, in unproductive ways, the firm’s strategic path. 
Additionally, CEOs need to consider the role of rhetorical history in their efforts to 
manage the influence of CEO narratives; as a strategic resource, rhetorical history can 
provide CEOs room to maneuver within their narratives, thereby generating strategic 
options and (if required) the ability to move off path. 
1.6 Thesis Layout 
 This thesis is laid out as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature review of 
organizational path dependence and narratives in strategy research, followed by the 
presentation of the research questions and conceptual framework. Chapter 3 provides a 
detailed review of the research methods, including the data requirements, data collection 
and analytical methods. Chapter 4 covers the case history of Nortel from 2002 to 2010 
and includes a biography of each CEO. Chapter 5, the first of two analytical chapters, 
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includes a comprehensive path constitution analysis to test for path dependence and 
strategic lock-in at Nortel. Chapter 6 is dedicated towards a narrative analysis of the CEO 
narratives including textual relationships and the narrative infrastructure. Chapter 7 
brings together findings from Chapters 5 and 6 to investigate the influence of CEO 
narratives on organizational path dependence, and presents additional findings that stem 
from the research. Chapter 8 summarizes the research findings and academic 
contributions, discusses limitations and future research, and closes with practical 
implications. Appendix G, found at the end of this document, provides a detailed textual 




CHAPTER 2.   Theory and Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
  This chapter presents the context for the research by opening with a discussion 
and review of the literature on the role of CEOs in firm performance, specifically as it 
relates to the trajectory of the firm. The purpose of this first section is to argue that, 
although research suggests that CEOs influence performance, there is limited 
understanding of how a CEO may directly impact outcomes over time.  
 Following, the chapter provides a literature review on the evolution of path 
dependence, from its original beginnings in economics to its current application in the 
organization sciences. A detailed review of organizational path dependence is presented, 
along with a discussion on current gaps in the theory, specifically as it relates to the role 
of initial conditions, self-reinforcing processes and triggering events. 
 Following the review of organizational path dependence, the chapter broadly 
defines the role of discourse in strategizing activities to focus specifically on the role of 
narrative in strategy. This is a relatively new field of research in strategic management 
that takes a processual approach to strategy, arguing that narratives (and the greater 
narrative infrastructure) may influence the trajectory of the firm. 
 The chapter closes by connecting organizational path dependence theory with 




2.2 The Role of the CEO in Firm Performance 
 Classical management research argues that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have 
a significant and direct influence on strategy and strategic decision-making (Andrews, 
1971; Ansoff, 1965; Barnard, 1938; Child, 1972; Selznick, 1957). With the formation of 
strategy as a distinct field, research on CEOs and strategy has persisted
1
. In a recent 
article on CEO succession and strategic change, Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst, and 
Greger (2012) suggest that the CEO remains the “principle leader and architect of the 
firm, as the individual ultimately responsible for the formulation and implementation of 
company strategy” (p. 730). CEOs, as critical actors, are often the focus of study in 
research on strategy process (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006) and strategic 
decision-making (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012), not to mention research on leadership. 
 In Upper Echelon Theory, Hambrick (2007) summarizes the influence of the 
CEO, along with the ‘mystery’ that shrouds the extent of the CEO’s influence. 
                                               
 
 
 1 A search on “CEO” and “Strateg*” in Web of Science lists over 757 articles published since 
1984, in ever increasing numbers, with over 50% published since 2006.  
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The question—just as with the effect of exercise on body 
weight—is how much relative, or incremental, effect the 
CEO has after controlling for obvious contextual factors. 
The answer, from the same studies, is that CEOs (in the 
United States, at least) account for a considerable portion of 
the variance in firm profitability that remains unexplained 
by contextual conditions. Just as exercise matters greatly to 
how much you—a specific individual—weigh, evidence 
indicates that top executives have considerable influence 
over the form and fate of their specific companies. Granted, 
executives have more discretion in some settings than in 
others (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987), but, in general, we 
can conclude that CEOs affect organizational outcomes. 
(Hambrick, 2007: 341) 
 Although scholars seem to agree that CEOs have significant influence over firm 
performance, much of the research on this relationship has focused on demographic and 
psychological variables, in other words, within and between CEO characteristics. The 
state of Upper Echelon Theory was recently summarized by Hambrick (2007), explaining 
how the original focus on the influence of CEOs’ experiences, values and personalities on 
strategic decision making has broadened in a number of areas: the influence of the Top 
Management Team in areas such as composition, characteristics and behaviour; and, 
moderators such as managerial discretion and executive job demands.  
 The focus on the influence of demographics and psychological characteristics, 
using proxy measures such as the size of CEO photographs in annual reports (e.g. 
Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, on CEO narcissism), is due, in part, due to limited access 
to CEOs (Hambrick, 2007). In addition, in an effort to move from research on ‘who the 
CEO is’ to ‘what the CEO does,’ longitudinal analysis is needed, which increases the 
difficulty of CEO access. In some cases, however, scholars have succeed in studying the 
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role of the CEO in strategy formulation and implementation (i.e. the process of strategy), 
and firm performance. 
 Burgelman (2002), for example, looked at the influence of Intel’s CEO, Andy 
Grove, on the firm’s strategy-making process. He argued that Grove shifted the firm’s 
strategy-making process from one of internal-ecology to a classical rational-actor model. 
Through the creation of a focused strategy ‘vector’, Grove was able to steer Intel towards 
successful performance, but in so doing, the organization became locked into the PC 
product-market; a phenomenon that Burgelman labelled ‘co-evolutionary lock-in’ 
(Burgelman, 2002). 
 Although the Intel story was a complex situation that evolved over time, and with 
numerous actors, it highlights the potential influence of the CEO in the strategic decision-
making process and lock-in.  
[Grove] made Intel focus on a narrow business strategy and 
established an induced strategy process that tightly aligned 
strategy and action and produced extraordinary success. His 
deep understanding of the forces that gave rise to the 
strategy vector also gave him great confidence in dealing 
with several crises that challenged it. This study, however, 
also reveals the complex reciprocal causation between 
Grove's strategic intent and the structures and processes 
that he put in place and how the very success of the strategy 
vector resulted in the emergence of co-evolutionary lock-in 
and impeded new business development. (Burgelman, 
2002: 349) 
 Burgelman’s (2002) study highlighted Grove’s degree of influence in the firm’s 
strategy-making process; however, the research did not discuss how Grove enabled 
employees to make sense of the strategy. So although what Grove did was well 
understood, how he did it is less clear. The study did emphasize, however, the power of 
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the CEO on the trajectory of the firm and how a CEO’s strategic options can be limited 
by the predecessor’s decisions.  
 Hutzschenreuter et al. (2012) explore, in greater depth, the phenomenon of CEO-
led strategic change post succession. Beyond intrinsic factors such as managerial 
cognition, affect, personality traits, and leadership styles, they propose that newly-
appointed CEOs will see a greater need for strategic change under three possible 
conditions: (1) if the tenure of the previous CEO was short (and therefore the firm’s 
alignment with the environment is lacking); (2) the more the firm has deviated from 
competitors’ strategies; or (3) the greater the uncertainty in the environment 
(Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012). Although they do not test their propositions, the authors 
suggest that future research on CEO succession and strategic change could be 
investigated through the lens of organizational path dependence:   
It is reasonable to assume that as new leaders take office, 
the scope of strategic change they will be able to initiate is 
to a large degree determined by their predecessors as well 
as other historical events within and outside the firm. Path-
dependency will most likely restrict the scope of potential 
actions new leaders are able to initiate. (Hutzschenreuter et 
al., 2012: 745). 
 CEOs have been long been held accountable for their public firm’s performance, 
with poor results often ending with dismissal (see Crossland & Chen, 2013, for a review) 
and, although CEO access has always been difficult, gaining access will be increasingly 
more difficult. The internet and technology allow competitors to gain access to 
information, pushing CEOs to become ever more private. But with their significant 
influence over strategy, strategic-decision making, and the strategy process in general, 
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understanding how CEOs influence the trajectory of the firm continues to be a highly 
pertinent research endeavour.  
 To investigate how particular CEOs influence firm performance, and more 
specifically, the trajectory of the firm, two case study approaches can be taken: a study of 
the role of a CEO in a firm that has either successfully undergone strategic change (e.g. 
Intel; Burgelman, 2002) or, over the course of time, failed to succeed in a transitioning 
industry. This thesis investigates the latter, with a specific focus on how CEO narratives 
influence organizational path dependence and, consequently, strategic lock-in.  Follows is 
a review of path dependence theory from its beginnings in economics to its current 
application in the organizational sciences. 
2.3 QWERTY and the Emergence of Path Dependence 
 In 1985, Paul David wrote a short story about the QWERTY
2
 keyboard. His 
article was published in Economic History with the objective to illustrate how some 
process are stochastic, or non-ergodic, in that their outcomes cannot be predicted but do 
have some apparent determinacy to them.  
                                               
 
 
 2 QWERTY refers to the first six letters, beginning at the top left, on the common computer 
keyboard (and, previously, typewriters).  
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A path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one of 
which important influences upon the eventual outcome can 
be exerted by temporally remote events, including 
happenings dominated by change elements rather than 
systematic forces. Stochastic processes like that do not 
converge automatically to a fixed-point distribution of 
outcomes, and are called non-ergodic. (David, 1985: 332) 
(Italics in the original) 
 David (1985) argued that not all problems can be easily explained using standard 
neoclassical economics; sometimes, “historical accidents” occur, whereby “one damn 
thing follows another” (p. 333). He tells the tale of how the QWERTY keyboard persisted 
throughout the evolution of the typewriter against economic logic. To position path 
dependence in the literature, a summary of David’s (1985) ideas is presented in the 
following paragraphs. 
  The placement of keys in the typewriter keyboard began with a decision made by 
Christopher Latham Sholes in the late 19
th
 century. Although he had a patent in hand for 
his typewriting machine, Mr. Sholes was unable to commercialize his product; the 
mechanism used to strike the key onto paper was such that the typebars would often jam 
if the typist went too quickly. Thinking that the proximity of the typebars with one 
another was the main inhibitor, Sholes identified a sequence of keyboard lettering that 
would allow for quick typing without obstruction. In 1873, and with the help of his 
partner and venture capitalist, James Densmore, Sholes sold the rights to Remington and 
Sons, where mechanics made some final (and slight) modifications – modifications that 
would allow a salesman to easily punch out TYPEWRITER on the top row of the 
keyboard. Hence, the QWERTY keyboard was born. 
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 The evolution of the QWERTY keyboard, however, or for that matter, the Sholes-
Remington typewriter itself, was not guaranteed. Poor economic conditions in the late 
19
th
 century led to a conservative seven-year growth rate and a pool of about 5000 units. 
Then the market turned. By 1880, the economy was starting to recover and business was 
becoming task-oriented. Competitors to the Sholes-Remington typewriter began 
introducing products that, in some cases, were technically superior, replacing the typebars 
with cylindrical sleeves. The Ideal keyboard was introduced (the first of many superior 
layouts), with a top row of letters that allowed for the composition of over 70% of 
English words (i.e. DHIATENSOR). 
 As the typewriter market grew and new technology was introduced, the Ideal 
keyboard layout seemed like a logical evolution of technology with obvious benefits. 
However, while the market was booming, a curious thing happened. The more typists 
randomly gravitated towards the QWERTY keyboard (which had a slight head start), the 
more popular the keyboard became. Typists, a newly introduced soft asset into the 
business environment of the day, memorized the QWERTY layout to become faster 
touch typists. Business owners subsequently placed an economic value on the memory of 
a typist and, by extension, the QWERTY keyboard layout. As more typewriters were 
manufactured, and as typewriters and typists became more central to the administration 
of business, return on investment of the QWERTY keyboard increased (as the cost of the 
overall system dropped). The “lock in” of QWERTY, as David (1985) explains, resulted 
from a set of initial conditions (economic conditions, evolution of business routines, 
timing of technology introductions) followed by a temporal process that characteristically 
was represented by technical interrelatedness (typists, touch typing and keyboard layout), 
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economies of scale (ever increasing pool of touch typists that memorized the QWERTY 
layout) and quasi-irreversibility (sunk costs of training and equipment).  
2.4 Path Dependence in Organizational Sciences 
 David’s (1985) story of the QWERTY keyboard marked the beginning of path 
dependence research within the field of economics. According to David (1985), path 
dependence (in economic theory) occurs when “important influences upon the eventual 
outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, including happenings dominated by 
chance elements rather than systematic forces” (p. 332). 
 Since David’s (1985) original article, the fields of economics and political science 
have systematically explored path dependence theory. Notably, debates on the notion of 
path dependence began early on, with some scholars questioning the actual existence of 
path dependence (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1990). These arguments, however, did not 
prevent the persistence of the theoretical construct, which slowly made its way into 
management.  
 Path dependence, as a concept, was introduced into the field of management in 
the early 1990s but has been most pervasive from 2000 onwards. A search of path 
dependence as a “Topic” in the Web of Science database discovered 178 published 
articles since 1990, with over 50% of the articles published in the last four years. 
Although many of the articles continue to focus on managerial economics and the 
management of technology, they illustrate the growing interest in the application of path 
dependence within the organizational sciences (i.e. many of the most recent articles on 
path dependence are published in top-tier management journals). 
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 In addition to the articles dedicated to path dependence theory, management 
researchers also refer to the construct in relation to other theories. Vergne and Durand 
(2010) note that the concept of path dependence was referenced in over 323 top-tier 
academic management journal articles between 1998 and 2007 (with over 10% of all 
articles published between 2003 and 2007
3
). A search in the ABI Inform Global Database 
on management articles published in the past twenty years (i.e. 1992 and 2012) found 
1675 articles (increasingly linearly over time) that referenced the concept of path 
dependence within the text. 
 The interest in path dependence theory is due, in part, to the theory’s initial 
proposition that “history matters” (David, 2001). From a more complex perspective, path 
dependence theory has siblings. Hannan and Freeman (1977), for example, brought forth 
the idea that internal structural arrangements, established at the formation of the firm, 
restrict choices in strategic decision making and help to explain why organizations differ. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explored the effect of isomorphic pressures, established 
early on in the creation of institutions, to help explain why organizations become locked 
in to similar ways of working. Stinchcombe’s (1965) theory on imprinting argues that 
when and where a firm was created heavily influences the firm’s structure. First-mover 
                                               
 
 
 3 Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science 




advantage suggests that history matters; being first carries both risks and rewards 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988).  
 Other theories also suggest that history matters: the resource-based view (Barney, 
1991), whereby the accumulation of resources, in a particular order over time, will 
influence the capabilities (and therefore scope) of the organization; and, the contingency 
approach (Miller, 1981; Miller & Friesen, 1977; Miller & Friesen, 1978), which argues 
that only a small number of organizational forms exist (archetypes or gestalts), based on 
the interaction between environments (internal and external) and strategic decision 
making. Chaos theory (Baum & Silverman, 1999; 2001) and absorptive capacity (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990) also suggest that initial conditions are important, although the former 
significantly more than the latter.  With so many similar theories suggesting that 
organizations are influenced by initial conditions, how does path dependence theory 
differ? 
 Path dependence was first explicitly discussed in relation to firm capabilities by 
Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl (2007). They state that path dependence includes both 
historical imprinting and, on a differentiating point, forceful dynamics: 
...once successful combinatorial activities generate positive 
feedback loops, thereby emergently constituting self-
reinforcing processes... such self-reinforcing processes may 
establish strategic paths which are prone to dramatically 
narrowing the scope of strategic management. In the worst 
case a specific orientation becomes locked, i.e., any other 
strategic alternative is excluded. (Schreyögg & Kliesch-
Eberl, 2007: 916) 
 Although their main purpose was to shed light on how to monitor capabilities in 
order to prevent rigidities, Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl (2007) introduced the notion that 
21 
 
path dependence is not only influenced by initial conditions but also plays out over time, 
and that central to this process are organizational actors who interact with and influence 
the environment in which they are embedded (Giddens, 1984). In particular, they argue 
that the dynamic capabilities argument is incomplete: changing capabilities that have 
been rigidified through positive feedback loops, specifically once they bring in 
decreasing rents, is not as simple as theory suggests. In other words, organizations can 
become locked in to a detrimental strategic path by the very routines that had previously 
led to positive performance (Schreyögg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007)
4
.  
 The evolution of path dependence research in the organizational sciences can be 
attributed to the movement from an implicit ‘history matters’ argument to an explicit 
study on path dependence as a process. Although David (1985) suggested that path 
dependence comes about through a combination of initial conditions and technical 
interrelatedness, economics of scale and quasi-irreversibility, and Arthur (1994) argued 
that the properties of the process included non-predictability, non-ergodicity, inflexibility, 
                                               
 
 
 4 Soon after Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl’s (2007) article was published, the Freie University of 
Berlin created a Path Dependence research centre and doctoral program, led by Dr. Georg Schreyögg and 
his colleague, Dr. Jörg Sydow. Since 2010, the organization has run a sub-theme on path dependence at the 





and inefficiency, they neither explored the underlying mechanisms nor suggested 
causality. It was not until organizational scholars began to investigate the process more 
closely that we gained a better understanding of how the process unfolds over time. 
2.5 Organizational Path Dependence 
 Organizational Path Dependence is defined by Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch 
(2009) as a “rigidified, potentially inefficient action pattern built up by the unintended 
consequences of former decisions and positive feedback processes” (p. 696).  In their 
research, they move beyond technological path dependence by exploring the self-
reinforcing processes that may contribute towards organizational lock-in. They propose a 
three-phased process – preformation, formation, and lock-in – that describes the 
constitution of an organizational path, and with a particular emphasis on organizational-
level processes (see Figure 2). Sydow et al. (2009) argue that path dependence may come 
about over time as organizations develop processes, through positive feedback, that may 
initially benefit the organization but may eventually reduce the scope of action and result 
in strategic lock-in.  These phases of path dependence, which represent the constitution of 
an organizational path, are described as follows. 
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Figure 2: The Constitution of an Organizational Path  
(Sydow, Schreyögg & Koch, 2009: 692) 
 
2.5.1  Phase I – Preformation and Initial Conditions 
 Unlike technological path dependence, where initial conditions are essentially 
wide open, Sydow et al. (2009) argue that history influences the constitution of an 
organizational path. Institutional imprinting must be accounted for; the organization’s 
rules, culture, and historical-institutional influences will bind the initial set of choices.  
As indicated by the shading in Phase I, many options are available to the firm, but 
managers are influenced by the organization’s institutional environment, which is created 
over time and reflected in routines and practices (David, 1994; Sydow et al., 2009). 
Options are thus reduced even at this phase of the process. 
 In the preformation phase, however, path dependence is still unknown. Although 
strategic options are limited by initial conditions, Sydow et al. (2009) argue that the 
further reduction of options is triggered by a critical juncture, such as a decision or event. 
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The theory does not stipulate either the type of decision or event, or its significance, 
suggesting that it is only possible to identify the triggering event once the process has 
been understood.  
 The theory is also less clear on which initial conditions influence organizational 
path dependence and under which circumstances. For example, which routines and 
practices constrain or limit strategic choice? Are there certain organizational 
characteristics that have a greater influence on an organizational path than others? 
Although the theory in organizational path dependence takes the past into account, it is 
less clear on which organizational attributes influence outcomes. 
2.5.2  Phase II – Formation through Self-Reinforcing Processes5 
   This phase is triggered by a decision or event in Phase I that reduces options and 
initiates the formation of a particular path. The phase is characterized by positive, self-
reinforcing processes that involve the search for increasing rents, resulting in dominant 
solutions and an increasingly narrower set of options. Sydow et al. (2009) argue that 
strategic decisions in this phase can be neither attributed solely to accidents nor deliberate 
                                               
 
 
 5 There is some discrepancy in the literature on the use of “processes” versus “mechanisms” when 
discussing the self-reinforcing processes. Sydow et al. (2009) use “mechanisms” but in later research 
Sydow et al. (2012) use “processes.” For the sake of consistency, this thesis uses “processes” throughout 
when referring to the self-reinforcing processes as it pertains to organizational path dependence.  
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behaviour. The self-reinforcing processes encourage actors to stay on path (due to the 
processes’ positive outcomes) but the organization is not, as of yet, locked in. 
 The self-reinforcing processes are core to the theory. Sydow et al. (2009) argue 
that their coordination effects, complementarity effects, learning effects and adaptive 
expectation effects may all contribute towards the emergence of an organizational path. 
These processes exist at multiple levels in the organization and, over time, due to their 
positive effects on performance, become embedded in the organization. Initially, as rent-
seeking processes, they lead to positive outcomes, but embeddedness may also lead to a 
degree of inertia, encouraging certain strategic options over others. The effects of these 
processes are defined by Sydow et al. (2009) as follows. 
 Coordination effects. Coordination effects relate to the efficiencies gained when 
organizational actors become proficient at following a set of rules and guidelines. 
Interactions between each other become more efficient such that coordinating costs are 
reduced. The rules are adopted by more and more people in an effort to seek greater 
efficiencies. The more the rules are adopted, the more efficiency is achieved and the less 
other routines are adopted or even considered (Sydow et al., 2009). 
 Complementarity effects. Complementarity in activities occurs when 
organizational rules, resources, practices, and routines are combined to achieve synergy 
(Barney, 1991); in combination, the related activities are more efficient than they were as 
stand-alone activities. Not only do these interrelated activities and routines become 
dominant in the organization, they also become deeply embedded within the 
organizational structure. Sydow et al. (2012) suggest that these effects may also be 
related to interorganizational arrangements (e.g. alliances, joint ventures, outsourcing 
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agreements) that can initially be beneficial to the organization but may eventually lead to 
rigidities (Sydow et al., 2009). 
 Learning effects. Activities are learned as they are repeated. The more an activity 
is repeated, the greater the learning. As the activity is learned, fewer mistakes occur and 
productivity increases. As the activity becomes less costly and increases in quality, it also 
increases in attractiveness and the desire to learn something new, in its place, decreases. 
Learning effects encourage organizational actors to refine what they have learned, rather 
than learn something new, thus reinforcing a particular organizational path (Sydow et al., 
2009). 
 Adaptive expectation effects. Adaptive expectation effects are realized when 
organizational actors gravitate towards practices that they believe are supported by other 
organizational members. In an effort to be accepted and included, actors adopt routines 
that are not necessarily in the best interest of the organization but, normatively, are the 
most accepted (Scott, 2008). By participating in the routines, actors reinforce the 
importance of the routines and, consequently, their persistence. These effects can be 
reflected in the firm’s institutional environment, specifically practices and routines that 
are undertaken for normative and cognitive reasons (Sydow et al., 2012). 
 As in Phase I, it is still not clear the extent to which initial conditions (e.g. 
organizational characteristics, history, and identity) will influence outcomes. For 
example, are the self-reinforcing processes presumed to be created in this phase or could 
they (must they?) have existed previously? Do all types of effects (from the processes) 
need to exist in this phase or can a sub-set of processes entrench the organization down a 
particular path, thereby reducing strategic options? As with the preformation stage, the 
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processual nature of the organizational path (leading to lock-in) is clearer than the 
specific characteristics of the firm’s organizational environment. Although Koch (2011) 
theorizes that only one self-reinforcing process needs to be present, research is this area is 
only just beginning. 
 The theory also provides minimal discussion on the role of subsequent triggering 
events. If a decision or event triggers an organizational path in Phase I, is it possible that 
a new decision or event (or multiple decisions and/or events) in Phase II may further 
reduce strategic options?    
2.5.3  Phase III – Lock-in 
 Phase III represents the portion of the organizational path where strategic lock-in 
occurs. Up until Phase III, options remain available to the firm, allowing it to deviate 
from its path into a different strategic direction. In Phase III, however, the organization is 
considered locked-in by the self-reinforcing processes that became inextricably linked 
and embedded within the organization. At this stage, actors are unable to deviate from the 
path. Sydow et al. (2009) also argue that, in this phase, organizational lock-in is so strong 
that even new members are forced to join the path.  
 The organizational path may be inefficient, specifically if it is unable to adapt to 
environmental shifts, however inefficiency is not particular to the theory. This phase 
simply suggests that the organization’s options are so limited that it cannot move off 
path. 
 Another characteristic of lock-in is that there exists a degree of predictability of 
future outcomes (Sydow et al., 2012). At this phase in the process, strategic decisions 
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may be made without debate or argument, alternative competing options may be 
dismissed, and investments (or decisions not to invest) may go unquestioned; ultimately, 
very few or only one strategic option may seem viable to organizational members. 
Notably, actors may or may not be aware that this is taking place, and although other 
options may exist, organizational actors may believe there to be only one possible path 
(Sydow et al., 2012). 
 Although Sydow et al. (2009) argue that lock-in is not necessarily inevitable, in 
that actors ultimately have the power to change the organizational path, theorizing on 
when and how actors can move off path is less developed. Once an organizational path is 
established, are there certain conditions that will inevitability lead to lock-in, beyond the 
self-reinforcing processes? Are there structural conditions that eliminate all possible 
options, even when actors are seeking alternatives? These questions are particularly 
relevant in the case of CEO succession. If a CEO were to enter a firm in Phase III, what 
conditions must exist for the new leader to change the strategic path; is it even possible? 
2.6 The Role of Context in Organizational Path Dependence 
 Although research in path dependence has moved from a discussion on initial 
conditions and perfunctory events towards a focus on the self-reinforcing processes that 
lead to lock-in, organizational context has had minimal attention. Only recently, Koch 
(2011) explored the influence of organizational context on strategic paths.  In his 
comparative study of two newspaper organizations, Koch (2011) argues that strategic 
paths are inscribed in organizations through self-reinforcing processes but that variability 
in strategic lock-in will also depend on the degree of alignment with the organization’s 
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context. For example, issues that are both on-path and conform to context will be fast 
selling, while those that are either off-path conforming to context or on-path deviating 
from context will be contested or challenged, respectively. Off-path issues that deviate 
from the context will be excluded altogether. This finding suggests that firms that are 
locked in and outperforming competitors will continue to choose strategic options that 
reinforce the path, while firms that are locked in but underperforming will struggle not 
only to move off path but also move along the path; these firms may not only experience 
strategic inertia but also become so rigid that they become stuck where they are. 
 Koch’s (2011) analysis suggests that context matters and highlights the role of 
actors in the path dependence process. In his study, he quotes Pierson (2000, 2004), who 
argues that context can trigger self-reinforcement. “Context, or various contextual factors 
such as power, complexity, or ambiguity, are perceived as path-driving forces, which 
means that they are part of positive feedback loops that contribute directly to path 
dependence” (Koch, 2011: 341). Organizational context is characterized by the 
governance and power structure, the formal structure, and the informal structure (Koch, 
2011). Both governance and power structure emphasize the role of leadership and, by 
extension, the role of the CEO, in the path dependence process. If the CEO is the 
“company’s preeminent executive leader, and as such can make a major impact on its 
strategy” (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012: 730), then it’s likely that the CEO has a direct 
influence on the firm’s organizational path. But how? For the purpose of this research, it 
is proposed that the CEO influences organizational path dependence through strategy 
narratives, as a primary mean of giving sense to stakeholders and obtaining capital. 




 Theory about strategy-as-narrative argues that texts play a central role in 
sensemaking activities (Barry & Elmes, 2007). Strategy is considered a form of forward-
looking fiction; strategists employ narratives to convince readers to pursue specific 
outcomes: 
A narrative view of strategy stresses how language is used 
to construct meaning; consequently, it explores ways in 
which organizational stakeholders create a discourse of 
direction (whether about becoming, being, or having been) 
to understand and influence one another's actions. Whereas 
authors of traditional strategy frameworks virtually ignore 
the role of language in strategic decision making, writers 
using a narrative approach assume that tellings of strategy 
fundamentally influence strategic choice and action, often 
in unconscious ways... (Barry & Elmes, 1997: 432) 
 Strategy narratives can be used to influence behaviour (Barry & Elmes, 1997; 
Fenton & Langley, 2011) of both internal and external stakeholders. Narratives are 
developed to communicate purpose to readers, with an expectation that the readers will 
consume the narrative and behave in a particular fashion.  For example, Lounsbury and 
Glynn (2001) explain how entrepreneurs use narrative to help venture capitalists 
understand both the firm’s sameness and the firm’s distinctiveness within the industry. 
By drawing on firm resources and potential resources, entrepreneurs’ stories connect their 
firm capabilities to the market needs, thereby gaining legitimacy while portraying a 
distinctive character (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Similarly, Martens, Jennings, and 
Jennings (2007) refine this argument by demonstrating that entrepreneurs use narrative to 
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not only establish firm identity but also demonstrate how they will manage perceived 
risk. 
 Conversely, Barry and Elmes (1997) argue that, in order to achieve strategic 
effectiveness, narratives must seek acceptance, approval, and adoption by readers, 
through two means: credibility and defamiliarization (as opposed to sameness). When the 
proposed strategy is significantly different from the current strategy, authors will use 
these means to convince the reader of the truthfulness of the narrative. Using a third 
person point of view or non-emotive tone may suggest to readers that the strategy is not 
tied to any particular person but to the organization as an entity unto itself. Well-
structured narratives that follow accepted management practices may suggest a formal 
approach to strategy, whereas a narrative with a story line (crisis, hero, and plot) may 
generate emotional involvement of the reader in the strategizing. Readers themselves 
influence the degree of credibility of the text, by the knowledge and understanding they 
bring to the interaction (Barry & Elmes, 1997).  
 The need for defamiliarization derives from the idea that narratives lose their 
effectiveness over time and, therefore, as new management ideas become fashionable 
(Abrahamson, 1996), authors need to refresh their narratives with different forms and 
frameworks. In this case, actors invoke practices from outside of the firm, seeking a new 
framework from accepted practices generated within the industry or by consultants and 
business schools (Barry & Elmes, 1997). 
 Barry and Elmes’ (1997) conceptualization builds upon Fisher’s (1987) argument 
that effectiveness of strategy texts can be measured in terms of narrative probability and 
narrative fidelity. Probability refers to the degree to which the reader is convinced of the 
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narrative, as it relates to other stories told within the organization, while fidelity is 
concerned with the degree to which the stories within the text are plausible, that is, the 
extent to which they accurately reflect social reality (Fisher, 1987). Both Fisher’s (1987) 
and Barry and Elmes’ (1997) theorizations suggest that present narratives are bound by 
what was said and done in the past. 
 In summary, narratives are used within and by organizations to influence 
behaviour (Barry & Elmes, 1997) and gain capital (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Stories 
are influenced by the firm’s resources and resource-picking capabilities, but narrators 
have leeway in how the stories can be constructed (Martens et al., 2007). The narrative, 
however, is constrained by not only firm resources and capabilities but also context (i.e. 
the external environment). Authors are challenged to use narrative to emphasize both 
sameness and distinctiveness, to gain legitimacy while seeking competitive advantage 
(Barry & Elmes, 1997; Fisher, 1987; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Authors are also 
challenged to remain factual about the present while being creative about the future 
(Martens et al., 2007). Research therefore suggests interplay between the past, present 
and future: authors have leeway in the content of their narratives, but are constrained by 
their resources (tangible and intangible) and the environment in which they are 
embedded. 
 With the temporal constraints placed on narrative, this review suggests that 
narratives might play a role in organizational path dependence; if authors are constrained 
by the past, present and future, then narratives themselves may participate in the creation 
and persistence of organizational paths. Although narratives may be used within 
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organizations to influence behaviour and gain capital, they may, over time, constrain 
strategic choice. The following section discusses how this process may occur. 
2.8 Narrative Infrastructure and Intertextuality 
 Research on the use of narrative in strategy is rooted in literature on sensemaking 
and structuration theory (e.g. Giddens, 1984; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985: Weick, 1995). 
It is from this research that Fenton and Langley (2011) propose that narrative, as a 
distinct form of communication, can be used to provide direction to readers, build 
organizational identity and direct behaviour. This proposition is based on the argument 
that much of the doing of strategy in and between organizations takes place through 
either conversation (talking) or writing (text).  
[Narrative] is a lens for examining how strategy is 
practiced and produced... and implies a particular focus on 
how narrative elements such as sequence, character and 
plot expressed in talk and text simultaneously reflect and 
structure people’s understanding of what they are doing, of 
who they are, of what roles they do or can play, and what 
the organization is or should become. (Fenton & Langley, 
2011: 9) 
 Texts, in this case, are considered concrete documents, produced through 
strategizing activities, authored by practitioners and reflective of practices. Fenton and 
Langley (2011), through this narrative perspective, propose that research into strategy 
texts can illuminate the strategizing that takes place in organizations and within their 
environment. By studying the content and form of narratives within strategy texts, the 
way in which they are written and how readers consume them, we may better understand 
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how strategy texts influence the behaviours of intra and interorganizational actors 
(Fenton & Langley, 2011). 
 Fenton and Langley (2011) argue that texts are produced through praxis, where 
practitioners interchange ideas and eventually produce texts for the consumption of 
organizational actors
6
. Actors make sense of texts individually and, in part, based on 
established archetypes (Golant & Sillince, 2007). The same actors consume the texts, 
resulting in individual (micro-level) behaviour but, in aggregate, both of these activities 
result in collective firm-level behaviour.  
 Kuhn’s (2008) communicative theory of the firm argues that the role of text (of 
which narrative is included) in organizations is central to the trajectory of the firm: 
                                               
 
 
 6 Fenton and Langley’s (2011) ideas are grounded in strategy-as-practice (s-as-p) research, where 
researchers consider strategy as something that people do (Jarzabkowski, 2004) and study three main areas: 
(1) practitioners (who they are, what they are doing and what tools  they use), (2) practices (how strategy is 
“done” in organizations), and (3) praxis (the activities that are generated by practitioners) (Whittington, 
2006).  Fenton and Langley (2011) argue that texts lie at the intersection of narratives of practice, praxis, 
and practitioners.  
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[Communication] is a process in which contextualized 
actors use symbols and make interpretations to coordinate, 
and control both their own and others’ activity and 
knowledge, which are simultaneously mediated by, and 
productive of, ‘texts’.. In other words, events, actions, 
agents, situations, systems, and even material/technological 
artifacts are constituted in discursive practice (Orlikowski, 
1992), and these discursive practices are principal in 
constructing firms. (Kuhn, 2008: 1232) 
 Texts are subcategorized into concrete and figurative texts: concrete texts are 
inscribed into permanent form while figurative texts are abstract representations of 
organizational entities such as practice sites, communities, and firms (Kuhn, 2008). 
Concrete texts (the focus of this thesis), taken both individually and together, can be 
considered as a network of texts.  
 For Kuhn (2008), texts have four main attributes: they represent intentions of 
authors and previous authors; they mediate conversations and coordinate behaviour; they 
direct actors’ attention and discipline their behaviour; and, they align disparate practices. 
Kuhn (2008) assumes that a firm’s primary objective is to attract capital (i.e. economic, 
social, cultural and symbolic), and therefore texts are used to obtain consent from 
stakeholders, a process that begins at the point of the text’s production. Embedded within 
the narrative is the implicit trajectory of the firm, which is shaped to influence 
stakeholders and, ultimately, obtain capital.  
 Kuhn’s conceptualization builds upon ideas from the Montreal School of 
organizational communication (e.g. Taylor, 1999), which argues that communication, 
through a coorientation system, produces the concept of a collective actor and thereby is 
the genesis of organization. “Text is the product of conversational process, but it is also 
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its raw material and principal preoccupation. Together, then, conversation and text form a 
self-organizing loop” (Taylor & Van Every, 2000: 210–211). 
 In other words, narrative is constitutive of agency and encourages “multi-actor, 
multi-level processes” (Deuten & Rip, 2007: 71) through a narrative infrastructure. This 
narrative infrastructure, in an organizational sense, can be defined as:  
The evolving aggregation of actors/narratives in their 
material and social settings that enables and constrains the 
possible stories, actions and interactions by actors. It can be 
seen as the ‘rails’ along which multi-actor and multi-level 
processes gain thrust and direction. (Deuten & Rip, 2007: 
75) 
 What remains in question is the degree to which a narrative infrastructure can 
influence action and interaction. Should the narrative infrastructure be weak, that is, no 
clear stories evolve, what influence does the infrastructure have on action, if any at all? 
Fenton and Langley (2011) suggest that the degree of intertextuality will influence the 
strength of the framework; if intertextuality is high, the infrastructure may send the 
organization down a particular path (Fenton & Langley, 2011). 
 The term ‘intertextuality’ has, over time, taken on numerous meanings. From a 
linguistic perspective, Fairclough’s (1992) conceptualization is that texts are constructed 
within context and through other texts, and that texts are not only present in other texts, 
but also recontextualized through social processes and change over time.  Intertextuality 
in the organizational sciences also refers to the way in which interpreters make sense of 
texts by drawing upon their knowledge of other texts, including the conventions that exist 
within particular textual forms (Leitch & Palmer, 2010). Riad, Vaara, and Zhang (2012) 
support the social constructivist nature of intertextuality, suggesting the following: 
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Whereas the superficial observation on intertextuality is 
that all texts contain traces of other texts, its analytical 
potential lies in the recognition of textuality as an ongoing 
process, wherein production also involves interaction 
between texts as well as the anticipation of reading and 
reader life experience (Boje, 2001; Boje et al., 2004; 
Meinhof & Smith, 2000). (Riad et al., 2012: 126) 
 Given its broad definition (and range of definitions), intertextuality has been 
subdivided into types. Fairclough (1992) considers two categories of intertextuality: the 
first, constitutive, which considers how texts share discursive features (i.e. themes); and, 
the second, manifest, which looks at intertextual similarities such as tone. Genette (1997, 
as explained by Allen, 2000) renames ‘intertextuality’ to ‘transtextuality,’ breaking it 
down into five categories, as listed in Table 1). 
Table 1: Genette's Types of Transtextuality  
(As summarized by Allen, 2000: 98-104) 
Textual 
Characteristic 
Genette’s (1997) definition, as quoted by Allen (2000) 
Intertextuality “a relationship of copresence between two tests of among several texts” (Genette, 
1997: 1) 
Metatextuality  When a text “unites a given text to another, of which it speaks without necessarily 
citing it (without summoning it), in fact sometimes even without naming it” 
(Genette, 1997: 4) 
Hypertextuality “any relationship uniting a text B... to an earlier text A... upon which it is grafted in a 
manner that is not that of commentary” (Genette, 1997: 5) 
Paratextuality “elements which lie on the threshold of the text and which help to direct and control 
the reception of a text by its readers” (Allen, 2000: 100) – e.g. titles, sub titles, 
book jackets 
Architextuality “the reader’s expectations, and thus their reception of a work” (Genette, 1997: 5) 
 
 Although a debate on the different meanings of intertextuality (e.g. structuralism 
versus poststructuralist perspectives) is beyond the scope of this thesis, current 
application of intertextuality to the organizational sciences seems to agree that, within a 
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narrative infrastructure, the degree of intertextuality can be measured by the relationships 
between texts, and these relationships can be defined by both structural and discursive 
(thematic) means. For example, Riad et al. (2012) investigate intertextual relationships 
within media texts produced during the  acquisition of IBM’s Personal Computer 
Division by Lenovo to highlight the “ways in which international M&As are immersed in 
a seascape of intertextual international relations” (p. 121). Deuten and Rip (2007) 
undertake a similar approach; in their study of a product creation process, they 
demonstrate how “attributions and typifications in stories... link up and an overall plot 
emerges” (p. 69).  
 The above examples support the notion that texts and narrative, in particular, 
through intertextual relationships, can influence behaviour and direct action. Notably, 
Riad et al. (2012) defend their decision to use media texts as their study’s unit of analysis, 
arguing that “intertextual inquiry is relevant for studying privileged forms of 
representation” (p. 126). Drawing on this argument, the following section discusses 
current research on CEO narratives, also a privileged type of text, given the strategic role 
of the CEO. 
2.9 CEO Narratives 
 As previously illustrated in the opening section of this chapter, the CEO is 
considered the firm’s head strategy architect – a grand narrator. As quoted by Barry and 
Elmes’ (1997), Gardner (1995) states:   
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The formidable challenge confronting the visionary leader 
is to offer a story, and an embodiment, that builds on the 
most credible of past syntheses, revisits them in light of 
present concerns, leaves open a space for future events, and 
allows individual contributions by the persons in the group. 
(Gardner, 1995: 56, in Barry & Elmes, 1997: 433) 
 The relationship between a CEO and his constituents, however, is different 
between himself and internal (i.e. employees) versus external stakeholders; in the case of 
the former, CEOs have relational-legal authority, whereas in the case of the latter, the 
relationship is non-hierarchical and unstructured (Fanelli, Misangyi & Tosi, 2009). These 
differences may lead to variance in the stories told by CEOs. For example, Palmer, King, 
and Kelleher (2004) found that change conversations differed between internal and 
external stakeholders: internally, narratives were characterized as operational change 
conversations; externally, narratives were characterized as support change conversations. 
Fanelli and Misangyi (2006) found that CEOs use symbolic management (e.g. strategic 
vision statements) when communicating through shareholder letters as a means to 
“buttress their relatively less powerful position” (p. 1052). 
 In studying the differences between external, public communications (using 
Letters to Shareholders) and internal, private communications (using planning 
documents), Fiol (1995) concluded that: 
Executives preparing public statements may first engage in 
internal communications to develop ways of categorizing 
their worlds. They may then add or delete evaluative 
statements as part of impression management for external 
constituencies. (Fiol, 1995: 534) 
Fiol (1995) suggested that future research in this area should focus on non-evaluative 
components of communication, such as orientation towards customers, services, 
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products, the past /future and internal/external, which are more believable and (more or 
less) consistently communicated both internally and externally. 
 Segars and Kohut ( 2001) extended research on the influence of CEO Letters to 
Shareholders with the advent of the World Wide Web, and summarized earlier research 
as follows.  
[Research has] enhanced understanding of how the CEO’s 
letter is structured in terms of content, how the CEOs 
themselves use the communication to rationalize corporate 
events, and how the letter may be used to predict the future 
performance of the organization. These studies have also 
illustrated the utility of the CEO’s letter as a strategic 
communication tool. Given this state of affairs and the 
emergence of digital media for broadcast of the CEO’s 
letter, senior management as well as corporate 
communications professionals are now charged with a 
higher level of responsibility in ensuring that the letter is a 
strategically effective account of past and future events 
of the enterprise. (Segars & Kohut, 2001: 536) (Emphasis 
added) 
 Suddaby, Foster, and Trank (2010) argue, however, that the rhetoric of corporate 
history is not simply an account of events; rather, the narrative created by the firm about 
its history can be considered a firm resource. By selectively reassembling the past, CEOs 
can shape history as a means to motivate and persuade stakeholders, and to establish 
strategic direction.  
2.10 Conceptual Framework 
 The above literature review indicates that the CEO is the primary strategic 
architect in the firm, having both direct and indirect influence over firm performance. 
Although research exists on the relationship between firm performance and CEO 
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characteristics (i.e. demographics, personality and top management team relationships), 
there is less understanding on how CEOs participate in the strategy process over time. 
This research argues that the role of the CEO in the development of an organizational 
path is significant; however, given issues of access, studying how a CEO participates in 
the strategy process and the extent of the CEO’s influence is challenging. 
 CEO narratives offer an interesting opportunity to study the influence of the CEO 
in strategizing, for two reasons: first, given the role of the CEO, the narratives can be 
considered of privileged and authoritative nature (i.e. they reach numerous stakeholders 
and can have an immediate impact on stakeholder behaviour); and, second, research 
suggests that narrative infrastructures can influence firm trajectory. If a set of 
organizational narratives has significant intertextual relationships, the resulting 
infrastructure may have a powerful influence in the process of organizational path 
dependence. 
 This thesis proposes that the collection of CEO narratives, developed over time, 
may create a narrative infrastructure that not only represents the firm’s organizational 
path, but also participates in its development and persistence. If the intertextual 
relationships between CEO narratives are significant, then the narratives themselves may 
establish a strategic path upon which the organization becomes locked-in. This 
conceptualization is presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Conceptual Framework 
Overlaid on Sydow et al.’s (2009: 692) Constitution of an Organizational Path 
 
2.10.1 Intertextuality and Narrative Infrastructure 
 The conceptual framework suggests that the CEO narratives form a narrative 
infrastructure over time and space, through their intertextual relationships. It is proposed 
that what a CEO says and writes to one set of stakeholders will be linked, in some way, to 
narratives shared with other stakeholders. The degree of intertextuality, however, is 
expected to vary; CEOs may or may not stick to their stories.  As research suggests, they 
have leeway in how they draw upon the firm’s historical factors and use the unknown to 
either familiarize or defamiliarize the narrative. The CEO therefore has influence over the 
degree of intertextuality that exists within the infrastructure. 
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 If the intertextual relationships are significant, the narrative infrastructure 
generated through the texts may be strong enough to directly influence the firm’s 
trajectory. Given the strategic role of the CEO, their narratives are expected to contain 
strategic imperatives, with the objective of gaining capital (e.g. resources, legitimacy, or 
financial). If the intertextual characteristics of CEO narratives are significant, and the 
purpose of the narratives is to influence behaviour through strategy stories, then the 
narrative infrastructure may become more powerful than any one of the CEO’s individual 
narratives. In such case, the CEO may be constrained by earlier CEO narratives, and 
moving off path through any future narrative may become difficult or even impossible. 
Strategic options may be limited by what they CEO has said in the past. 
2.10.2 Self-Reinforcing Processes, Initial Conditions and Critical Events 
 The conceptual framework also suggests that, within organizational path 
dependence theory, the role of self-reinforcing processes, initial conditions, and critical 
events may be underdeveloped. First, although the effects of self-reinforcing processes 
have been categorized into four types, certain types of self-reinforcing processes may be 
more influential than others. Do processes that have longer organizational life pose a 
greater threat to strategic lock-in or are there other factors that enhance the influence of 
processes in path dependence? 
 Second, which initial conditions need to be considered in the organizational path 
dependence process? Is the influence of initial conditions always and only context 
dependent; that is, does it always ‘depend’ or are there certain initial conditions that have 
greater influence in path dependence than others? For example, are self-reinforcing 
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processes a type of initial condition? To what extent should organizations be cognisant of 
these processes and the influence of the processes over time? Are there other types of 
initial conditions, such as resources, both intangible and tangible, that may also influence 
strategic lock-in? Are the initial conditions firm-specific or can they be found at other 
levels? Is it possible that intangible resources, like corporate reputation, can limit (or 
broaden) a firm’s strategic options? These questions suggest that, although there is 
common agreement that ‘history matters,’ the definition of ‘history’ is nebulous. 
 Third, there is an inherent difficulty from both a research and practical 
perspective in identifying events and critical junctures. How does one know when a 
critical event has occurred if it has just happened? If retrospective analysis is the only 
method, how far along the organizational path must one be to identify a past event that 
has significantly reduced strategic options? Could this process occur more than once in 
the creation of the path? Does strategic lock-in occur over a course of collective of events 
(David, 1985) or is it simply the severity of one singular event that indicates a path has 
been initiated? These questions suggest that an analysis into critical events and the way in 
which they reduce strategic options might illuminate how firms can be more cognisant of 
a critical juncture when it occurs, in lieu of retrospectively, thereby enhancing the value 
of organizational path dependence theory in practice. 
2.10.3 Self-Reinforcing Processes in CEO Narratives 
 The conceptual framework argues that, if the narrative infrastructure is strong, 
CEO narratives may play a role in the organizational path dependence process. The 
strength of the infrastructure is defined by the textual relationship between the narratives, 
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which leads to the question: what do the narratives contain? Research suggests that CEO 
narratives may contain stories that ultimately seek to influence behaviour and gain 
capital, with a potentially different set of stories for each type of stakeholder. A strong 
relationship between texts (i.e. intertextuality) would suggest that although the stories 
may be told in a different way (such as tone), the discursive themes would be similar.  
 By drawing on organizational path dependence theory, this research proposes that 
rent-seeking self-reinforcing processes may be both evident and reinforced in the CEO’s 
narratives and that, over time, these processes contribute towards strategic lock-in. How 
might these processes present themselves? Some ideas follow, using Sydow et al.’s 
(2009) categorization of the effects produced by these processes. 
 Coordination effects. Narratives may be used by the CEO to coordinate activities, 
by identifying the rules and guidelines that organizational actors must follow in their 
daily activities. For example, CEO organizational announcements may explain roles and 
responsibilities of specific individuals and/or teams and how various groups are expected 
to work together. CEO narratives on strategic planning processes (i.e. management by 
objectives) and procedures of strategic decision-making may also enhance the 
organization’s ability to coordinate activities, while, at the same time, lead the 
organization down a particular path. 
 Complementarity effects. CEO narratives may be used to link resources and 
capabilities within the organization, in order to achieve synergies across functions, 
business units, or geographies. The CEO may promote specific industry groups or 
markets as important elements in the organization’s strategy, directing employees and 
other stakeholders to pursue specific means. If CEO narratives focus on specific 
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resources and capabilities, the exclusion of others (by simply not mentioning them) may 
lead to missed opportunities (and a perception of decreased strategic options). The 
narratives may be exclusionary both in what they say (about what not to do) and in what 
they don’t say. 
  Learning effects. CEO narratives may be repetitive in the types of activities they 
promote or in the work upon which they focus. By continually encouraging employee 
attention in specific areas of the business, the CEO, through the narrative, can build upon 
employee knowledge, leading the organization to become skilled or even experts. If CEO 
narratives promote the use of certain practices and routines, and publicly reward 
organizations and employees for using them, the organization (overall) might become 
increasingly proficient and resist learning new ways of working. 
 Adaptive expectation effects. Finally, CEO narratives may (either directly or 
subtly) emphasize the norms and values of the organization, and the accepted routines 
and practices that accompany them. The authoritative position of the CEO may provide 
licence to explicitly identify expected organizational behaviours, while discouraging 
others, either implicitly or through their absence.  
 In conclusion, the conceptual framework suggests that research on CEO 
narratives may provide insight into the influence of strategy narratives in organizational 
path dependence, as well as insight into the influence of initial conditions, self-




CHAPTER 3.   Research Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents a detailed discussion of the research methods used to 
investigate the influence of CEO narratives in organizational path dependence. The 
chapter first reviews current research methods on organizational path dependence and 
narratives. The case study and research design are then presented, outlining the six steps 
undertaken in the research project: data collection, creation of the event data base, writing 
of the case history, analysis of the organizational path (and testing for lock-in), CEO 
narrative analysis, and integration of results. The requirements for each of these steps are 
discussed in detail within their own sections.  The chapter closes with a review of the pilot 
studies undertaken prior to the research proposal, along with a discussion of 
trustworthiness and ethical considerations surrounding the qualitative research project.  
 In addition to the research methods above, the results of a textual analysis on the 
CEO Emails are summarized in this chapter (under data collection for CEO narratives), 
the detail of which is documented in Appendix G. Given that no research currently exists 
on CEO Emails, the objective of the analysis was to determine the content and form of 
CEO Emails and investigate their role in the strategy process.  
3.2 Current Methods in Organizational Path Dependence and Narrative Analysis 
 This section offers a review of current research methods in organizational path 
dependence and narrative analysis, to inform the methodological arguments for the 
research design. However, before outlining current methods, it’s important to indicate 
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that the research requires a phased approach; before analyzing the role of CEO narratives 
in organizational path dependence, the existence of path dependence, and more 
specifically, strategic lock-in, must be substantiated. Therefore two specific methods are 
discussed: first, Path Constitution Analysis, which provides techniques to identify the 
constitution of an organizational path and test for strategic lock-in, and second, narrative 
analysis for the characterization of intertextuality. The findings from these two efforts 
can then be brought together to investigate the specific influence of CEO narratives in the 
process. Follows is a discussion on each of these methods. 
3.2.1 Organizational Path Dependence: Path Constitution Analysis 
 Given the relative newness of path dependence research in organizational 
sciences, most empirical investigations have used qualitative methods, in particular, case 
studies, along with some simulation studies and experimental designs (Sydow et al., 
2012). Vergne and Durand (2010) argue that to effectively test for the existence of path 
dependence, the only acceptable methods are controlled designs (i.e. computer-based 
simulations, experimental studies and counterfactual investigation), as case studies allow 
for researcher bias in the interpretation of results. In addition, they argue that the ex-post 
nature of the methodological approach does not allow for testing of contingency or long-
run equilibrium. That is, case studies are often historical in nature (except ethnographic 
studies) and presume that path dependence has occurred based on a set of observable data 
and assumptions of randomness.  
 Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Karnøe (2009) counter argue that controlled designs 
are no more objective than case study research (or narrative analysis) and cannot 
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accurately represent the real world. Following suit, Sydow et al. (2012) put forth a 
specific methodology, Path Constitution Analysis (PCA), for analyzing the constitution 
of an organizational path and evidence of lock-in – a method grounded in both path 
dependence theory and path creation theory (Garud & Karnøe, 2001).  
 Drawing from Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory, Sydow et al. (2012) propose 
that the analysis of path dependence must address the processual nature of the theory and 
the embeddedness of actors within the process. They argue that research methods on 
characterizing an organizational path and testing for strategic lock-in should use an 
“interpretative, social constructivist manner (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) without, on the one 
hand, sticking to methodological individualism or simply applying an institutional or 
structural analysis on the other” (p. 2). Thus, they propose Path Constitution Analysis 
(PCA) as a method that supports the investigation into the constitution of an 
organizational path. 
 As a methodological approach, PCA incorporates the potential agency of actors 
by encouraging the investigation into six constitutive features of the path: level 
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interrelatedness, triggering events, non-ergodic
7
 process, self-reinforcing processes, lock-
in, and multiple actors who “intentionally or unintentionally (re-)produce the path in 
time-space” using a longitudinal approach (Sydow et al., 2012:5) (see Table 2). Although 
in their example of the application of PCA they use only qualitative data, Sydow et al. 
(2012) encourage the use of both qualitative and quantitative data, and argue that a 
number of qualitative analytical methods (i.e. temporal bracketing, content analysis, and 
event analysis) can be employed. Most importantly, they argue in support of a qualitative 
case study approach, informed by theory, which considers the important role of actors in 
the process. The case would allow for the investigation into the six constitutive features, 
which are discussed as follows. 
                                               
 
 
 7 Sydow et al. (2012) draw on David’s (1985, 2001, 2007) and Arthur (1989, 1994) to define non-
ergodicity as follows:  
...paths are non-ergodic (Arthur 1994; David 2001, 2007); while 
different outcomes are possible at the beginning, the range of options 
narrows down over time in the face of self-reinforcing processes, in the 
form of “increasing returns” (Arthur 1989, 1994; David 1985), for 
instance, which determine the outcome of the process and will most 
likely lead into a technological, institutional or organizational lock-in.” 
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Table 2: Constitutive Features and Potential Indicators of Paths  
(Sydow et al., 2012: 2) 
 
 Level interrelatedness. Sydow et al.’s (2012) model of Path Constitution Analysis 
is grounded in structuration theory. They argue that strategic behaviour is played out by 
powerful agents through recursive activities both within their level (e.g. the organization) 
and between levels (e.g. the industry, the media, and other stakeholders). PCA therefore 
implies that the researcher analyze the path from a focus level of analysis but within the 
context of a greater boundary. Evidence of interrelatedness must exist to characterize the 
constitution of the path.  
52 
 
 Actors.  At least two actors or actor groups are required in the development of the 
path, whereby the actors influence each other, the path, or both. Actors may exist at the 
upper or lower boundary levels, in addition to the focus level of analysis.  
 Triggering events. A triggering event is one that influences the strategic path in 
the long run. At the time, it may seem neither important nor relevant, but in retrospect, a 
triggering event is identified as a critical event in time that directly influenced the 
subsequent strategic choices at the level of analysis. The actors may or may not be aware 
of the triggering event but either they or a third party is able to retrospectively attribute 
the event as a direct cause to the path trajectory. 
 Non-ergodic process. Non-ergodicity suggests that the constitution of the path is 
not random, although initially the formation of the path (and associated lock-in) is not 
guaranteed. Strategic options are initially available, due to events occurring either 
simultaneous or sequentially, or both. A specific path emerges over time, as strategic 
options are reduced. Non-ergodicity also implies, however, that options are not 
eliminated; rather, many options are available, but the likelihood of their occurrence 
drops substantially, leaving only a few choices available in the end. 
 Self-reinforcing processes. The self-reinforcing processes that provide 
coordination, complementarity, learning, and adaptive expectation effects operate within 
the focal level of analysis and the upper and lower boundary levels). Through positive 
feedback, these processes initially are rent-seeking and, in combination, carve out a 
particular strategic path. Over time, due to the rent-seeking nature of the processes (and 
their degree of embeddedness), they may lead to rigidity, a form of strategic inertia that 
results in lock-in. 
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 Lock-in.  Lock-in occurs as a likely outcome to the self-reinforcing processes 
previously discussed; that is, the outcome is predictable. Lock-in does not suggest or 
imply that options are eliminated; rather, lock-in occurs in spite of other options being 
available, due to the self-reinforcing processes and the cognitive and normative 
understanding of strategic decision makers. Although actors may have choices, only one 
strategic option may seem legitimate while other options may seem inferior.  
3.2.2 Narrative Infrastructure and Intertextuality: Content Analysis 
 In their review of narrative research in organizational sciences, Rhodes and 
Brown (2005) argue that narrative methodologies are specifically adept as analyzing 
temporal issues: 
[R]ather than viewing organizations as static, homogeneous 
and consistent entities, narrative approaches demonstrate 
the processual characteristics of organizations and can 
render both the paradoxes and complex causal relationships 
inherent in organizational change open to analysis. (Rhodes 
& Brown, 2005: 177) 
 Given that this research focuses on the role of CEO narratives in organizational 
path dependence, it is implied that narrative analysis will be undertaken. Rhodes and 
Brown’s (2005) reflection, however, raises a potential problem. Although a narrative 
analysis to understand temporal issues can highlight evidence of path dependence, the 
conceptual framework for this research suggests that the narratives themselves are 
influencing that path. The narrative analysis, therefore, must focus specifically on the 
influence of CEO narratives in organizational path dependence and, as the conceptual 
framework suggests, narrative infrastructures and intertextuality.  
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 Although narrative analysis in regards to narrative infrastructures and 
intertextuality is relatively sparse in the organizational sciences, existing studies have 
used content analysis to characterize the narratives, drawn either from retrospective 
interviews or in-vivo conversations. Two such studies are discussed to illustrate these 
methods: Deuten and Rip (2007) and Riad et al. (2012). 
 Deuten and Rip’s (2007) research focuses on the narrative infrastructure created 
in product creation processes. In an effort to understand how narrative influences the 
development of a product over time, the researchers analyze not only the narratives 
produced through interviews, but also the documentation generated during the project, 
such as emails, memorandums and other formal written texts. With this large body of 
narratives, they reconstructed the sequence of events and illustrated how a meta-story 
emerges through the development of a narrative infrastructure.  
 Riad et al. (2012) studied the intertextual relationships between narratives 
produced during an international acquisition of IBM’s personal computer division and 
Lenovo. In their study they argued that the texts produced by the media during the 
acquisition represented an ongoing authoritative dialogue that illustrated the relationship 
between “intertextuality, international relations and international management” (Riad et 
al, 2012: 142). They examined the relationships between texts including either direct 
reproduction or paraphrasing of ideas. In addition, to understand constitutive 
intertextuality (Fairclough, 1992), they performed a content analysis using open coding to 
identify and connect discursive themes within and between the individual texts. Using 
this approach, Riad et al. (2012) were able to support their argument that when 
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intertextual relationships between authoritative texts are significant, they not only 
represent but also contribute towards relationships through discursive means. 
3.3 Research Design 
  To test for organizational path dependence and the influence of CEO narratives in 
the process, a case study was undertaken. This section discusses the types of case studies 
available to researchers and the arguments for the choice of a single case study with 
embedded units of analysis (Yin, 2003). The section follows with an outline of the overall 
research design that supports investigation of the conceptual framework proposed in the 
previous chapter. 
3.3.1 Case Study Design  
 Yin (2003) presents four design types of case study research (see Figure 4). In all 
types, the case is embedded within the context, separated by a soft boundary, suggesting 
that the distinction between the case and context may be blurred (as is the case with 
organizational path dependence). Single case studies are appropriate for the study of 
critical cases (to test theory), an extreme case (to understand a serious disorder), a typical 
case (representative of the everyday), a revelatory case (unusual access), or a longitudinal 
case (over time). When there is only one unit of analysis in the case study (e.g. the 
organization), the study is holistic in nature; appropriate for organizational level 
phenomenon but can be highly abstract. Multiple units of analysis in a single case are 
called embedded case studies, and allow for a detailed level of investigation. Multiple 
56 
 
case studies use replication logic, as opposed to sampling logic, where the intention is to 
develop rich theoretical frameworks (Yin, 2003). 
Figure 4: Case Study Designs (Yin, 2003: 40) 
 
 For this research, a single case study was chosen, using embedded units of 
analyses. The primary unit of analysis for the research was the organization itself, with 
CEO narratives as the embedded unit of analysis. The research design supported the 
exploration of the narratives within a given organization (single case) over time, between 
actors (CEOs) and between different sources of narratives.  
 As suggested by Bennett and Elman (2006), “It is appropriate to study a case in 
which the outcome is known if the purpose is to determine whether a purported necessary 
cause is operating it” (p. 462). To study the role of CEO narratives on path dependence it 
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was therefore important to select a research site where there was an intuition that strategic 
lock-in may have occurred. Although lock-in does not necessarily imply failure, an 
organization that failed during major industry shifts, while many of its peers did not, 
presents itself as a candidate. Nortel, a Canadian-based multinational enterprise, 
operating in the high technology industry of telecommunications equipment 
manufacturing was therefore chosen as the research site. The case covered the years 
between 2002 and 2010, a period when the organization moved from being an industry 
leader into bankruptcy protection (i.e. Chapter 11). In addition to having potentially 
experienced strategic lock-in, this research site also offered an additional opportunity of 
studying the influence of CEO succession within the process, as the firm was led by four 
different CEOs during the 8- year period, as outlined in Table 3. 
Table 3: Nortel CEOs and their Tenure 
CEO Start of Tenure End of Tenure Months of Tenure 
Frank Dunn April 2002 April 2004 24 
William Owens April 2004 November 2005 20 
Mike Zafirovski November 2005 August 2009 45 
Paviter Binning8 August 2009 March 2010 8 
  
                                               
 
 
 8 Paviter Binning held the official position of Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO), as Nortel 
abolished the position of CEO upon Zafirovski’s departure and Binning’s appointment; the CRO position 
held equivalent responsibilities. 
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 In terms of research methodology, Nortel falls into the category of an exemplary 
single case (Yin, 2003). First, the case is typical of companies that suffered losses during 
the global economic crisis of 2008; many companies faced difficulty when the economy 
collapsed, due to the dramatic reduction in available capital.   
 Second, the case is unique, as dramatic events took place within the firm 
throughout the period of study. For example, Nortel’s stock price reached an all-time 
high of CDN $124.50 in 2000 (representing one third the market value of the Toronto 
Stock Exchange) to a low of less than $2 about eighteen months later. In 2006, the firm 
earned a profit for the first time in seven years and then, a few years later, fell into 
bankruptcy protection. The firm also suffered from numerous financial restatements and 
experienced four CEO successions. 
 Third, the case is revelatory. Access is a major challenge when using narrative 
analysis for the study of strategy and strategizing. In this case, access to a private data set 
(i.e. the CEO Emails) provided a unique perspective on strategy texts within 
organizations.  
 Finally, the case is longitudinal. The study includes CEO narratives gathered from 
an 8-year period. The duration of the downfall, the major periods of change, and the CEO 
successions provide an ideal setting for a revealing longitudinal study (Pettigrew, 1990).  
 The case also carries social significance (Leitch & Palmer, 2010). When Nortel 
entered into bankruptcy protection, it was legally allowed to default on certain 
obligations, leaving a long list of creditors without payment. Additionally, thousands of 
employees lost their jobs and pensioners lost portions of their retirement, while top 
executives continued to receive bonus payments.  
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  Finally, during the period of study, Nortel was a public company. According to 
Kuhn (2008), firms seek to gain consent from stakeholders in order to attract capital. 
Financial capital, for a public firm, is core to its existence. As a public company, Nortel 
provided an appropriate context for understanding the influence of strategy narratives on 
the firm’s trajectory, given that the CEOs produced numerous texts for both internal and 
external stakeholders.  
3.3.2 Research Design 
 Due to the complexity in the research program – that is, must first test for path 
dependence, then analyze the narratives for their role in the process – a six-step research 
design was established (as shown in Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Research Design 
 
 Organizational path dependence theory suggests that the investigation of the 
influence of CEO narratives is a process research problem. Process research is defined as 
follows: 
Process research is concerned with understanding how 
things evolve over time and why they evolve this way (see 
Van de Ven & Huber, 1990), and process data therefore 
consist largely of stories about what happened and who did 
what when – that is, events, activities, and choices ordered 
over time. (Langley, 1999: 692) 
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Using Langley’s (1999) strategies for theorizing from process data, a 6-step analytical 
approach was undertaken (see Table 4). Each step in the analysis informed the following, 
such that, by the final step, it was possible to synthesize the results and theorize on the 
influence of CEO narratives in the organizational path dependence process. Each of these 
steps is discussed in detail in the following sections. 
Table 4: Analytical Approach 
Step Objective Methodology 
1 Data Collection Collect both event data (industry 
and firm level), along with CEO 
narratives 
Historical document search and 
quantitative gathering 




Create chronological listing of 
events and narratives 
Sequencing of incidents and events 
3 Case History Establish context of the case Narrative strategy 
4 Path Constitution 
Analysis 
Characterize the organizational 
path and determine if strategic 
lock-in occurred 
Path Constitution Analysis; visual 
mapping and temporal bracketing  
of events, grounded coding 
5 CEO Narrative 
Analysis 
Identify the content and form of the 
narratives, characterize textual 
relationships, define the narrative 
infrastructure 
Content analysis using grounded 
coding to identity meanings and 
patterns  - within and between 
texts, and over time 
6 Synthesis and 
Results 
Determine the influence of CEO 
narratives in organizational path 
dependence 
Synthesis of results 
3.4 Step 1A: Event Data for Path Constitution Analysis (PCA) 
 Path constitution analysis (PCA) relies on event data. To perform the PCA on 
Nortel, and the pre-requisite case study, event data was gathered not only for the period 
under analysis, but also for the years prior as a means to determine initial conditions. 
Various electronic sources were used to collect Nortel data and industry data. Over 2300 
electronic documents (not including the CEO narratives) were collected, as outlined in 
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see Table 5. Follows is a description of each data set, including the characteristics of the 
data and how it was obtained. 
Table 5: Summary of Data used for Path Constitution Analysis  
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3.4.1 Nortel Securities Documents 
 To identify significant corporate events, every document filed by Nortel on the 
System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR
9
) was downloaded, 
manually in PDF format, reviewed, renamed (date, type and topic) and verified for 
duplication. After removing all duplications, 732 documents were categorized based on 
filing type (see Table 6). The documents ranged from standard financial reports, to 
material (8-K) filings on changes in business strategies, along with changes in executive 
personnel (and their associated compensation and benefits practise), letters from the 
securities commissions (re: financial restatements), press releases, prospectuses, purchase 
and sale agreements, and changes to corporate documents such as ethics and stock plans.  
Table 6: Nortel Corporate Documents from SEDAR 
SEDAR Document Quantity 
AGM Notices, proxy statements, forms, etc... 80 
Certificate of Amendment  1 
Code of Ethics  4 
Credit/Equity Facilities, Agreements, Indentures 9 
Disclosures 8 
EDC agreements and waivers 9 
Form 10-K (Annual report) 13 
Form 10-Q (Quarterly report) 33 
Form 11-K (Investment plan report) 4 
                                               
 
 
 9 SEDAR, the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval,  is a publicly available 
website that includes all Canadian public company material information www.sedar.com 
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SEDAR Document Quantity 
Form 12b-25 (request for late filing) 8 
Form 13-502 (Participation fees) 10 
Form 15 (Terminate reporting) 3 
Form 28 (Annual filing of reporting issuer) 2 
Form 52 (CEO/CFO Report Certifications) 69 
Form 8-K (Material event) no news release 102 
Form 8-K (Material event) with news release 153 
News Releases 149 
Nortel Corporate By Law No 1  1 
Notice of Withdrawal as issuer 1 
Prospectus, offerings 5 
Purchase Agreement  1 
Registration Rights Statements and Agreement  8 
Restated certificate of incorporation  1 
Sale Documents 34 
Securities Exchange Commission / Ontario Securities Commission Letters 3 
Security Agreements 2 
Settlements 6 
Stock Plans (all types) 12 
Undertaking 2004-2005  1 
Total 732 
3.4.2 Media Articles 
 To identify external events and events that were considered newsworthy, a search 
on articles published about Nortel was performed in the ABI Global and Factiva 
databases. Search words included leadership, performance, organization, and strategy; 
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1495 documents were found (see Table 7)
10
. Each of these articles was downloaded 
electronically in text format, verified for duplication, converted to word, formatted for 
consistency, and labelled by date, type, and title. 











Baud Telecom Company 1   1  
Benefits Canada 1     
Bloomberg 10     
Broadband Business Forecast 1     
Business Communication Review 8     
Business Strategy Series 1     
Business to Business 8     
Business Today 3     
Business Week (including online) 37   3  
CA Magazine 1     
Canadian Business 29   1  
Canadian Electronics 1     
Canadian HR Reporter 1     
CIO Canada 1     
Communications News 1     
Computer Dealer News 4     
Computer World 9 1    
                                               
 
 
 10 Articles relating specifically to Nortel products and of a technical nature were not included in 
the data collection, as they were considered not directly applicable to the construction of the organizational 













Computing Canada 2     
CRN 11  1 1  
Customer Relationship 
Management 
2     
Electronic News 4   1  
Embassy 2     
eWeek 20     
Financial Post 2   1  
Financial Times 70 1 1 5  
Financial Wire 12     
Forbes 2     
Global Telecoms Business 2     
Globe and Mail 549  4 15  
Hill Times 3     
Industrial Engineer 1     
Information Week 15     
Ivey 1     
MacLean's 5     
Manufacturing Business 
Technology 
1     
Microscope 1     
MRT Magazine 1     
National Post 394  2 6  
Network Computing 1     
Network World 81 1 2 3  
New York Times 60   1  
RCR Wireless News 9   3  
Report on Business 5     
Research Money 1     
Smart Money 2  1   
Telecom Asia 1   1  
Telecom Web News Digest 10   1  













United Macedonian Diaspora 1     
USA Today 5     
Wall Street Journal 88 2 2 3  
Wireless Week 2     
Total 1495 5 13 46 0 
Note: Interview articles are included in this list to show the source of the articles; they are included in the 
total number of media articles. 
 
3.4.3 Industry Reports 
 To compare Nortel’s strategy to that of its competitors and to better understand 
the industry and market factors, 64 industry reports were obtained from Mergent, 
Datamonitor, Hoover, Financial Post and the International Telecommunications Union, a 
NATO organization (see Table 8).  
Table 8: Industry Reports 
Report Type Source Quantity Period 
Telecommunications 
Industry Analysis 
Mergent 47 2003-2010; Europe, Asia Pacific and 
North America 







http://www.itu.int website 1990-2010 
3.4.4 Analyst Ratings and Reports 
 Quarterly analyst ratings and reports were included in the analysis, to investigate 
the interaction between Nortel and the financial markets. Analysts typically publish 
comments directly following a firm’s earning call, in which financial results (or other 
major material matters, such as a new CEO) are discussed. Within these reports, the 
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analysts also publish a rating that serves as guidance on whether to buy, sell, or hold the 
stock. Analyst reports were obtained through Thompson One, while the ratings were 
obtained through the Wharton Research Data Services. 
3.4.5 Financial Data and Stock Price 
 To supplement the industry analysis (competitor and Nortel performance), 
financial data on Nortel and Nortel’s direct competitors (i.e. Alcatel-Lucent, Cisco, 
Ericsson, and Siemens) was obtained through Mergent, while stock price data was 
obtained through the Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre.  
3.5 Step 1B: CEO Narrative Data  
 CEO strategy narratives are produced for both external (public) and internal 
(private) consumption. They can be in both written and verbal form. Public narratives can 
be found in sources that include Letters to Shareholders, CEO quotes in press releases, 
CEO interviews with the media, CEO speeches at events, annual general meetings, CEO 
analyst calls, and the associated presentation material that often accompanies the more 
formal events.  Private narratives may be found in meeting minutes and internal memos, 
along with formal planning documents. These sources are more difficult to obtain, due to 
confidentiality issues and the time constraints placed on the CEO.  
 To investigate the role of CEO narratives on path dependence, variance in CEO 
narrative sources is helpful to not only confirm findings but also detect differences 
between types of narratives and identify the strength of the narrative infrastructure. Five 
sources of CEO narrative were included in this research (for a total of 389 documents), 
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based on both availability of the documents and theoretical reasoning, including:  CEO 
Analyst Calls, CEO Letters to Shareholders, CEO News Releases, CEO Media 
Interviews, CEO All-employee Emails, and CEO Strategy  presentations that 
accompanied formal CEO events (see Table 9). Each of these sources of narratives is 
discussed in turn; first, from a theoretical perspective and second, in terms of the data 
collection processes and sample size. 
Table 9: CEO Narratives 
CEO Narratives 
(source) 
Dunn Owens Zafirovski Binning Total 
CEO Analyst Calls   8 11 18 None 
held 
37 
CEO Letters to 
Shareholders  
2 2 3 None 
held 
7 
CEO News Releases  20 23 43 5 91 
CEO Media 
Interviews 
5 13 46 - 63 
CEO All-Employee 
Emails 
22 26 109 11 168 
Total 57 75 238 16 389 
 
3.5.1  CEO Analyst Calls 
 Analyst calls are held by public companies to disclose earnings information and, 
on occasion, significant material events. Previously held in a face-to-face meeting format, 
the advent of information and communication technologies moved these calls to a 
telephone conference call format. The conference calls are usually hosted by the firm’s 
director of Investor Relations and include the following: a financial overview by the 
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CEO, financial details by the CFO, wrap-up by the CEO, a question and answer period 
with the analysts in attendance, and a closing statement (Crawford Camiciottoli, 2010). 
  In October 2000, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
adopted new rules in relation to “Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading.” One of these 
rules included Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), which stipulated the following: 
Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) is a new issuer disclosure 
rule that addresses selective disclosure. The regulation 
provides that when an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, 
discloses material nonpublic information to certain 
enumerated persons (in general, securities market 
professionals and holders of the issuer's securities who may 
well trade on the basis of the information), it must make 
public disclosure of that information. The timing of the 
required public disclosure depends on whether the selective 
disclosure was intentional or non-intentional; for an 
intentional selective disclosure, the issuer must make public 
disclosure simultaneously; for a non-intentional disclosure, 
the issuer must make public disclosure promptly. (SEC, 
2000, para 2 of Executive Summary, rule 17 CFR 243.100-
243.103) 
 With the inclusion of analyst calls in the public domain, research on conference 
calls within the field of business has increased. For example, Larcker and Zakolyukina 
(2012) studied analyst calls for deceptive language, in part, because they are considered 
to contain spontaneous disclosures, unlike quarterly and annual reports (i.e. 10-Qs and 
10-Ks). Crawford Camiciottoli (2010) found that analyst conference calls display 
characteristics of intertextuality with business meetings, academic conference 
presentations, and press releases; and move between monologic (presentations) and 
dialogic discourse (Q&A).  
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 In finance, a separate stream of research studies the relationship between 
executives and analysts in conference calls (e.g. Mayew, 2008) and the influence of 
conference calls on analysts’ forecast (e.g. Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto, 2002). Brown, 
Hillegeist, and Lo (2004) found that the conference call generally communicates material 
information to the market and that there is significant variance between calls over time. 
Research on analyst calls, although relatively new in the field of management (versus 
accounting), suggests that the calls contain CEO strategy narrative about both the present 
and future state of the firm. 
 Transcripts from every Nortel analyst call held during the period of study were 
obtained from the Fair Disclosure Wire, through the ABI/Inform Global database, for a 
total of 37 transcripts. Due to Regulation FD (SEC, 2000), analyst call transcripts must be 
made publicly available. With the exception of the first analyst call from Q1 2002, which 
only included the event brief, all earnings calls included a verbatim transcript of the 
entire event, including the question and answer period. Analyst calls run by Nortel that 
were not specific to earnings but were directed by the CEO (8 of the 37) were also 
included in the analysis. These included calls held in 2004 (restatement announcement, 
CEO change), 2005 (acquisition, CEO change, special project), 2006 (business update), 
2007 (statement delay) and 2008 (revised financial outlook).  All 37 transcripts were 
downloaded electronically in rich text and subsequently formatted so that the content 
analysis software could identify each verbatim quote by author. The files were named by 
date, type, and topic of the call. 
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3.5.2  CEO Letters to Shareholders 
 Since the late 20
th
 century, Letters to Shareholders (Letters) have been used in 
numerous organizational studies to investigate psychological constructs such as risk 
taking attitude, cognitive maps, and attention patterns in CEOs (McClelland, Liang & 
Barker, 2010). Segars and Kohut’s (2001) research indicates that the content of Letters 
represents the firm’s strategy and can be used to predict future performance. They 
summarize Clapham and Schwenk (1991) as follows: “The CEO’s letter provides an 
important cue to employees and prospective investors for the formation of cognitive 
impressions regarding the ‘personality’ of the enterprise in terms of performance” (p. 
536).  
 Recently, McClelland et al. (2010) used Letters to understand CEO commitment 
to the status quo and Fanelli et al. (2009) used them to measure CEO charismatic visions. 
Craig and Amernic (2011) analyzed Letters for destructive narcissism, arguing that such 
language (regardless of the CEO personality) may suggest a dysfunctional corporate 
culture.  
 Fiol (1995) found that managers’ internal communication was often similar to 
their external communication, especially in terms of non-evaluative statements. D’Aveni 
and MacMillan (1990) found that Letters of failing firms deny crisis while focusing on 
short-term goals, while Abrahamson and Park (1994) found that corporate officers may, 
at times, conceal negative organizational outcomes from shareholders. 
 Collectively, this research suggests that the Letter to Shareholders includes CEO 
strategy narrative, reflects managers’ current understanding of the organization and its 
environment, and presents the CEO’s vision of the future.  
72 
 
 Nortel’s CEO Letters to Shareholders from years 2001 to 2007 were included in 
the analysis. They were extracted from the company’s annual reports, which were 
downloaded in PDF from the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval 
(SEDAR). For the years 2002 to 2007, the Letters were signed by only the CEO. For the 
2001 Letter, both Frank Dunn and the Chairman of the Board, Lynton Red Wilson, 
signed the letter; it was treated as a CEO narrative like the Letters from the other years. 
There were no Letters from 2008 onwards, when Nortel was in bankruptcy protection. 
Each Letter was kept in PDF format and named by date and type. 
3.5.3  CEO News Releases 
 Corporate news (press) releases are issued for a variety of newsworthy subjects:  
quarterly and annual earnings, management changes, product announcements, and shifts 
in business strategy. According to Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), the CEO has the 
ultimate say in what the release says. Graffin, Carpenter, and Boivie (2011) argue that 
news releases can be used by firms to create strategic noise “to make an organizational 
situation less transparent and consequently more difficult to analyze” (p. 765). Given the 
materiality and influence of news releases, and the CEO’s authority over its content and 
his/her own quotes, the release can be considered a valid source of CEO narrative. 
 All news releases issued by Nortel from April 2002 to March 2010 were 
downloaded from the SEDAR website, in PDF form. News releases were filed by Nortel 
either as separate documents or as exhibits in SEC Form 8-K. In some cases, duplicate 
news releases were filed; both as a separate document and as an exhibit in the 8-K. Over 
400 8-K and standalone news release documents were downloaded from SEDAR. If 
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duplicate news releases were found, the news release embedded within the 8-K was 
retained (to preserve context), while the standalone copy was removed. In total, 299 news 
releases were retained for the purpose of the research, of which 91 contained CEO 
quotes. The news releases were kept in PDF format and named by date, source (i.e. 
SEDAR), type, and topic. 
3.5.4  CEO Media Interviews 
 Although media interviews with CEOs provide a fertile ground for narrative, no 
management studies were found in this area.  
 As indicated in the previous section, media articles on Nortel were collected to 
identify and corroborate both industry and Nortel events. During the data collection of the 
media articles, every media interview was identified and categorized within the event 
database. These media interviews were included as sources of CEO narratives. Of the 
1495 media articles, 63 were found to either be full interviews or contain original CEO 
quotes (see Table 10). Some media articles included quotations drawn from the CEO 
analyst calls but were not included, as the quotes from the analyst calls were analysed as 
part of the complete call, in its original (verbatim) form. Most of the 63 articles were 
downloaded in rich text and formatted for the content analysis software; a select few were 
only available in PDF format and remained that way. Each article was named by date, 




Table 10: CEO Media Interviews 








Baud Telecom Company   1  
Business Week (including online)   3  
Canadian Business   1  
Computer World 1    
CRN  1 1  
Electronic News   1  
Financial Post   1  
Financial Times 1 1 5  
Globe and Mail  4 15  
National Post  2 6  
Network World 1 2 3  
New York Times   1  
RCR Wireless News   3  
Smart Money  1   
Telecom Asia   1  
Telecom Web News Digest   1  
Wall Street Journal 2 2 3  
Total 5 13 46 0 
 
3.5.5  CEO All-Employee Emails  
 A CEO All-Employee Email (CEO Email) is defined here as an email issued by 
the CEO to all employees within the organization, sent from the CEO’s email account to 
each employee’s individual email account. Although CEO Emails are likely quite 
common, no research exists on this source of narrative. As organizational boundaries 
have blurred, due to dispersed work forces and global supply chains, the use of email has 
increased. “Employees are increasingly likely to use and prefer electronic mail (email) to 
communicate with coworkers, customers and other colleagues” (Byron, 2008: 309). 
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Through email, CEOs have the opportunity to directly communicate with each employee, 
on all matters that he/she deems important; but little is known on how executives, let 
alone the CEO, use email, probably due to the inability of researchers to gain access.  
 At Nortel, starting with Frank Dunn, it was common practice to issue all-
employee emails on corporate performance, leadership, organization, and strategy. For 
this study, 168 CEO Emails were obtained from Nortel, as listed in Table 11. The emails 
were obtained in two ways: 148 emails were received directly by the researcher, while 
employed at Nortel. The remaining 20 emails were received electronically, from a Nortel 
employee, after Nortel had declared bankruptcy protection and liquidated its major 
business units. The full list of emails, by title, CEO, and date, can be found in Appendix 
A. Sample emails (one per CEO) can be found in Appendix B. All emails were received 
in HTML format, converted to rich text, formatted for content analysis and labelled by 
date, type, author, and title. 
Table 11: CEO All-Employee Emails 
Author Period Emails Total Words (all emails) 
Frank Dunn May 2002 – March 2004 22 14701 
Bill Owens April 2004 – October 2005 26 12962 
Mike Zafirovski November 2005 – August 2009 109 69110 
Paviter Binning August 2009 – February 2010 11 3480 
 
 As part of the data collection, each CEO Email was read in chronological order to 
determine the nature of the content. The emails were categorized into three descriptive 
groups: strategy, organizational announcement, and non-market event (see Table 12). 
Strategy emails contained specific references to the firms strategy and performance, 
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while organizational announcements not only discussed leadership appointments and 
restructuring but also the strategic reasons behind the changes. Non-market event emails 
were related to major external events such as natural disasters and 911 memorial events. 
Even though the latter group of emails were not directly related to strategy, they 
described Nortel’s role in relation to the event (e.g. setting up telecommunication systems 
in the case of a natural disaster or the status of Nortel employees involved in the disaster), 
and therefore they were retained for the purpose of the narrative analysis. 
Table 12: CEO All-Employee Email Categories 
CEO Strategy  Organizational 
Announcement 
Non-Market Event 
Frank Dunn 19 2 1 
William Owens 17 2 7 
Mike Zafirovski 85 21 3 
Paviter Binning 10 1 0 
Total 131 26 11 
 
 Given that no research exists on CEO Emails and their role in strategy, a separate 
research project was undertaken to identify the uniqueness of the CEO Emails (in related 
to other narrative sources) and determine their validity for inclusion in the thesis. This 
research is included (in detail) in Appendix G. Using qualitative research methods, a 
textual analysis (using DICTION dictionaries) was performed on the emails to 
characterize tone, while a content analysis (using grounded coding) was used to 
characterize the macrostructure.  
 Findings of the research project suggest that the CEO Email can be considered a 
source of intraorganizational strategy narrative, whereby the CEO attempts to establish a 
77 
 
one-on-one discourse with every employee. Using rhetorical history, the Nortel CEOs 
defined, developed and confirmed organizational norms, values and beliefs, to shape 
employee behaviour, and reconstructed past events to legitimize executive decisions and 
actions.  
 The informal and personal nature of the CEO Email also allowed CEOs to 
develop their individual identity within the organization, in context to the organization’s 
identity. However, with the communicative purpose being to shape employee thinking 
and behaviour, the CEO Email retained a monological tone that reaffirmed the CEO’s 
role as the master architect of the firm’s strategy, even with attempts at levelling.  
 The CEO Emails were found to have a temporal awareness and concern for the 
past, present and future. The emails were high on realism and were activity-based, with 
an emphasis on present action.  They contained a tone of optimism and commonality and 
yet, although they were strategy narratives, were low on certainty. 
3.5.6  Supplemental CEO and Top Management Team Narratives 
  In addition to the 389 CEO documents, the data set also included 62 supplemental 
documents for triangulation purposes, as follows:  CEO and Top Management Team 
(TMT) analyst PowerPoint presentations, Annual General Meeting minutes and 
presentations, and internal (employee) strategy presentations presented during the annual 





Table 13: Supplemental Narratives from Top Management Team 
Strategy Presentations Dunn Owens Zafirovski Binning 
CEO PowerPoint presentations to 
analysts & employees 
  18 to analysts 
2 to employees 
 
Chairman all-employee emails  1 (R Wilson) 1(H Pearce)  
Annual General Meeting Minutes and 
PowerPoint presentations 
  3  
Top Management Team PowerPoint 
presentations to analysts & 
employees 
 2 to employees 23 to analyst 
12 to employees 
 
 
 In a recent study, Kaplan (2011) presents case study findings on the pervasive use 
of PowerPoint in organizational life, arguing that PowerPoint not only reflects strategy 
making but also is central to its development. “PowerPoint is not just a static piece of 
technology but rather that it exists as enacted in the organization. Analogously, strategy 
culture is not static either but exists through discursive practices that are mediated by 
PowerPoint-in-use” (Kaplan, 2011: 342). Kaplan’s (2011) findings support Vaara’s 
(2010) argument that “Strategy documents should not be treated as just any texts, but 
understood as powerful devices through which specific objectives, values and ideologies 
– and not others – are promoted and legitimated” (p. 699). Strategy documents (and in 
this case PowerPoint presentations) can provide further insight into the strategy narrative 
supported by the CEO at a given point in time. 
3.6 Step 2: Event History and Discourse Event History Database 
  To organize the narrative data and to begin the process of constructing the case 
history, a chronology of events was developed using both the event data and the narrative 
data. A combined event history (Van de Ven & Poole, 1990) and a discursive event 
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history (Maguire, 2004) database was created in an excel workbook for this purpose, by 
reading each of the documents individually. 
 Each document served as an entry into the database, using its publication date for 
reference. Every document was identified by its documented date, event date (sometimes 
different as documents were published after the event), source (e.g. SEDAR, Nortel, a 
media outlet), source (classification of the document, if application, such as “CEO 
Email”), author (for Nortel documents, the actual name was listed), title of the document 
(if provided), and the event itself. In addition, the Nortel stock price on the day in 
question was included.  
 In addition to the excel workbook format, a secondary event database was created 
within the software used for the narrative analysis, ATLAS.ti. ATLAS.ti
11
 is qualitative 
scientific software that provides the ability to analyse large quantities of qualitative data 
including text, graphics, audio, and video. It also provides the ability to manage the 
documents dynamically through user-defined categories and to map out relationships 
between texts through networking tools.   
 To use ATLAS.ti as both an event database and tool for qualitative analysis, the 
narrative documents were filed on computer (in PDF or rich text format) and labelled by 
date and type. The documents were then loaded into ATLAS.ti and numbered 
                                               
 
 
 11 ATLAS.ti version 6 was used to start the research. When version 7 was released, the project 
Hermeneutic Unit (data set) was upgraded to the new version. 
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chronologically by their published date. Reference to the event database from this point 
forward includes both the Excel workbook and the ATLAS.ti database. 
3.7 Step 3: Case History 
 Using the documents and the event database, a case history was developed of 
Nortel for the period from 2002 to 2010. The case study is an anchoring of events in time, 
with an additional anchor point of the CEOs, who (in this case) are the lead actors. 
Constructing the case narrative is an important step; it represents an ordering of events 
and stories to establish the context of the case (Langley, 1999). The case history became 
a primary source of study for Step 4, the characterization and analysis of Nortel’s 
organizational path. 
 To establish the case study context, a detailed longitudinal case history of Nortel, 
over the period under study, was first constructed from the raw data (Langley, 1999), 
using the event history database and the documents themselves. The data presented in the 
previous sections was read individually and the listing of events was reviewed in the 
database. An outline of major events was then created from the data and analysis using 
event identification techniques suggested by Van de Ven and Poole (1990), whereby 
individual incidents are analyzed over time and events are extracted. The list of events, 
by quarter, can be found in Appendix E. The case history is presented in Chapter 4. 
3.8 Step 4: Path Constitution Analysis  
 Before studying the role of CEO narratives in path dependence, the constitution of 
the organizational path had to be characterized and tested for strategic lock-in. As 
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explained previously, Sydow et al. (2012) recently proposed Path Constitution Analysis 
(PCA) as a means to this end. This step therefore applied PCA methodology to identify 
Nortel’s path and test for lock-in by investigating the six constitutive features.  
 As an initial step, visual mapping and temporal bracketing strategies were applied 
to the event database to begin identifying the constitutive features such as critical events 
and lock-in: first, visual mapping was used to show the events as they occurred over time; 
and, second, temporal bracketing was used to identify the potential phases of path 
dependence. As suggested by Langley (1999), “the decomposition of data into successive 
adjacent periods enables the explicit examination of how actions of one period lead to 
changes in the context that will affect action in subsequent periods” (p. 703).  
 Using the case study and the results from the temporal and visual mapping 
strategies, the PCA was undertaken. Each of the constitutive features listed in Table 2 
were analyzed, using the indicators (column three of the table) as a guide. Notably, the 
CEO narratives were included in some portions of this analysis, as a means to identify the 
constitutive features. For example, to determine level interrelatedness, both the CEO 
narratives and event documents were analyzed for references to groups of actors, the 
industry, financial markets, etc... As opposed to retrospective interviews, these narratives 
and documents offered an in-vivo account of Nortel’s levels of interaction (level 
interrelatedness and actors) and Nortel’s identification of significant events. The data 
from the CEO narratives was taken from the grounded coding of the narratives as 
explained in the following section and as listed in Appendix C. 
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3.9 Step 5: CEO Narrative Analysis 
 As in Step 4, this step was a precursor to analyzing the influence of narratives in 
path dependence, by understanding the narratives themselves (content and form) and the 
relationships that exists between different sources of narratives, different authors and 
over time. As proposed in the conceptual framework, it was suggested that if the 
intertextuality between the narratives was significant, the narratives would form an 
infrastructure that would influence the firm’s trajectory (as suggested in Figure 6). This 
step therefore involved an analysis of the intertextual relationships within and between 
the CEO narratives that spanned the 8-year period of the case, four CEOs, and five 
narrative sources (as described in step 1B) and a characterization of the resulting 
narrative infrastructure.   This step was approached in two phases: (1) an analysis of 
structural characteristics; and (2), an analysis of discursive themes. 
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Figure 6: Proposed CEO Narrative Infrastructure 
 
 Structural analysis of narratives and textual relationships. A structural analysis 
on each source of CEO narrative was performed to understand its form and relationship 
between different sources. The structural analysis was grounded in Genette’s (1997) 
approach and included: (1) a descriptive analysis, including peripheral aspects (i.e. 
paratextuality and architextuality); and, (2) evidence of narrative within other narrative, 
either direct or indirect (i.e. metatextuality and hypertextuality). 
 Content analysis of narratives and textual relationships. A content analysis was 
performed using a grounded coding method (Langley, 1999). In grounded coding, 
comparative analysis on a large number of small units of data (e.g. text) is performed to 
create descriptive categories. As it applies here, the grounded coding method (as with 






























































relationship between both the different sources of CEO narratives and over time/between 
CEOs. 
 The analysis was performed using the scientific software, ATLAS.ti. For the 
analysis, each of the 389 CEO documents was read within ATLAS.ti and the CEO quotes 
(only) were coded using the grounded coding techniques. The process of grounded 
coding produced over 200 first-order concepts (see Appendix C), which were then 
categorized into second-order themes (driven by theory). Both the concepts and themes 
were used to identify the textual relationships between the content of the narratives.  
3.10 Step 6: CEO Narratives in Organizational Path Dependence 
 The objective of the research project was to investigate the influence of CEO 
narratives in organizational path dependence. In this final step, the results of the path 
constitution analysis (step 4) and the CEO narrative analysis (step 5) were brought 
together to discuss findings and to address the questions raised in the conceptual 
framework. This step considered the dependent variable as organizational path 
dependence (and lock-in, in particular) and therefore investigated the influence of CEO 
narratives as an embedded unit of analysis on the creation of the path. This step also 
further investigated the influence of initial conditions, self-reinforcing processes, and 
triggering events in the organizational path dependence process. The major contributions 
of the thesis are discussed in this step.  
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3.11 Pilot Studies 
 Prior to undertaking the full research project, pilot studies were performed to 
investigate the validity of the case selection (i.e. Nortel) and, in particular, the utility of 
the data collected prior to proposal defense. Given the theoretical support for the use of 
public CEO narratives (as outlined previously), the pilot studies focused on the CEO 
Emails (although other CEO narratives were included). Three aspects of the research 
were investigated in three different studies: (1) the appropriateness of the CEO Emails as 
a source of narrative; (2) evidence of strategy narrative in the CEO narratives; and (3), 
evidence of intertextuality (between different sources of narratives and over time). Each 
of these three areas were tested separately and explained as follows. 
3.11.1 Pilot Study 1: CEO Emails as a Source of Narrative 
 To test the utility of these emails, the research idea was presented to a group of 
six researchers during HEC Montréal’s Strategic Discourse Days, held October 31, 2011, 
and November 1, 2011, one of them being Dr. Loizos Heracleous, from Warwick 
University, who does research in strategy discourse. An outline of the research project 
was provided to the group in advance (see Appendix D), and included three sample CEO 
Emails issued by Mike Zafirovski (February 6, 2006; June 16, 2008; and, September 17, 
2008). During the workshop, the researchers read the three emails and then provided their 
initial impressions, as follows. 
 One researcher noted that each text contained a wealth of data that could be 
studied from a number of different perspectives, suggesting that emails provided the 
opportunity for in-depth theorizing. A second researcher noted how the texts moved over 
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time from a polyphonic tone to a monological tone, citing how the CEO initially used 
pronouns such as “we” and “us” but changed over time to using references such as “me 
and my leadership team” and “you” or “the employees.” A third researcher focused on 
analytical methods, suggesting that, due to the length of the texts, it might be worth 
studying just the introductions and conclusions of the texts over time as a first step, to see 
how the narrative elements changed from the beginning of the CEO’s tenure to the end 
(this suggestion was followed). All researchers agreed that the scientific software, 
ATLAS.ti, was an appropriate software program for this type of study. 
3.11.2 Pilot Study 2: Evidence of Strategy Narrative in the CEO Emails 
 To determine if the CEO Emails contained strategy narratives and/or reflected 
corporate and external events, a small event database was created for the period from 
November 2005 to June 2006. Using corporate SEC documents, media articles, stock 
price, and financials, main events were extracted and recorded in a time series. These 
main events included changes in stock price, material reports (e.g. financials, executive 
changes), and industry events. Thirteen CEO Emails (from the same period) were then 
inserted, by date published, into the event database. Each email was then analyzed for 
evidence of the events that took place around the same period. Findings indicated that the 
CEO Emails contained not only strategy narrative but also reference to both corporate 
events (past, present, and future) and external events (industry and market). Notably, it 
became apparent that external events were appropriated by the CEO when they supported 
the strategy narrative but ignored or debated when they conflicted with the narrative. 
Findings also suggested that the emails both represented managerial discretion and 
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reduced managerial options, indicating a potential relationship with organizational path 
dependence. 
3.11.3 Pilot Study 3: Evidence of Intertextuality in the CEO Emails 
 Kuhn (2008) argues that texts are constructed within context and through other 
texts, and that texts are not only present in other texts, but also recontextualized through 
social processes and change over time. Intertextuality suggests that texts not only reflect 
organizational becoming but also can directly participate in path dependence. This test 
looked for evidence within the CEO Emails for intertextuality.  
 Findings indicated that certain elements of text were common across a number of 
types of text, and that some elements were unique to each. For example, when the 
corporation had a material change, the document filed with the SEC (8-K) was precise 
about the details of the change, and provided limited reference to future strategy. The 
press release related to the material change included only a portion of what was included 
in the official SEC filing, and excluded the financial data, significantly changing the 
context of the message. The related CEO Email was even more limited on the details of 
the material change yet provided a lengthy narrative on strategic imperatives. The 
underlying facts of each text were the same but the narratives differed significantly in 
tone and content.  
 In addition to comparing and contrasting types of text at a given point in time, 
texts were also compared over time, that is, a group of different types of text, published at 
the start of Zafirovski’s tenure (early 2006) were compared to the same grouping of texts 
published towards the end of his tenure (mid 2009). Notably, the variance in text between 
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types at the start of his tenure was greater than at the end. More specifically, the narrative 
in the CEO Emails more closely resembled messages to other stakeholders in both 
content and form, suggesting that the variance shifted over time due to significant events. 
This analysis suggested that the firm was moving through the path dependence process 
and that it reached a point of lock-in where the room to manoeuvre, even within 
narratives, had become limited. 
3.11.4 Pilot Study Conclusions 
 The pilot studies indicated that the initial research questions, along with the data 
itself, represented a viable research program. The studies also increased confidence in the 
data generally, as certain findings confirmed previous research in the area of shareholder 
letters and internal strategy discourse: Fiol (1995) found that managers internal 
communication was often similar to their external communication especially in terms of 
non-evaluative statements; D’Aveni and MacMillan (1990) found that Letters to 
Shareholders of failing firms deny crisis while focusing on short-term goals; and, 
Abrahamson and Park (1994) found that corporate officers may, at times, conceal 
negative organizational outcomes from shareholders.  
 Based on the findings of the pilot study, the research was undertaken, with two 
significant changes. First, the period of study was broadened from the tenure of one CEO 
to that of four CEOs. The pilot study suggested that the intertextuality that existed within 
one CEO’s tenure might also exist between CEOs. Therefore, additional data was 
pursued. The study period was extended to cover the period of April 2002 to March 2010.  
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 Second, the number of CEO narrative types was broadened. Originally, the data 
set did not include analyst calls. However, with the Fair Disclosure Rule (SEC, 2000), all 
analyst transcripts from April 2002 were found, providing an additional CEO narrative 
type for the study. 
3.12 Trustworthiness and Ethical Considerations 
 This research used a case methodology to investigate the research question, which 
raises concerns over credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability, 
discussed as follows. 
3.12.1 Author’s Experience 
 The author of this thesis was employed by Nortel from 1992 to 2009 in functions 
that included information technology, research and development, solutions design, 
communications and sales. The author’s responsibility levels increased over the period of 
employment, from professional to senior management. Throughout, the author had 
significant interaction with strategic decision makers and executive officers, including the 
CEO, Chief Information Officer, Chief Technology Officer, and certain presidents. 
Although this prolonged engagement (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) provided the author with 
an in-depth understanding of the organization’s culture and strategy, it also has the 
potential to influence the author’s analytical results. As a result, significant precautions 
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were undertaken to ensure that the analysis was grounded in proper research methods
12
, 
to include the extensive data set collected for and used in the project. 
3.12.2 Credibility 
 Credibility is obtained due to the large sample size of texts across both space and 
time. The sources of CEO narratives (389 texts) included five different types of texts, 
produced over eight years and by four CEOs. This set of texts was supplemented by an 
additional 2000+ documents, which were used as supplementary data. The analysis of the 
qualitative data was done with scientific qualitative software (ATLAS.ti) and 
theoretically supported by accepted qualitative research methods. In addition, quantitative 
data was used to support the qualitative findings and to extend the context of the case, 
specifically as it relates to the industry and competitive environment.  
3.12.3 Transferability 
 Although the Nortel case is, by definition, an extreme case (Yin, 2003), the 
longitudinal nature of the case enhances the transferability of results. Throughout the 
eight years, Nortel underwent different types of change, each of which could be 
applicable to other firms at different stages in their organizational paths. In addition, as 
                                               
 
 
 12 The author’s “minor” in the doctoral program is in research methods, which included courses in 
multivariate statistics, quantitative research methods, qualitative research methods and structural equation 
modelling. Many of the techniques from these courses were used in the analysis. 
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the thesis investigated not only the role of CEO narratives in organizational path 
dependence but also initial conditions, self-reinforcing processes and triggering events, 
these conceptual results could be both theoretically and practically applied to future 
research and practice, respectively. 
3.12.4 Dependability and Confirmability 
 The data set, event database, analytical software, and all analytical results have 
been kept on file electronically, on a local hard drive, DropBox, and a back-up hard 
drive. The emails are also available in hard copy. All data and analysis can be made 
available upon request. 
3.12.5 Ethical Considerations 
 With the exception of the CEO Emails, case data came from public sources. Most 
of the CEO Emails (148) were obtained by the author while employed with the firm. The 
remaining emails were provided by a Nortel employee upon request, when the firm was 
in bankruptcy protection. Since the emails were obtained, Nortel has announced its 
intention to liquidate all assets (Nortel 8-K, August 29, 2012) and therefore the CEO 
emails are considered public domain. However, for the protection of privacy, only 
extracts of the CEO Emails are used in the thesis and only four complete emails are 
provided as an example. Although the full set of emails is available upon request for the 
purpose of examination, it has not been made generally available. Additionally, the intent 
of this thesis is to understand the influence of CEO narratives in organizational path 
dependence; it is not intended to be an evaluation of CEO performance and therefore 
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CHAPTER 4.   Nortel Case History 
4.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, the case of Nortel is presented to establish context and prepare for 
the path constitution analysis (see Figure 7). This case history was constructed using the 
event history database and the content from the documents identified in the previous 
chapter, including industry, competitive and Nortel reports, along with Nortel’s securities 
filings. The CEO narratives included in the case history were added once the case 
analysis was complete, for illustrative purposes only. 
Figure 7: Case History (Step 3) 
 
4.2 Beginnings 
 The story of Nortel starts long before the dramatic collapse of the 
telecommunications industry in 2000, although the last decade of the corporation was 
arguably the most dramatic phase of Nortel’s history. Stock price is certainly not the only 
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indicator of success and failure, but Nortel’s drop from a high of CDN13 $124.50 in 
August of 2000 to less than CDN $2 in November 2002 was significant (see Figure 8). At 
its peak, Nortel carried more than one third of the Toronto Stock Exchange, with a 
market capitalization of almost CDN $400 billion. This dramatic decline generated an 
abundance of media attention throughout all of Canada and in the United States. At the 
centre of the narrative: the Nortel CEOs.  
Figure 8: Nortel Stock Price (Canadian Dollars) 
 
Source: Toronto Stock Exchange, TSX 
Note: Splits occurred on May 3, 2000 (2:1) and Dec 1, 2006 (1:10) 
                                               
 
 
 13 All dollar amounts are in US dollars, unless indicated otherwise. 
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4.3 Nortel History 
 The story of Nortel begins in 1885, when the company was first incorporated as 
Northern Electric and Manufacturing. Headquartered in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, the 
firm was largely responsible for building the equipment used in Canada’s cross-country 
telephone system and, in later years, led the digital and fibre optic revolutions within the 
global telecommunications industry. The company’s parent, the Bell Telephone 
Company of Canada (Bell), initially owned 93% of Northern Electric and was its biggest 
customer.  
 In 1914, the firm became incorporated as the Northern Electric Company, 
Limited, through a merger with Imperial Wire and Cable Company Limited. At that time, 
the company was 50% owned by Bell, 44% owned by Western Electric (a U.S. 
company), and 6% owned by others. Although it originally purchased technology from 
Western Electric, Northern Electric created its own R&D organization in 1958. 
Following, in 1962, Bell bought Western Electric’s 44% share and, two years later, 
created Northern Electric as a wholly owned subsidiary.  
 In 1969, Bell-Northern Research Limited (BNR) was created as a separate 
subsidiary, charged to focus exclusively on research and development for both Northern 
Electric and Bell, who shared equal ownership of BNR.  A few years later, Northern 
Electric was renamed to Northern Telecom Limited (Nortel) and began its international 
expansion in countries that included the United States, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong 
(China), the Netherlands, and Turkey. At the same time, Bell (and by extension Nortel 
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and BNR) went public, selling 9.9% of the company’s ownership in a 2.6 million stock 
offering at $15 per share. Nortel also increased its ownership of BNR from 49% to 70%.  
 In 1983, as the telecommunications industry deregulated, Bell Canada Enterprises 
(BCE) was formed, which acted as a parent company to both Bell and Nortel. During this 
period, Nortel amalgamated all of its wholly-owned subsidiaries   
 Throughout the last quarter of the 20
th
 century, Nortel continued to expand its 
manufacturing and sales operations around the world through acquisitions and joint 
ventures. By the early nineties, the company had grown significantly. Jean Monty, the 
CEO who took over in 1993 after Paul Stern, implemented a new organizational structure 
that brought together the four major product organizations (switching networks, 
multimedia communication systems, transmission and components, and wireless systems) 
and the North American sales teams into one of two operating units; Nortel North 
America. The second operating unit, Nortel World Trade, was responsible for all business 
operations (i.e. marketing, sales, and administration) for the rest of the world. While 
Monty pushed ahead with full internationalization of the company, he also sold off non-
core businesses, focusing on large opportunities with the carrier customers (i.e. 
telecommunication service providers). 
 In 1997, John Roth, an engineer from BNR, became CEO of the firm. From 1997 
to 2001, Roth led the acquisitions of more than 20 companies, with a total value of $45B. 
His largest purchase was that of Bay Networks, a Californian-based company that sold 
into the enterprise business market (a hole in Nortel’s portfolio), at a purchase price of 
$9.1B. With the acquisition, Nortel formally changed its name to Nortel Networks (to 
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recognize the new partnership). Soon after, BCE spun off Nortel, who acquired full 
ownership of BNR (and consequently integrated it into the organization). 
 In the late nineties, industry experts forecasted huge bandwidth requirements for 
the explosion of internet companies, and Nortel, as a global leading supplier of fibre optic 
equipment, was expected to benefit. In May 2000, the company’s common shares split 2 
for 1 and, by August 2000, the stock price had reached an all-time high of CDN $124.50 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange; its market capitalization was almost CDN $400B. By 
year-end, revenues were recorded at $30B – up from $22B in 1999 and $17.5B in 1998. 
  In 2001, however, the internet boom was circumvented by the dot.com bust. 
Bandwidth requirements dropped significantly; the internet was at overcapacity. With 
sales that never materialized, Nortel focused on streamlining operations by outsourcing 
most of its manufacturing business. The company restructured into three organizations 
(Metro and Enterprise Networks, Wireless Networks and Optical Long-Haul Networks) 
and dropped its workforce from 92,900 at the start of the year to 51,600 by year-end. It 
continued to operate, however, all over the world, with employees located in 276 sites 
(18,700 USA; 13,700 Canada; 13,700 Europe; 5,500 other).  
 By the end of 2001, Nortel’s stock price had lost more than 90% of its value and 
revenues were almost halved ($17.5B). John Roth had announced his intent to step down 





. Frank Dunn was appointed CEO, working in conjunction with John 
Roth and Chairman Red Wilson to form the Office of the Chief Executive. The company 
had a net cash position of $3.5B and $4B in outstanding long-term debt and over 100 
subsidiaries (wholly and partially owned). Although the company was only about half the 
size it was a year earlier, in people and in revenue, it continued to operate within the 
same product markets and geographies as before. 
4.4 The Telecommunications Industry at the Turn of the Century15 
 At the turn of the century, the telecommunications industry was experiencing 
rapid growth, with the year 2000 seeing the most rapid, at 28%. Mobile subscribers 
worldwide had reached 700 million, expected to reach over ½ billion by the end of the 
decade and to surpass fixed line telephony as early as 2004. Service revenue in 2000 was 
reaching $3T. As technological advances shifted focus from voice to data, and from fixed 
to wireless, investor enthusiasm grew. Dot.com companies promised the delivery of 
multimedia internet applications and consumer expectations soared. Service providers 
                                               
 
 
 14 Chandran had suffered from a stabbing during a robbery in his Singapore home in 1997 
 15 Data source for industry information is from The International Telecommunications Union 
(www.itu.int), a United Nations specialized agency for information and communication technologies. 




turned to the equipment manufacturers (e.g. Nortel) to upgrade and install new networks, 
as wireless communications required new equipment (e.g. GSM). Network infrastructure 
spending was more than $200B in year 2000. 
 As the industry grew, however, so did competition. Changes in regulation opened 
up incumbent territories worldwide. Operators began investing in foreign firms and the 
nature of competition became truly global. Consequently, service providers dropped their 
end-user prices and profits fell; investor confidence began to fall, leaving less money 
available for the investment in new networks.  
 While investor confidence was falling, requirements for capital investment had 
never been higher. The promise of the internet and mobile telecommunications demanded 
significant funding for both the spectrum licences and the 3G network itself. Service 
providers, successful at buying the highly expensive 3G licenses, were left with a huge 
debt burden, leaving some unable to purchase and install the network for which they 
purchased the licence. 
 Beyond the network and associated capital requirements, there were further 
complications, which could only be solved with more investment; interoperability with 
older networks and technology was necessary to continue providing seamless services 
and the applications themselves needed to be created and delivered. However, the 
applications did not materialize. With investor confidence lagging, paired with the 
complexity of the applications and technology, dot.com companies were unable to deliver 
on their business plans. Many went out of business. The telecommunications industry, 
because of this collision of high capital requirements, technology advancements and 
complexity, flattened. While service providers were seeking new investment to build 
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their 3G networks, shareholders were looking for consolidation of operations, reduction 
in operating margins and industry consolidation.  
 The providers of telecommunications equipment, such as Nortel, saw a significant 
drop in demand from their carrier customer base, and were left themselves with too much 
operational capacity. Their only choice was to reduce their own investments and wait for 
the carriers to start spending again. Some companies unable to cope with the sudden 
industry downturn went out of business, such as Global Crossing (a fibre optic cable 
company) and Iridium (a satellite company hoping to provide the world with internet 
access). Others that had a global installed base and a diversified portfolio of products 
were strategically positioned to manage through the downturn, assuming their financial 
and operational structure was effectively managed. (See Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 
11 for competitive positions). 






















Figure 10: Nortel and Competitor Change in Market Capitalization 
 
Figure 11: Nortel and Competitor Stock Price 
 
4.5 Frank Dunn: November 1, 2001, to April 28, 2004 
 Frank Dunn became Nortel’s CEO at a difficult time; the stock price had dropped 
by over 90% and year-end revenues for 2001 were down about 50%. Although Chief 
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COO’s sudden departure left a gap. After a six-month search, the Board appointed Frank 
Dunn as President and Chief Executive Officer. Dunn was 48.  
 Dunn joined Nortel Networks in 1976 as a graduate of McGill University 
(Montreal, Canada), with a bachelor degree in Commerce. He worked in a variety of 
operational roles within all of the business units and, just prior to his appointment as 
CEO, was the company’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO). When he was appointed 
President and CEO, the company created an Office of the CEO, which included Dunn, 
Roth, and the Chairman of the Board, Lynton Red Wilson. The office was dissolved in 
February 2002, when the Board of Directors decided that Dunn was capable of leading 
the company on his own. 
 One of Dunn’s first major responsibilities was the reporting of the 2001 results, 
which were significantly lower than the previous year. Dunn presented a conservative 
outlook, given the drop in customers’ capital spending, but firmly stated that return to 
profitability would occur towards the end of 2002. The market generally accepted his 
position, although raised concerns that customers’ low capital spending would continue 
to weigh heavily on the firm’s financial structure. 
 Soon after announcing the results, Dunn and his executive management team held 
an investor conference in New York City to provide the 2002 outlook. Just two days prior 
to the conference, CFO Terry Hungle resigned after being charged with trading outside of 
the authorized trading period. Entering into the conference, Dunn immediately took on 




 At the conference and in the months to follow, analysts questioned Nortel’s 
ability to return to profitability so quickly. Capital spending remained low for its 
customers and competition was driving down prices. Nortel’s product portfolio was also 
significantly diverse and the downsizing activities were only making it more difficult to 
meet customer demands. Moody lowered Nortel’s rating below investment grade and a 
class action lawsuit was filed again the company for material misrepresentation of the 
company’s investment plan. Dunn, however, was adamant about returning the company 
to profitability. In his update to employees on the second quarter outlook, Dunn said: 
Everything that we announced today has one goal in mind - 
making us profitable and doing so with urgency. We can't 
afford to stand still in this environment, and we are 
adjusting our business model where we need to with the 
goal of becoming profitable in the near term. (Dunn, CEO 
Email, May 29, 2002) 
 Throughout 2002, Dunn made a number of significant decisions to restructure the 
company’s balance sheet and its operations. He raised almost $4B in equity and aimed to 
make additional cuts it the workforce, moving from a target of 48,000 employees (from 
51,600 at start of year) to 35,000. Periodically throughout the year, he revised the 
financial outlook lower than guidance due to further slowdown in customer spending. 
When the share price dropped below $1, he considered a reverse stock split, with 
intention to present at the following year’s annual general meeting (AGM). 
 By year-end of 2002, Nortel had not achieved profitability. Although some of the 
restructuring was underway, its cost structure had not changed significantly and customer 
spending still had not returned to expected levels; revenues were down again from 
$17.5B in 2001 to $10.56B in 2002. Dunn had made downsizing decisions across the 
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company but he did not change his product market strategy, only reorganizing what was 
already there into four segments: wireless networks, wireless networks, enterprise 
networks, and optical networks. He also moved his projection of returning to profitability 
to June 2003, but remained optimistic about Nortel’s future: 
Despite the fact we're going through the worst slowdown in 
the industry's history, we are making significant progress, 
and you have my personal assurance we're going to be 
more aggressive in getting our story out. The constant 
second-guessing, wrong-headed speculation, and 
pessimistic assessments of people outside the company 
cannot continue to go unanswered. I've recently given a 
series of interviews making it clear we've bolstered the 
company's staying power and are executing a sound 
strategy to rebuild our foundation for the future. (Dunn, 
CEO Email, October 7, 2002) 
 As Nortel entered 2003, Dunn identified seven strategic objectives: return to 
profitability in the second quarter, technology leadership, customer engagement, 
rebuilding the brand, quality, energizing employees and collaboration for success. 
However, Dunn’s focus on profitability was the priority. In this opening year letter to 
employees he stated:  
As many of you know, I'm a football fan. So let me 
conclude by sharing a quote I like by the great Johnny 
Unitas, one of the best quarterbacks in professional football 
history. His Baltimore Colts won the 1958 NFL 
Championship over the New York Giants when he threw a 
no-margin-for-error touchdown pass in overtime. After the 
game, a journalist asked him why he threw such a risky 
pass when there was a good chance it could have been 
intercepted and returned for a touchdown. Demonstrating 
quiet confidence, Unitas replied: "When you know what 




I can assure you Nortel Networks knows what it's doing 
and we know where we're going. In the near term, we'll not 
get intercepted as we drive to profitability by the second 
quarter of 2003. Nor will we be intercepted on our long-
term drive to be an industry leader synonymous with the 
future of telecommunications. Let's all be energized and 
passionate about making 2003 a winning year for Nortel 
Networks! (Dunn, CEO Email, January 1, 2003) 
 By the end of the 2003’s first quarter, Nortel had achieved profitability, a full 
quarter ahead of schedule. Employees were rewarded with a return to profitability bonus. 
At the same time, Export Development Canada extended a CDN $750M facility 
agreement to Nortel and shareholders approved a 5:1 to 10:1 reverse stock split (which 
was never implemented). Aside from a small net loss in the second quarter, Nortel 
seemed to be heading towards recovery. Third quarter reported net earnings of $179M 
and year-end results were profitable, resulting in over $10M in bonuses to the executive 
management team. 
  In late 2003, however, Nortel entered into its first series of financial restatements, 
by announcing a plan to restate the years 2000, 2001, 2002 and the first half of 2003. 
Dunn reported that he expected a reduction in net losses and increase in shareholders’ 
equity and net assets, although he did not expect any impact to cash balances or future 
operations. From that point forward, the company experienced ongoing delays in the 
reporting of both the restated financials and the ongoing financial reports, repeatedly 
requesting extensions form Canada’s Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) and the 
United States’ Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). 
 Dunn entered 2004, however, with optimism. He continued to focus on 
downsizing and streamlining operations by initiating the outsourcing of all remaining 
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manufacturing activities to Flextronics. Dunn also focused the company’s strategy on 
taking an “offensive” position in services. He expressed confidence that Nortel was well 
positioned for the future. 
By achieving profitability for the year 2003, we are sending 
a clear signal that our business strategy is sound, we have 
grown market share in key categories, and we are again 
recognized globally as an industry innovator and thought 
leader. We offer a portfolio of technologies that I believe 
are second to none, and an ability to deploy a 
comprehensive suite of solutions across a complete set of 
market participants, be they enterprises, wireline or 
wireless service providers. (Dunn, CEO Email, January 29, 
2004) 
 Analysts, however, had mixed opinions. In early 2004, some began to upgrade 
Nortel’s stock and projected valuations of double or more within 12 months. Other 
analysts recommended hold or underperform on Nortel stock, citing questionable 
customer spending projections. Nortel was often compared to Lucent, who appeared 
unable to manage through the downturn. Nortel, on the other hand, had one of the highest 
growth margins in the industry, which caught the attention of the analyst community, 
although they were skeptical that it could be sustained. 
 Nortel’s February 2004 analyst conference continued to inspire analysts, who 
responded to Dunn’s movement from products to solutions. The still-flat carrier spending 
seemed a concern to all (Nortel and investors) but many seemed to believe that Nortel 
was well positioned to recover. With approximately $4B in cash and the same in debt, 
Nortel financials appeared strong, and their product portfolio seemed poised to serve the 
growing shift from voice to data, and wired to wireless telephony. The stock price began 
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to reflect the optimism, surpassing $10 for the first time in years (and the highest price 
the stock would ever reach from that period onwards). 
 Nortel ended the quarter, however, on a more solemn note. Doug Beatty, the 
CFO, and Michael Gollogly, the controller, were placed on paid leave by the Board of 
Directors, in light of their potential responsibility in the accounting issues. On April 28, 
2004, Dunn, Beatty, and Gollogly were all terminated for cause by the Chairman of the 
Board, while four other senior finance executives were placed on paid leave. Nortel 
delayed the Annual General Meeting (AGM) and announced that financials would be 
restated once again; net losses were expected to decrease in the early years, while net 
earnings were expected to become net losses in 2003.  Because of the restatements, the 
SEC issued a formal order of investigation in connection with previous financial 
restatement and the current need to restate. The OSC followed suit and ordered the 
temporary stop to all trading by directors, officers, and employees. The federal grand jury 
in the US subpoenaed documents from January 1
st
 onwards in relation to the ongoing 
criminal investigation related to the restatements and the RCMP undertook their own 
investigation. Twenty-seven class action complaints were filed in the US. 
4.6 William (Bill) Owens: April 27, 2004, to November 15, 2005 
 On April 28, 2004, the Chairman of the Board, Lynton Red Wilson, issued the 
following email to Nortel employees about Bill Owens’ appointment:  
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 Nortel Networks is well-positioned within our marketplace. 
Our solutions and product portfolio are superior. While 
challenging, it is important we make the decisions 
necessary to move the Company, its employees, customers 
and shareholders beyond this chapter.  
 
It can be expected that today's announcements will receive 
significant attention from the media and investor 
communities. Obviously, customers, suppliers and other 
industry members will also have questions. 
  
I want to reassure you that the Board of Directors of Nortel 
Networks, Bill Owens, and the other members of the senior 
management team take this broad attention and these 
questions seriously. We also recognize it is distracting and 
challenging to maintain focus on the business, but we must.  
While bringing closure to this chapter is ongoing, it is only 
one part of the Nortel Networks story. It is important that 
we do not allow it to overshadow our recognized 
technology leadership and business momentum.  
 
Nortel Networks remains strong. Our true focus remains on 
creating value for our customers and our shareholders. 
(Chairman’s Email, April 28th, 2004) 
 Bill Owens, a retired U.S. naval commander, joined the Board of Directors on 
February 28, 2002, at the age of 61. At the time, Owens was co-CEO (and Vice Chairman 
of the Board) of Teledesic, LLC, a satellite telecommunications private venture that was 
trying to bring broadband telecommunications to all parts of the world. Owens had 
previously worked at Science Applications International Corporation, an information 
technology company, as their Vice Chairman, President, and Chief Operating Officer. 
His military positions included Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Commander of the 6
th
  
Fleet, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defence, and Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. While he sat on the Board, Owens also was a director of British 
American Tobacco, Polycom, ViaSat, Microvision, Symantec, Metal Storm, and Telstra.  
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 On April 27, 2004, a day before Dunn’s firing was announced, Owens was 
appointed President and CEO of Nortel. Upon his appointment, Owens left his position at 
Teledesic and relocated to Nortel’s headquarters in Toronto, Ontario.  Owens’ terms of 
employment included a base salary of $1M and a target annual bonus of 170%. His 
contract also stipulated a monthly 5-year pension payment of $33,540. 
 As with Dunn, Owens became Nortel’s CEO at a difficult time. The restatements 
consumed the attention of the finance organization, which was charged to not only run 
the finance operations but also redo the finances for the previous years, work with 
external auditors, and partner with consultants to prevent future problems. In his opening 
letter to employees, Owens acknowledged the difficult situation but also discussed 
Nortel’s strengths (see Table 14).  
Table 14: Owens' First Email to Employees (April 29, 2004)  
As we read the many stories in the media, for me, today has been filled with a lot of reflection. I wanted to 
share with you my thoughts. I think that it's important to put a lot of perspective into the comments we're 
hearing and reading about ourselves today. Nortel has been a continuing strong player in our marketplace 
and we remain so today. I am very confident about our future. Our business is strong and I am excited 
about the momentum we are generating in the marketplace. As you know, we have announced a number of 
important contracts during the quarter, and I am looking forward to continued momentum in 2004. 
  
We WILL WEATHER the arduous process of getting through the accounting review, and we will deliver 
truly best of breed financial accountability. I promise you my every effort to restore trust, transparency and 
financial accountability in Nortel. We have a process in place that will get us through this complex 
situation as soon as it can be done, and I will be giving you ongoing updates. Beyond that, I look forward to 
working with you to grow the business and to continue to deliver the kinds of solutions and services our 
customers have come to expect from Nortel. 
  
I want you to know of my deep feeling that we will emerge from all of this a very strong company. It will 
take some time to re-establish our complete credibility, but there are certain truths. First and most 
importantly, we are blessed with a wonderful group of people -- strong, smart, and devoted to our company. 
Second, I want you to know how committed and confident I am in working with you to grow our business 
to an even stronger level. Third, while confidence has been shaken, I know we will work to restore it for 
our customers, our suppliers and our many shareholders. We will succeed and, one day in the not too 




Nortel is a truly great company. I'm very proud to be here with you. Let's put our arms around each other 
and stay focused on growing our business and taking care of our customers. And importantly, know that I 
and the senior leadership of this company care deeply about you, our most treasured asset.  
 




 Soon after Owens’ appointment, the remaining seven employees on leave were 
fired with cause. The class action lawsuits and the criminal investigations continued, with 
Dunn et al. being accused of manipulating financial reports. Proceedings began in the 
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) for damages related to the return to profitability 
program, which not only paid millions to executives but hundreds of millions to 
employees company-wide. Filings of both the restatements and current earnings were 
continually delayed and years 1999 and 2000 were added into the analysis. Nortel did not 
hold an AGM that year. 
 Throughout 2004, Owens focused on completing the financial restatements and 
fixing the corporation’s cost structure, which included further layoffs of 3200 employees. 
Previous guidance by the past executive management team on gross margins (too high) 
and operating expenses (too low) proved incorrect, and customer-spending growths were 
slower than expected. Nortel also seemed to be losing market position vis-à-vis its 
competitors and revenue forecasts were adjusted downwards. In an effort to be first in the 
Indian market, Nortel signed a contract with Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL), an 
Indian state-owned telecommunications company, for $500M, but at a loss. Customers, 
however, seemed loyal to Nortel; sales in the wireless and voice-over-IP markets 
appeared promising.  
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Importantly, our customers have been very loyal to us, and 
our business is solid. I have visited with most of our major 
customers. While they watch the progression of our 
restatement, they have the faith that we will handle it 
correctly, that we will be there for them for the long-term, 
and that we will continue to develop and support them with 
the quality products we've brought them for decades. 
(Owens, CEO Email, December 17, 2004) 
 As Nortel moved into 2005, the financial statement and restructuring activities 
dominated Owens’ time. The independent review filed their recommendations in an 
official report (i.e. as a material filing), which the Board adopted in its entirety. A new 
Ethics and Compliance Officer was hired and five Board members chose not to return. 
The executives that received the profitability bonuses offered to return them (but kept 
their restricted stock units) and Nortel launched a lawsuit against Dunn, Googly, and 
Beatty to retrieve their bonuses valued at over $10 million. Nortel held both its 2004 and 
2005 AGM at the same time. There was a change in the CFO and controller, once again. 
Although the financial restatement activity seemed to be behind them, Nortel still had 
significant restructuring expenses ahead.  
 In early March of 2005, Owens began making strategic moves – an area where 
both employees and industry felt Owens had neglected. He hired Gary Daichendt, an ex 
Cisco (Nortel competitor) as President and Chief Operating Officer, who in turn brought 
in his colleague, Gary Kunis (also from Cisco) as Chief Technology Officer. Owens also 
made a strategic acquisition of PEC Solutions, a government professional services firm 
that had access to lucrative U.S. federal government contracts. Soon after, Owens 
reiterated his earlier strategy of rebuilding corporate integrity, establishing an effective 
leadership team, managing cash, cost and revenue, and growing the business through 
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partnerships and acquisitions. Business strategies continued to focus on data solutions, 
wireless, and services. “Innovation is alive and well at Nortel, and we will continue to 
invest and lead in next-generation technologies” (Owens, CEO Email, May 4, 2005). 
 Owens enthusiasm was short lived. A month later, the two Cisco executives left 
Nortel abruptly. On Gary Daichendt’s departure, Owens’ stated, “Although I am 
disappointed with this outcome, it became increasingly obvious that our business views 
and management styles are different” (CEO Email, June 10, 2005), while the media 
suggested a conflict in corporate strategy. At the same time, Lynton Red Wilson stepped 
down as Chairman of the Board, replaced by Harry Pearce, who followed by giving the 
directors a pay increase. Investor confidence started to wane. 
 Nortel, however, made enough sales to satisfy the market and seemed poised to 
achieve their expected 10% growth rate for the year. In the fall, Owens restructured the 
organization to support his ongoing strategy of services, enterprise customers, innovation, 
and customer relationships (a strategy that deviated little from Dunn’s). The restructuring 
was, ultimately, Owens’ last major strategic initiative at Nortel. On November 15, 2005, 
Owens officially stepped down. On the analyst call in which his replacement was 
introduced, Owens stated:   
And, you know, it's a bittersweet time for me, of course, 
but I have been a part of the CEO succession process. I 
have done it openly, willingly with Harry Pearce and the 
Board, and I'm just very proud of the fact that we found 
Mike Zafirovski to come and be our CEO. So I feel good 
about it, and I think it is appropriate at this time.  
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There was no desire on my part to be a candidate. I realized 
this was time for the next phase, and I have been with the 
Board now watching the growth of the Company and 
realizing that we are ready for and the Company is stable 
enough to have truly a world-class CEO. And so the search 
for a world-class CEO included a wide variety of people. I 
was not on that list, and I did not intend to be on that list. 
And this is the right time for a new younger person who is 
going to be able to be with this Company for years to drive 
the Company forward.  
 
I was not asked to step down. This is something that we 
talked about as Mr. Pearce said right after the AGM, and it 
was a discussion about where is the Company, how does it 
feel about finding a successor? I was not asked to step 
down, and I feel like the Company is doing exactly the 
right thing at the right time, and I feel very good to have 
been a part of all of this. The stabilizing of the company 
and then turning it over to truly a world-class person. 
(Owens, Nortel Analyst Call, October 17, 2005) 
 When Owens left Nortel, he entered into a severance agreement that included 
lump sum payments of two years’ salary ($2M), 9 weeks accrued vacation, two times 
annual 170% bonus, prorata bonus payment for 2005, accelerated vesting of 2.9 million 
options, relocation costs, tax preparation services, and a 5-year guaranteed pension 
benefit ( $703,913 lump sum and monthly payments of $99,073). When Nortel entered 
into bankruptcy protection in January 2009, Owens filed a claim for his remaining 
pension payments of approximately $2M. 
4.7 Mike Zafirovski: November 15, 2005, to August 10, 2009 
 Mike Zafirovski, at the age of 51, assumed the role of President and CEO on 
November 15, 2005.  Zafirovski’s terms of employment included an annual salary of 
$1.2M, annual bonus between 150% and 300% of base salary, 5 million stock options, 
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restricted stock units of $7.5M, long-term incentive of 200% to 400% of salary, 
relocation costs, and a special lifetime annual pension benefit of $500,000 (after five 
years of employment). 
 Zafirovski emigrated from Macedonia to the U.S. in 1969, at the age of 15. He 
joined General Electric in 1975, where he stayed until 2000. During his last 13 years at 
GE, he worked as President and CEO in five of their businesses. In 2000, he left GE for 
Motorola, where he was President and COO from 2002 to February 2005. The media 
speculated that he left Motorola in 2005 because he was passed over for the position of 
Chief Executive Officer, although this was never substantiated by Zafirovski himself.  
 Owens chose to announce Zafirovski’s appointment through an analyst call held 
on October 17, 2005, the same day the news was released to the press. Together, the 
current and new CEO discussed Nortel’s progress and its future. Although his official 
start date was still a month away, Zafirovski used the call to present his strategic plan: 
complete the financial transformation; renew integrity; establish a strategic focus; work 
towards profitability; build innovation and R&D effectiveness; and, focus on processes 
and automation. In response to an analyst question regarding a COO position, Zafirovski 
stated: 
We do not plan to fill a COO position. My perspective has 
been now for 30 years it is virtually impossible to separate 
execution and strategy. And at least for the foreseeable 
number of years, if not decades, I would not think of us 
having a COO position. (Zafirovski, Analyst Call, October 
17, 2005) 
 On October 18, 2005, Motorola launched a lawsuit against Zafirovski and Nortel 
over breach of contract. They settled out of court, where Zafirovski had to repay $11.5M 
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of his severance package, all of which was reimbursed to Zafirovski by Nortel. During 
the same period, Nortel sold its Toronto headquarters for CDN $100M and relocated to a 
smaller facility in the area. Third quarter results were issued on time, presented by 
Owens, and the transition to Zafirovski on November 15, 2005, was well received. 
Analysts and the media were encouraged with Zafirovski’s background and immediate 
focus on corporate strategy. The restatements behind them, Nortel seemed (finally) on the 
road to recovery. Zafirovski moved into a Toronto apartment and worked out of the 
company’s headquarters throughout his tenure, while his family continued to live in 
Illinois.  
 On November 15, 2005, Zafirovski sent his first all-employee email (which he 
called “Zmails”) announcing a 45-day tour of the Nortel sites. During this period, he 
began to change his executive team, staring with the removal of Brian McFadden (Chief 
Research Officer), Sue Spradley (President of Global Services) and Pascal Debon 
(President of Wireless), all of whom reported to Frank Dunn. At the same time, he hired 
David Drinkwater, Chief Legal Officer, who worked for the OSC; Joel Hackney and Don 
McKenna from GE (his former employer); George Reidel, Chief Strategy Officer, from 
McKinsey; and, Dennis Carey, who worked for both Motorola and GE. Carey, in 
particular, was charged with focusing the corporate culture into three areas: integrity and 
accountability; effective leadership and decision-making; and, cross-company 
collaboration. 
 From his first analyst call, Zafirovski established a specific strategic vision. He 
used ideas from his former mentor, Jack Welch, to be either first or second in each 
business, with a target of at least 20% market share. He instituted quality and efficiency 
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programs (e.g. Six Sigma), restructured the R&D investment profile, and brought in 
McKinsey consulting to help. His focus was on creating a new leadership team and new 
leadership values, implementing a strategic planning process (adopted from GE), and a 
program called BIG: Business transformation, Integrity renewal, and Growth 
Imperatives. The business transformation program focused on pricing and sales 
effectiveness, direct materials, services, organization, general and administrative 
effectiveness, and R&D effectiveness.  In his 2005 year-end letter to employees, 
Zafirovski was candid about his own role. 
Last Friday night, as I was flying back from a very 
productive trip to Europe following several customer and 
employee visits, I came across a newspaper article entitled 
"Optimism Puts Rose-Colored Tint in Glasses of Top 
Execs." Included in the article were quotes like: 
• "99% of CEOs thought they could lead their 
companies from crisis;"  
• "Optimism is all about possibilities, change, 
hope…without those qualities, how can any leader 
succeed?;" and,  
• "By definition, leaders are slightly delusional."  
My first reaction was to take exception to the word 
"slightly" . . . . Seriously, the question of our confidence in 
ourselves-and as members of Team Nortel-is something I 
will begin discussing today and a topic I will continue to 
raise in the coming weeks and months. Confidence in 
ourselves and each other will be critical factors in how far 
and how fast we take this 110-year-old company. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, December 20, 2005) 
Zafirovski also acknowledged both the company’s attributes (see Table 15) and adopted 
an attitude of “forceful optimism... a belief and an attitude that I expect from everyone at 
Nortel – a combination of positive anticipation for the future combined with a determined 
approach to maximize positive impact” (Zafirovski, CEO Email, December 20, 2005). 
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Table 15: Nortel’s Attributes (Zafirovski, CEO Email, December 20, 2005) 
Positives Must Improve 
Strong innovation DNA Decision-making processes  
Customer partnering Lack of accountability 
Global footprint The over-complexity of our processes 
Employee talent/qualifications Quality of products/solutions  
Loyalty Lack of focus  
Brand No / low profitability (last 9 years) 
 
 In addition, Zafirovski quickly made changes in the corporation’s marketing 
strategy. He moved from Owens’ “This is the Way” campaign to “Business Made 
Simple”: 
We have the opportunity to make it as powerful externally, 
and as a catalyst for driving our cultural change as "Just Do 
It" and "We Bring Good Things To Life" were for their 
companies. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, February 6, 2006) 
 
In parallel, we will be introducing programs to significantly 
increase your engagement and involvement in running the 
business--as well as helping to eliminate the complexity 
and bureaucracy in our company. We will only reach our 
goals of Business Made Simple when we run our company 
in a simpler, more focused fashion. (Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, February 2, 2006) 
 Zafirovski’s beginning, however, was marked by further challenges. In February 
2006, Nortel settled the class action lawsuits filed against them for the accounting 
problems that plagued Dunn’s tenure. The settlement included a payment of $575M cash 
and an issuance of 14.5% of the firm’s equity. Although the cash payment represented 




The attention this settlement will get will no doubt be a 
temporary distraction as pundits and industry watchers may 
use it as an opportunity to re-tell the circumstances around 
the financial restatement and recent challenges facing the 
Company. It's important to recognize that the settlement is 
in relation to activities that are a part of our past, and a big 
part of moving forward is in closing this unfortunate 
chapter in our otherwise proud and distinguished history. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, February 8, 2006) 
 Soon after the settlement, Nortel announced that the company would have to 
restate results (for the third time) for 2003, 2004 and part of 2005, due to methodological 
issues with revenue recognition. The company delayed reporting of its 2005 results, 
which showed growth for the first time since 2000, but low profitability and shrinking 
cash reserves. They delayed the AGM and announced job cuts mid-year of 1000 
employees (a reduction 1900 and a hiring of 800 in lower cost locations). Employees 
received salary increases and partial bonuses; Zafirovski voluntarily reduced his special 
lifetime annual pension benefit by 29%, to $355,000. Midyear, the company issued $2B 
of senior notes and membership changes occurred within the Board of Directors. 
 Despite the setbacks, Zafirovski continued to promote his short-term priorities 
and established a long-term plan. He committed to $1.5B operating margin expansion and 
formally communicated his strategy (see Table 16). 
Table 16: Zafirovski's 6-Point Plan 
Zafirovski’s 6-Point Plan 
1. World-class management team, culture and processes. 
2. Focus on the balance sheet, governance and business/finance controls. 
3. Drive to world-class cost structure and quality levels that will take us to a mid-teens operating 
margin. 
4. Our targeting a minimum of 20% market share. 
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Zafirovski’s 6-Point Plan 
5. Investment for profitable growth. 
6. An increased emphasis on service and software solutions. 
 
 As part of his plan, Zafirovski brought in more executives including Lauren 
Flaherty, Chief Marketing Officer (from IBM), John Roese as Chief Technology Officer 
(an entrepreneur) to oversee not only the core R&D organization of 250 employees, but 
(eventually) all 12,000 R&D employees worldwide, Dietmar Wendt (from IBM) to lead 
the new Global Services organization, and Ellen Bavornick (from GE and Motorola) to 
preside over the corporate-wide Six Sigma program. He also promoted from within for 
regional positions in Europe and Asia.  
 Zafirovski, in an effort to reduce costs and focus on market opportunities, 
promoted the necessity of strategic partnerships and established an alliance with 
Microsoft, a move that encouraged analysts (although had minimal material impact). 
Re-creating a great company happens one step at a time, 
and today I am convinced we have taken a giant step 
forward in that direction. I am delighted to report that we 
have signed a landmark agreement with Microsoft to create 
the Innovative Communications Alliance. This clearly 
demonstrates Nortel’s commitment to charting a course for 
growth that combines our own industry-leading innovation 
with opportunities to work with other industry leaders to 
accelerate the creation and adoption of new technologies. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, July 18, 2006) 
 Zafirovski also established a strategic focus in three areas: mobility and 
convergence, enterprise transformation, and services and solutions. As a result, 
Zafirovski sold the company’s UMTS (wireless) business, sensing that Nortel could not 
achieve a leading market position or 20% market share – a decision that analysts 
120 
 
repeatedly questioned for more than a year after the sale was complete and one that 
Nortel appeared to have difficulty accounting for financially. In emails to employees, 
Zafirovski appeared confident.  
My interaction with the “outside” world -- investors, 
customers, and shareholders -- has made one thing 
perfectly clear: our plan and framework is right on target. It 
attacks fundamental issues like integrity, talent, financial 
health, quality and cost competitiveness; and it underlines 
the process we have to embrace for growth. (Zafirovski, 
CEO Email, September 20, 2006) 
 Towards the end of 2006, employee satisfaction seemed to be improving, “The 
good news is that 20% more of you agreed that ‘you currently feel satisfied as an 
employee’ compared to 6 months ago” (Zafirovski, CEO Email, November 13, 2006). 
Zafirovski’s executive management team was in place, the company’s strategy was 
formalized, revenue was increasing, a number of strategic partnerships were signed, and 
manufacturing efficiencies had been gained. However, Nortel was still spending more 
than it was earning; shareholder value had not been realized. The November investor 
conference confirmed Zafirovski’s concerns: 
Across the board, they were particularly impressed with our 
progress on Business Transformation; it bolstered their 
confidence that the turnaround at Nortel is in full swing. 
And while we outlined a strong story on the plans and 
processes we will follow to invest for growth, we have to 
demonstrate that we can execute on those plans fully to 
earn their confidence. The bottom line is that it’s the 
combination of our transformation progress and our ability 
to generate growth that will answer their questions about 
our ability to generate sustainable profit (Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, November 17, 2006) 
In his year-end letter to employees, Zafirovski’s emails suggested concern: 
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[We] still face a challenging future if we – each and every 
one of us – don’t make some critical changes and execute 
on our plans. Our cost structure is still too heavy, our 
processes are still complicated, and although improved, our 
quality and our ability to meet delivery schedules and plans 
of record must achieve higher levels of performance. Yes, 
our processes (Business Transformation, Lean Six Sigma, 
TTM and Own It!) are in full swing, with lots of promising 
traction. But – and I told the investment community AND 
customers this too – we must bring an even stronger focus 
and level of urgency and effectiveness in getting results in 
these critical-to-success areas. It is really in our hands. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, December 19, 2006) 
 Zafirovski’s second year as CEO was just as challenging as the first. In Dec 2006, 
the company chose to consolidate its shares with a 10:1 ratio, reducing the number of 
outstanding shares from 4.3 billion to 433 million. Two executives left the company 
without explanation: Susan Shephard, the Chief Ethics officer, and Peter Currie, the CFO, 
who was replaced by David Drinkwater (the Chief Legal Officer). Nortel announced that 
they would restate results for a fourth time, for the years 2004, 2005, and 2006, and delay 
2006 year-end reporting. The Code of Business Conduct was reissued and a new business 
transformation plan led to a further reduction of 2900 positions (and a relocation of 1000 
more). Deloitte, the firm’s auditor, withdrew their audit reports from earlier years and 
Nortel announced a $1B senior notes offering, required to refinance a portion of the 
existing $1.8B convertible notes due in September 2008. Nortel also settled a CDN $35M 
civil penalty for OSC violations related to the financial restatements. 
 Soon after the employee reductions and the issue of the new code of conduct, 
Hackney, one of Zafirovski’s first executive hires and eventual President of Enterprise, 
was charged with assaulting a young woman in a Raleigh, North Carolina (USA) parking 
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lot, over a parking space. In response to queries from employees and the media in regards 
to the company’s code of conduct, Zafirovski issued the following to employees: 
Joel is a leader with an important mandate who will need to 
continue to challenge his team to perform at world-class 
levels while exemplifying our leadership and core values. 
His track record includes very strong results and his 
leadership capability has been validated by employee 
assessments (as recent as December 2006), which included 
feedback from all of his direct reports. That said, I know 
Joel is taking this incident very seriously and will use it to 
work to become an even better leader.  
 
I am absolutely confident of Joel's ability to execute our 
business objectives, and he has given me his full assurance 
that he will hold to the highest ethical and professional 
standards expected of a Nortel leader. (Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, February 28, 2007) 
 On March 12, 2007, the SEC charged Frank Dunn (and three others) for 
accounting fraud. The RCMP followed suit on June 19, 2008, with similar charges
16
. 
Employee satisfaction suffered; results from the winter survey suggested that employees 
were skeptical about Nortel’s turn-around. Zafirovski responded as follows: 
So let me be clear. My executive team and I are not the 
ones who will ensure a bright future for Nortel alone. Each 
and every one of you has a part to play. Each and every one 
of you is part of team Nortel. We need you in the game. 
100%. Without reservation. The sum of all of your efforts, 
if channeled with the right attitude in the right places, can 
make an incredibly powerful difference.  
                                               
 
 




This is one of those moments of truth. When each and 
every one of you needs to look in the mirror and ask the 
following question: do I believe in Nortel and am I willing 
to get in the game? If the answer is yes - then jump in. Take 
that extra step. Do that extra task. Run that project just a 
little tighter. And you will see the momentum build all 
around you. More importantly, you will see a change in 
your own career progression. Because nothing unlocks 
potential like commitment and dedication. (Zafirovski, 
CEO Email, May 4, 2007) 
 Despite the setbacks, 2007 hinted at recovery. Revenues, gross margin, and 
operating margin were up, and cash flow was positive for the first time since 1998. 
Paviter Binning was brought in as the new CFO (the 8
th
 CFO in less than five years) and 
Zafirovski stuck to his 6-point plan. He continued to shift R&D investment into the 
Enterprise and Services business, and worked towards cultivating a “must do” attitude. 
He was elected to the national security telecommunications advisory committee by US 
President George Bush. Third quarter results for 2007 indicated that Nortel’s gross 
margins were better than industry, pushing the stock up 16%. On Analyst Day, when 
Zafirovski’s entire management team presented the corporate strategy to investors, the 




Our future success no longer depends on regulators or 
courts. It depends on us -- on our ability to accelerate this 
year's progress into 2008 and make us a smarter, stronger 
and better performing company. A company that can 
reclaim its rightful leadership position in the market. I 
won't mince words: 2008 will be a highly competitive year. 
There is still a lot of work to be done. But with forceful 
optimism, confidence and passion, we will make the right 
decisions, the tough choices and the bold moves. There is 
no team in the industry that I'd rather have by my side than 
you! And I know we can do it (CEO Email, December 20, 
2007, italics in original) 
 The year 2008 started much like the previous year, with further reductions. In the 
reporting of its 2007 results, Zafirovski announced that 3100 employees would be laid 
off, while 1000 employees would be hired in lower cost areas. The restructuring would 
initially cost the company $250M, with benefits realized about a year later. “I am certain 
that the media headlines that will appear during the course of the day will not be kind. 
We knew this going in, and we moved forward knowing that these decisions are 
necessary to affect a turnaround that is real, and that will last” (Zafirovski, CEO Email, 
February 27, 2008). 
 The first half of 2008 continued to suggest improvements. A strategic alliance for 
WiMax with Alvarion was initiated, Nortel won a contract for the London 2012 Olympic 
and Paralympic Games, quarterly results showed growth in revenue and margins, and the 
analyst day conference in June ended with upward movement in stock price. Although 
analysts continued to question growth potential given the global economic situation, they 
recommended to either hold or buy the stock and the S&P listed Nortel as a B stock for 
long term issuer rating. All the while, Zafirovski continued to emphasize urgency. He 
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issued six employees emails during this period, all closing with a call to action (see Table 
17).  
Table 17: Closing Paragraphs, Zafirovski’s CEO Emails 
Email date/title Closing Paragraph 
February 4, 2008: 
Accelerate to win 
Together, we can re-create this great company. We have a shared desire to 
succeed that drives us forward. We also have momentum. We have a strategy 
that resonates with our customers. And, we have a leadership team that will go 
the distance. I'm telling you, because I also know, it won't be easy. To get to the 
next level, we have to accelerate. You have my full commitment on this journey 
and, rest assured, I will accelerate the actions necessary to make Nortel a 
winner. I need you all to be the best you can be. I'm counting on you. Our 
customers are counting on us. Let's go make it happen! 
February 27, 2008: 
A Year of Tough 
Challenges...and 
Huge Opportunity 
Make no mistake, there is a tremendous amount of work ahead of us. But our 
ultimate goal remains the same: to build a great company, with great people who 
strive, achieve and grow as part of a winning enterprise. I have great confidence 
in our ability to succeed. 
March 26, 2008: 
State of the 
Business and The 
Road Ahead 
We are already achieving what many doubters out there said was impossible. 
Every day we are improving and rebuilding our company and our prospects for 
the future. We are working very hard, we are determined and committed - and, 
we are really making change happen. Not just strategically, but in everything we 
do. We are making some bold and courageous moves to redefine Nortel and the 
future of communications. We’ve reached the middle of our transformation and 
we all know we’re not done yet. Finishing the journey won’t be easy. Far from 
it. But, if anyone can do it, we can -- and we will.  
May 5, 2008: 
Making 2008 a 
Breakout Year 
With the fundamentals starting to come into place we must ready and push 
ourselves with urgency. Together, we can make 2008 the breakout year for this 
company. We have all put much into this journey, and now we are catching 
glimpses of what will come if we keep working at it. This is not the time to let 
up, but to stand up, be counted and work together to go the rest of the way. 
June 16, 2008:    
The Power of 
Momentum 
You are this company, and your impact is the only thing that is going to take us to 
the next level. I believe we are on the right path - our strategy is resonating with 
our customers - but the execution is up to all of us. If we deliver, we will 
succeed. I am proud of this team, and I thank you for your hard work to get us 
this far. Let's dig down and find what it takes to go the distance. I know we can 
do it.  
August 1, 2008: 
Driving Growth 
and Profitability 
If we stay true to these values, we will transform with purpose, we will grow and 
we will succeed. As we discussed at the June analyst meeting, I am very excited 
about moving our transformation to the growth stage. Great companies grow or 
perish. The most successful organizations are those that have a strong sense of 
who they are, what they value and how they bring it to the world. Nortel is no 
different. Even during the toughest of times, by pulling together, we can be part 




 On August 1, 2008, Zafirovski announced the 2
nd
 quarter results to the analyst 
community, about six weeks prior to the global economic downturn. In his closing 
summary of the presentation portion, the CEO stated: 
Let me just finish this page with this unrelenting focus to 
continue to drive achieving our 2008 objectives. Again 
operating margin improvement ahead of the market. To 
build the customer and market momentum in the areas 
where we are making the investments in growth, which we 
know we are going to have to achieve, to be able to not 
only finish 2008 strong, but build a foundation for 2009. 
We are just starting to move from the transformation stage, 
to one where we are growing the business. We understand 
our markets, we understand the industry, we know the 
headwinds facing us and the industry, but also I want to 
highlight that we feel confident, by the management 
demanding following standards, and we are projecting to 
do this right. (Zafirovski, Analyst Call, August 12, 2008) 
 In the question and answer period, Vivek Arya, from Merrill Lynch, questioned 
Zafirovski’s outlook: 
Mike, my question is the same I asked in the last call. Do 
you think Nortel has the right strategy for growing in 2009, 
or do you need to make drastic changes right now in 2008 
to make sure that things don't get worse next year? Gross 
margins seem to have peaked, new orders are slowing 
significantly. Operating expenses are not really coming 
down. Even though it seems you can do okay in the second 
half '08 because of your deferred revenues, I am still 
struggling to see what the five month plus strategy is, 
especially if the macroeconomy does not improve? (Nortel 
Analyst Call, August 12, 2008) 
 On September 17, 2008, Nortel provided a preliminary view of the third quarter 
and revised its outlook for the 2008 fiscal year. Zafirovski announced to the press (news 
release), the analysts (analyst call) and employees (CEO Email) that the company was 
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facing considerable challenges due to poor global economic conditions (and low 
customer spending) and would therefore undertake “a comprehensive review of our 
business and steps to reduce Nortel’s overall cost base” (Zafirovski, CEO Email, 
September 17, 2008). He also announced that Nortel would divest its Metro Ethernet 
Networks business unit, considered by some analysts and media to be the company’s core 
asset.  
 Nortel’s situation became clearer in November, when Zafirovski announced the 
need to deliver an annual savings of $400M by the end of 2008.  
As I told you when we last spoke, the credit crunch has 
serious implications for Nortel and how we need to behave 
in this environment. We must preserve and/or generate as 
much cash as we can to give ourselves options. If we do not 
manage this part of our business, well, the future will be 
bleak. It's that simple. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, November 
11, 2008) 
 Zafirovski restructured the corporation into three distinct self-sufficient business 
units and announced 1300 layoffs, with 25% to be completed by year-end through 
voluntary severance packages. Corporate functions were significantly reduced and six 
members of the executive management team were to leave by year-end, including four 
corporate officers (legal, technology, marketing, and compliance) and two presidents.  
 By the end of 2008, Nortel had 30,000 employees (down from 90,000 in 2002). 
Moody Investor’s Service downgraded the Nortel family rating from B3 to Caa2. 
Analysts raised concerns that Nortel lacked cash to fund operations in 2009, and that the 
sale of the Metro Ethernet Networks business would be difficult given the economic 
circumstances. However, not all analysts were ready to sell off the stock; of the 20 
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recommendations from Bloomberg, only nine analysts recommended selling, and price 
targets ranged from about $6 to $8.  
 Mark Sue, an analyst with RBC Capital Markets (New York), however, rated the 
stock at underperform and set the target price to $0, arguing that unless Nortel could 
successfully sell the Metro Ethernet Networks business (at the price they originally 
valued), the company would run out of cash; Nortel would be unable to cover the interest 
carrying costs on their $4B of unsecured public debt and the pension plan liabilities. The 
Wall Street Journal followed, reporting that Nortel sought legal counsel to explore 
protection from creditors, although Nortel argued that “No bankruptcy filing is 
imminent” (Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2008). 
 On January 14, 2009, suspicions were confirmed; Zafirovski announced that 
Nortel’s Canadian and US subsidiaries had filed for bankruptcy protection (see Table 18). 
With about $2.5B in assets and $4.5B in outstanding debt, Nortel decided to restructure 
under protection from creditors. 
Table 18: Zafirovski’s Email on Bankruptcy Protection (January 14, 2009) 
This morning, we announced that Nortel is undertaking a comprehensive business and financial 
restructuring. To accomplish this, Nortel has made court filings for creditor protection.  
I know this is incredibly tough news to hear, but I believe this process will enable Nortel to become a more 
focused, financially sound and competitive company. Make no mistake, the coming days and weeks will 
not be easy. But together, we will get through it. Later today I will speak with you in person, explain this 
decision in more detail and answer your questions. Please join me. Click here to presubmit questions. 
 
Most importantly, during this restructuring process, we must reach out to customers and explain what is 
taking place, and why. I want to personally assure them that Nortel is here to serve them and is dedicated to 
our relationship with them. Our sales teams are on the front lines, but in this environment, we must all be 
ambassadors for Nortel.  
 
Despite the need to do this, and my firm belief that it will allow us to strengthen our financial footing, this 
was an incredibly difficult decision for us to make. It will impact jobs and some of Nortel's prior 
obligations. I can assure you we explored every possible alternative and engaged in extensive consultation 
with our Board of Directors and advisors. High debt levels, a high cost structure, and certain historic costs 
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(some going back to when we had three times as many employees) - compounded by the current economic 
crisis - significantly reduced our options. 
 
Just seven months ago, at our June 2008 investor conference, we summarized that the external market 
expectations for most of our growth segments were in the 10% range for the next 3 years. We believed that 
we had the solutions, momentum and improving cost structure to do well in that environment. You know 
the changes in the external environment since then, from financial and capital markets to decreasing 
visibility and forecasts for our industry. Faced with an unclear view of 2009 - where most current 
predictions are for industry revenue declines of at least 10% (a net decline of over 20% from just two 
quarters ago) - we needed to act now while we have sufficient cash to fund our ongoing operations.  
 
Let me briefly outline the way forward. While day-to-day operations will be ongoing, the filing process 
will unfold in phases. We have completed the prefiling and planning phase and have started what is known 
as a "stabilization" phase. This period is focused on getting customers, suppliers and employees on board 
with how we will operate under protection and in line with how we will move forward. Following that, we 
will formulate a plan that will go in front of creditors for approval. Once the plan is accepted, we will begin 
its implementation.  
 
I assure you, I am eager to communicate openly and frequently to ensure you are well-informed about the 
milestones that we will pass over the next while. We have built a communications site for employees. We 
have also built an external site for customers, partners and other stakeholders to ensure transparent 
communications with the broad network of individuals and companies that do business with us and that 
rely on Nortel. These sites will be updated regularly with new information as this process unfolds. 
 
The management team and I are committed to the future and passionate about helping Nortel emerge from 
this process stronger, better and more focused. Acting decisively, preserving the business and delivering the 
best results possible will be critical to our future. It is important to know that the more successful we are in 
preserving our business, the greater the opportunity to preserve employment and optimize value for all 
stakeholders.  
 
As employees in these times, we must all continue doing our daily work with intensity and dedication. Our 
ultimate success depends on executing the comprehensive business and financial restructuring plan, 
however difficult, and moving this company forward. 
  
I am proud of the work we do at Nortel. I've seen your deep determination and resolve to help this company 
succeed. You have stepped up time and again. The most recent examples are your strong efforts in closing 
the fourth quarter, including a strong performance in meeting customer deliveries. Thank you!  
 
I recognize that delivering at such a high level for such a long time has been difficult. I understand that it 
has taken a toll on you and your families and that you are worried about this announcement. Yet, every 
time we have faced adversity, I have been inspired by your strength and will to carry on. It is clear that you 
care about what happens to Nortel. To emerge successfully from this, we must reach inside and find that 
same drive and dedication. We must also reach out and support each other. At the end of the day, we must 
all feel the reward - a stronger and better Nortel - will be worth the effort.  
 
I know you are committed to continuing this journey and to building the kind of company of which we can 
all be proud. We now need to work together and write a new chapter for Nortel. You have my commitment 
on this journey. 
 





 The New York Stock Exchange delisted the Nortel stock and the CEO limited 
news releases to the extent the law allowed. Although quarterly and annual results 
continued, Nortel did not publish an annual shareholders letter or hold an AGM. Material 
filings were limited to three categories: financial reporting, asset sales, and changes in 
executive management. Severance packages committed to in late 2008 were cancelled; 
the pension plan was underfunded, and a series of employee layoffs ensued. Severance 
and pension benefits became unsecured claims, while the large bondholders attempted to 
take over the firm; Zafirovski attributed decisions to the company’s financial advisors 
and suggested that withholding such claims would be detrimental.  
But in the end, it came down to a simple, but extremely 
difficult decision. Do we pay severance and risk our 
financial footing further - putting the company at risk - or 
do we forgo severance and arm ourselves so that we may 
continue the fight and save this company? (Zafirovski, 
CEO Email, January 30, 2009) 
 Zafirovski’s arguments to stakeholders suggested that Nortel’s restructuring was 
temporary and that a new Nortel would emerge.  To incentivize employees, he paid out 
quarterly bonuses for anyone who worked 45 days in the quarter. Payments were based 
on revenue, cash, and customer-oriented operational metrics of lead-time, outage 
recovery, and service responsiveness. He withdrew plans to sell the Metro Ethernet 
Business, continued to work towards reducing costs and, with this executive and sales 
teams, spoke with customers in an effort to restore confidence. At the same time, 
however, he decentralized the four major businesses and centralized administrative 
functions. By mid-year, the first of many sales agreements was initiated; the liquidation 
of assets had begun. 
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On May 11, we said we were working to maximize the 
value of the company, while preserving our innovation 
platforms and employment to the greatest extent possible. 
We also said that we had been in discussions with external 
parties around a number of our businesses. I am pleased to 
announce that these discussions have progressed and that 
today we entered into a "stalking horse" sale agreement for 
our CDMA business and LTE Access assets with Nokia 
Siemens Networks for US$650 million are advancing in 
discussions with external parties to sell our other 
businesses. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, June 19, 2009) 
 By July of 2009, the Toronto Stock Exchange had delisted the Nortel shares (at 
CDN 18.5 cents) and Zafirovski continued to sell off pieces of the company. Nortel 
entered into a sales agreement with Avaya, for the Enterprise business, and Ericson 
successfully won the auction of the CDMA and LTE assets for almost twice the original 
bid (US$1.13B).  
 On August 10, 2009, Mike Zafirovski stepped down as Nortel’s last CEO and 
issued his last email to employees (see Table 19). As per the terms of his agreement, he 
was entitled to a lump sum payment of two full years of salary, two times the annual 
bonus and pro-rata bonus payment, immediate vesting of options and restricted stock 
units, and his pension. In September 2009, he filed a claim against Nortel for $12M.  
Table 19: Zafirovski’s Last Email to Employees (August 9, 2009) 
Team Nortel: 
 
This will be my last Zmail to you, and let me say upfront how much I have appreciated working with you 
and valued your tenacity, professionalism and dedication. As we announced today and as I discuss in my 
video to you, we have reached a natural transition point in the company - both I and the majority of the 
Board of Directors will be stepping down as of today. 
 
With the recent sale agreements for our CDMA and LTE Access assets; the stalking horse sale agreement 
around our Enterprise business; the promising discussions we are having around our other businesses - we 




The tremendous work you have done to stabilize our business since our filing on January 14 and your 
continued efforts to keep the company running well have been truly remarkable. Unlike most companies in 
our situation - we not only continued to win new business, but we were able to reach multi-year highs 
during the first half of this year in our ability to serve customers and perform under the tough conditions of 
creditor protection and a very weak global economy. 
 
The Q2 results which we also announced today - the combination of improving revenues, margins and cash 
compared with Q1, as well as continued strong customer service - are good proof of it. 
 
Our journey together has been paved with both challenges and successes. Over the past few years, we have 
much to be proud of. We laid to rest the material weaknesses in our business and put an end to accounting 
issues that had been so draining on the company’s resources for so long. We improved our quality and 
productivity levels. We also went a long way along a path to re-imagine this company and shift its 
economic center from legacy to growth investments. Your ability to innovate and apply those innovations 
to solve our customers’ business problems remains unparalleled in this industry. From fourth-generation 
mobile broadband to 40Gig/100Gig to Unified Communications to VoIP applications - you have 
demonstrated to the world that Nortel ingenuity can go a long way. 
 
Together, with your colleagues, you have created significant value - value that does not go away even as 
our businesses will be incorporated into other industry players. That value has been made real in the intense 
competition to win access to our technologies and the people behind them. Our acquirers see the value your 
expertise and know-how can bring to their own visions to transform the industry and the world. The Nortel 
name may go away, but the breadth and depth that many of you will carry forward under new banners will 
not. 
 
Within my mandate to maximize the value of the company for our stakeholders - my greatest efforts have 
been spent trying to ensure that we preserve the innovations you have created and employment to the 
greatest extent possible. Certainly, with the sale to Ericsson and the safe landing of at least 80 percent of 
Nortel’s wireless employees there, I am pleased to say there has been a return on that effort. 
 
Most importantly, I want you to know that I have never been more proud to have been associated with a 
group of people as I have with the people of this company. Even as the global economy faltered - you did 
not. Through the uncertainty of past many months and difficult goodbyes to long-time colleagues, you 
stayed focused and got the job done. You did the right thing - for each other and for Nortel. The power and 
pride that flows from those accomplishments will be with you forever. 
 
I am profoundly humbled by your passion and commitment. Like you, I wish things had gone differently. 
But, I can assure you that since my first day with Nortel, including since filing for creditor protection, I 
took my obligations very seriously to press on and ensure I did my best to protect the value you had worked 
so hard to create. 
 
There is still much work to be done. Continuing to operate and working to sell our remaining businesses is 
key to ensuring we find homes for as many employees as possible with new players. We must not and 
cannot let up on serving our customers through the integration process. The more seamless our transition to 
our acquirers, the more successful it will be for everyone. I ask that you do everything you can in the weeks 
and months ahead to ensure Nortel’s legacy is a robust and vibrant one. In the video accompanying this 
Zmail, as well as in the other organization announcements being issued today, you will see the new and 
expanded leadership roles for Pavi Binning, as well as for George Riedel, Joe Flanagan and John Doolittle. 
These are very important and deserved moves, and my last request to you is that you support them with 
your best efforts and dedication. I know you will. 
 
My final words to you are simply this: thank you. I will be thanking our customers who stuck with us 
through this tough time. I will be thanking our suppliers who did everything they could to ensure we could 
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continue serving our customers. I have thanked our Board of Directors who worked tirelessly to bring good 
guidance and governance and ethics back to Nortel. 
 
And, most of all, I want to thank you - the Nortel’s employees - for all you have done and continue to do 
for Nortel. You are a most important group of people, and it has been a privilege to have worked with you. 
 
Thank you, and I wish you well. 
 
Mike 
4.8 Paviter Binning: August 10, 2009, to March 21, 2010 
 On August 10, 2009, when Mike Zafirovski stepped down, Nortel chose not to 
replace the CEO position. Instead, the Board of Directors (and the court appointed 
monitor) assigned Paviter Binning, Nortel’s CFO, as Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO). 
Binning was one of four executives responsible to the Board of Directors, the monitor, 
and the proposed U.S. Principal Officer. He had accountability for all four of Nortel’s 
business units. The three other executives included George Riedel (corporate strategy), 
Joe Flanagan (Nortel Business Services), and John Doolittle (restructuring activities).  
 Binning joined Nortel in November 2007, at the age of 47, as Executive Vice 
President and CFO. He came to Nortel with a 25-year finance background, including the 
role of CFO at Marconi Corporation PLC, and finance positions at Diageo PLC and 
Hanson PLC. His terms of employment included a salary of CDN $683K, CDN $1.35M 
restricted stock units, annual bonus of up to 100% of base salary, and long-term 
incentives of CDN $2.3M. Separation terms included 18 months of base salary, 36 
months of benefits, and vesting of restricted stock units. 
 During Binning’s tenure, most of Nortel’s assets were sold off. The CDMA and 
LTE business sold to Ericsson for over $1B, while the Enterprise business was sold to 
Avaya for $900M. The Metro Ethernet Business was sold to Ciena corporation for almost 
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$800M and other components of the firm were either sold or on their way to being sold 
by March 2010, when Binning stepped down from the CRO role.  
 Due to creditor protection, Binning was not required to hold analyst calls. During 
his eight months of leadership, he was quoted in three news releases and issued ten 
employee emails, all of which were directly related to the sale of particular assets (see 
Table 20 for an example). 
Table 20: Binning’s CEO Email on Enterprise Sale (December 12, 2009) 
Today Nortel reached another important milestone by concluding the sale of substantially all of the assets 
of our Enterprise and Government Solutions businesses to Avaya. This is our second large-scale divestiture 
of assets, following the recent completion of the sale of our CDMA and LTE Access assets to Ericsson. 
 
While its never easy to bid farewell to an important and successful part of the Nortel family, we remain 
proud of their reputation for excellence and for their contribution to preserving the value of our innovation 
and know-how in the enterprise marketplace. Furthermore, we are pleased to have secured employment for 
more than 6,000 Nortel employees, who today became a part of the Avaya team.  
 
There has been tremendous effort on the part of the Enterprise and Nortel Business Services teams that has 
allowed us to get to this stage of our agreement with Avaya. NBS is ready to deliver on our obligations 
under the Transition Services Agreement. I appreciate the hard work and long hours that have made today's 
announcement possible. Nortel employees can keep up with their progress on the new Transition Services 
web page <http://navigate.us.nortel.com/imds?pg=/tsa>. 
 
It is important that we remain vigilant in the days ahead when it comes to respecting Nortel's and Avaya's 
intellectual assets. In some instances, you may have former colleagues who share Nortel facilities, but who 
now work under the Avaya banner. We remain friends, but professionally please keep in mind that we're 
now in different companies.  
 
I would like to thank those who are joining Avaya for your years of professional and dedicated service to 
Nortel. We wish all of you great success in the days ahead. To those of us remaining with Nortel, please 
accept my thanks for your continuing efforts at protecting the value of our know-how for ourselves, our 




  Binning officially stepped down as CFO, CRO, and EVP on March 21, 2010, but 
stayed for a short period to assist in the transition to Doolittle, who assumed his 
responsibilities as CFO. The CRO position was not filled. On April 12, 2010, George 
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Riedel became President of the business units, in addition to his role as Chief Strategy 
Officer. 
4.9 Epilogue 
 By the end of 2010, Nortel had generated over $3B in net proceeds related to the 
divestiture of all its businesses (including the sale of its Ottawa R&D facility for over 
CDN $200M) and had generated about $620M in annual revenue (down from $3.5B in 
2009). As part of continuing operations, the company paid out almost $100M in retention 
bonuses to key employees. Through the divestitures, just over half of the 30,000 
employed on January 14, 2009, were offered positions of employment in the acquiring 
companies. Nortel continued to fund healthcare benefits for its Canadian pensioners and 
survivors until the end of the year, along with survivor and long-term disability benefits, 
the plans of which were then wound up; healthcare benefits ceased, while pension, 
survivor, and Long Term Disability (LTD) payments were dramatically reduced due to 
underfunded pension and LTD plans. (In other regions, some of these decisions remain 
before the courts). During this period, Nortel also paid terminated employees a $3000 
advance on their claims, for a total of about $4M. 
 In 2011, the firm sold its 6000 patents for $4.5B to a consortium of companies 
that included Apple Inc., EMC Corporation, Ericsson, Microsoft Corporation, Research 
in Motion Limited and Sony Corporation. “The extensive patent portfolio touched nearly 
every aspect of telecommunications and additional markets as well, including internet 
search and social networking” (Nortel, 2001 Annual report, Management Discussion and 
Analysis). By mid-2012, Nortel had about 500 million shares outstanding and $8B in 
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escrow (proceeds from divestitures). In August 2012, with about $600M in cash and 500 
employees, the firm announced that it would cease any further financial reporting. 
17
In light of the foregoing, the directors and officers of 
NNC and NNL have indicated that they will step down 
from their positions with NNC and NNL upon the issuance 
of a court order under the CCAA that the Monitor will be 
seeking to extend its powers. Such order would allow the 
Monitor to exercise any powers that may be properly 
exercised by a board of directors and to terminate the 
engagement of NNC and NNL’s external auditors. 
 
Following the third quarter 2012 filing deadlines, as a 
means of keeping the public informed of material 
developments during the remainder of the CCAA 
proceedings, and until otherwise determined by the 
Monitor, we and NNL will endeavour to continue to 
comply with the material change disclosure requirements 
under Canadian securities laws, to the extent practicable in 
the circumstances, and to file on SEDAR
18
 (the electronic 
filing system of the Canadian Securities Administrators) all 
court reports of the Monitor except for such reports, or 
portions thereof, in respect of which confidential treatment 
has been requested. All other continuous and current 
disclosure filings of NNC and NNL will be discontinued. 
(Nortel 8-K, August 9, 2012) 
                                               
 
 
 17 NNC=Nortel Networks Canada; NNL – Nortel Networks Limited (US); CCAA -  Companies' 
Creditors Arrangement Act. 
 18 SEDAR stands for the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval www.sedar.com 
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 In January 2013, Frank Dunn, Douglas Beatty, and Michael Gollogly were 
acquitted in Canada of any wrongdoing. As of May 2013, creditor proceedings for the 




CHAPTER 5.   Organizational Path Dependence at Nortel 
5.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, the case history of Nortel was presented, to establish 
context for the research project and to identify the chronological listing of major events. 
As the case history suggests, Nortel’s organizational path involved a series of events that 
seemed to reduce strategic options over time. When the economy finally collapsed in 
September 2008, all of Nortel’s efforts to move off path failed, sending them into 
bankruptcy protection. 
 The objective of this chapter is to present the results of the path constitution 
analysis (PCA), which was undertaken as a theoretical analysis of Nortel’s organizational 
path. Although the case history suggests that lock-in occurred, the purpose of the PCA is 
to determine, using the event data (and associated documents), the characterization of 
Nortel’s path and the occurrence of lock-in (see Figure 12).  
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Figure 12: Path Constitution Analysis (Step 4) 
 
 This chapter follows the structure of Path Constitution Analysis as presented in 
the Research Methods chapter (and in Table 21, as a reminder), as follows.  
 Level interrelatedness and actors. This section demonstrates how focal actors 
(i.e. the CEOs) in the organizational level of analysis related activities recurrently both 
within their level of activities (firm level) and at levels above. As argued by Sydow et al. 
(2012), “a certain path can only be observed when it is put into perspective with regard to 
the surrounding – i.e. contextual – levels of analysis (Ragin, 2006)” (p. 6). 
 Triggering events. In an effort to identify triggers of path dependence, major 
events were identified from the event history database (through the documentation) and 
the case history analysis. The CEO narratives were then used to supplement the analysis, 
to understand how the CEO positioned the events in regards to strategic options. For 
example, a major event that suggested an opportunity for change was positioned as such 
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by the CEO. An event that may have restricted strategic options was sometimes 
downplayed by the CEO. 
 Non-ergodic process. Using the results of the triggering event analysis (above), 
the collection of events was studied to determine how the events, over time, influenced 
the organizational path. Organization path dependence suggests that the outcome is 
neither initially automatically determined nor entirely left to chance. This section 
discusses how Nortel’s path became increasingly constrained until lock-in was 
unavoidable. 
 Self-reinforcing processes. This section used the results from the previous 
analysis above, and also the results of the case history, to identify the self-reinforcing 
processes that appeared to influence Nortel’s strategic path. The primary data used for 
this analysis was the event data, as the influence of the CEO narratives on the 
organizational path (specifically as it relates to self-reinforcing processes), is completed 
in the following chapter. 
 Lock-in. This section also discusses how Nortel became locked in to a particular 
strategic path and, even when they tried to move off-path, was not able to. 
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Table 21: Path Constitution Analysis 
(Sydow et al., 2012: 2) 
 
 Before performing the PCA, visual and temporal mapping methods were used to 
descriptively understand the organizational path. Using the event data and the case 
history, an event diagram was constructed to identify major events (see Figure 13 on the 
following page). This event map was used as a guide in the PCA analysis. Follows (after 









5.2 Level Interrelatedness and Multiple Actors 
 In the case of Nortel, the path was analyzed at the firm (organizational) level. To 
initiate the investigation into the degree of interrelatedness between levels, each level of 
the competitive environment was considered as potentially related to the focus level of 
analysis. Using both the concepts identified in the grounded coding of the CEO narratives 
(see Appendix C) and the narratives used to construct the event database, five levels were 
identified:  the macroeconomic (geo-political) environment level, the industry level 
(product and financial markets), the organizational level (focus level of analysis), the 
intraorganizational level and the individual employee level.  
 In some documents the narratives referred to the actors who operated within the 
level (i.e. analysts, as opposed to financial markets), while in other cases, they referred 
directly to the level itself (i.e. “the industry”). As such, both actors and bodies of actors 
(represented by and denoted as “levels”) were used to identify the boundaries and levels 
that were operating in Nortel’s particular organizational path, which are represented in 
Figure 14 and Table 22. As the figure indicates, Nortel was embedded within a larger 
context, including the industry and the macroeconomic environment. Organizational path 
dependence theory suggests that an organizational path is bounded by these levels and 
characterized by the interaction between the levels (Sydow et al., 2009); therefore, this 
section outlines the interaction. 
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Figure 14: Level Interrelatedness and Actors 
 
Table 22: References to Actors in CEO Narratives 
Actor “Groups” (Extracted from 1st 
Order Concepts, see Appendix C) 
Level Total Quotes  
(in 389 narratives) 
Customers Industry – Product Market 1464 
CEO Reference to Self Organizational 1374 
Employees Individual Employee 1062 
Industry Conditions Industry – Product Market 965 
Top Management Team Organizational 909 
Business units, LOBs Intraorganizational 776 
Partners, JVs, Strategic Alliances Industry – Product Market 356 
R&D Intraorganizational 298 
Analysts Industry – Financial Market 229 
Regulators Industry – Financial Market 201 
Marketing Intraorganizational 179 
Shareholders Industry – Financial Market 177 
Competitors Industry – Product Market 169 
BOD Organizational 150 
Operations Intraorganizational 144 
Macroeconomic Environment Macroeconomic 133 
Sales Intraorganizational 121 
Legal, Litigation Industry – Financial Market 102 
External Experts Industry – Financial Market 84 
Suppliers, vendors Industry – Product Market 72 
Business Media Industry – Product Market 65 
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5.2.1 Macroeconomic (geo-political) Environmental Level  
 Throughout the case, narratives (both CEO and others used in the event analysis) 
positioned Nortel as a firm competing within an industry that was significantly influenced 
by the macroeconomic environment. The macroeconomic environment was often blamed 
for: lower than expected performance; future expectations; uncertainty; and, general 
industry slowdown. For example, in discussing the 2002 results with analysts, Dunn 
explained: 
The wild card, by the way, is the geopolitical situation 
around the globe, and that is a wild card. And that's why we 
are very cautious here at Nortel and we are planning not for 
any positive surprises and will adjust accordingly (Dunn, 
Analyst Call, January 23, 2003).  
 References included how the economy directly influenced not only Nortel’s 
performance but also the performance of Nortel’s customers, and thereby indirectly 
affected Nortel. For example, when reporting the 2001 results, Dunn explained,  
Market visibility remains limited given the uncertainty of 
the economic downturn and its impact on our customers' 
businesses and spending plans. As a result, we expect 
customers to move cautiously in the near term while 
maintaining the flexibility to increase spending in the 
future. (Dunn, News Release, January 15, 2002)  
 The references to the economic environment followed a pattern. Dunn’s 
narratives included the economic environment in two periods: when reporting the 2002 
results, which had fallen by 50%, and when his target for profitability (end of 2002) 
slipped by six months. Zafirovski’s narratives on the economic environment increased 
from late 2007 onwards, when the corporation struggled to achieve growth objectives.  
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Of course, the Telecom and enterprise markets are not 
immune to the more global economic developments. Not 
revolutionary statement. There is a concern over the U.S. 
economy and related what it could do to other economies 
globally.” (Zafirovski, Analyst Call, February 27, 2008) 
5.2.2 Industry – Product Markets Level 
 Within the industry, Nortel interacted with four major groups of actors: the 
industry conditions themselves (considered a ‘group’ for this purpose), customers, 
competitors and  partners (joint ventures, strategic alliances), suppliers/vendors, and the 
business media. 
 Industry conditions. Industry conditions played a significant role throughout the 
case period, given the interrelatedness with the macroeconomic environment and with the 
firms in the industry itself. At Nortel, industry conditions were positioned as a result of 
the macroeconomic environment. Global economic and political change (macroeconomic 
environment) influenced the availability of capital within the industry, which led to a 
reduction three areas: telecommunications capacity; infrastructure; and, (consequently) 
the need for manufacturing equipment. Industry conditions were mainly drawn upon, 
however, when the conditions were less favourable, and as a means to support lower than 
expected (or industry average) performance, allowing Nortel to attribute problems to 
external issues that were beyond the firm’s control. Significant discussion on industry 
conditions occurred soon after the dot.com bust, when Nortel’s annual revenues dropped 
by 50%.  
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For the telecom industry, the big event in 2001 was a 
sudden reversal of fortunes that reverberated across the 
sector. No telecom company was unaffected by a critical 
mass of difficulties that engulfed the entire industry. Every 
company in the industry was challenged to re-examine 
assumptions, strategies, and expectations. (Dunn, 2001 
Letter to Shareholders) 
 Dunn’s narratives referenced industry conditions throughout his tenure with a 
second peak in early 2003, on the reporting of financial results, where revenue was again 
lower than the previous year and he had not achieved profitability. The primary concern 
at the time was that growth in customer spending had not returned to expected levels, due 
to the general slowdown in the economy and lack of capital spending by customers. 
Nortel (and competitors) were directly affected by this industry phenomenon. 
 Owens had somewhat less narrative on the industry conditions although it also 
remained relevant throughout his tenure. References peaked at the reporting of the 2004 
annual results, which were lower than expected.  
 Zafirovski’s narrative had consistent inclusion of industry conditions, with 
increasing references in 2008, when growth in customer spending was still lower than 
expected and the economy was showing further signs of weakening. 
 Customers. Customers also dominated the narratives throughout the entire case. 
Narratives spoke about customers as a resource and as an influence; for example, 
Zafirovski stated, “To win in this fast-paced, global marketplace, we have to be obsessed 
with our customers' needs” (Zafirovski, CEO Email, February 4, 2008). During periods 
of difficulty, narratives emphasized the need to connect with customers and reassure 
them of Nortel’s longevity.  
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Over this year I have spent a lot of time meeting with 
customers, keeping them informed of our situation and 
listening to their needs. They've stayed with us and we 
appreciate it greatly. Nortel is a great franchise and we will 
preserve it, we will do everything possible to be there for 
our customers and their needs. (Owens, Analyst Call, May 
2, 2005) 
 In relation to Nortel’s strategy, narratives discussed customer needs as the driving 
force for change.  
As I've mentioned many times before, one of our strategic 
priorities is to drive consistent and increasingly profitable 
organic growth in the Enterprise space. We’ve upped our 
investments in R&D, sales and go-to-market to drive new 
innovations demanded by our customers. And we have put 
in place the monetization and marketing capability to 
capitalize on them rapidly and successfully. (Zafirovski, 
CEO Email, June 5, 2007) 
 Competitors (competition). When referring to the external environment, CEO 
narratives included relatively fewer discussions about competitors, with most occurring 
during analyst calls. The narratives fell into three categories: competitive positioning, 
strategic comparisons, and financial comparisons. Naming of competitors was done in the 
analyst call narratives: “Lucent's a very significant player in CDMA. We're in number 
two position, gaining momentum. Number three and four are struggling right now. 
Ericsson talked about maybe getting out of the business” (Dunn, Analyst Call, July 18, 
2002).  
 Other narratives included competitors when discussing financial performance or 
general industry malaise, to suggest that Nortel was doing as best as could be expected 
since even competitors were struggling. 
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We may see more pressure on Huawei and other Chinese 
competitors to go through what we have done with respect 
to financial accountability -- to be completely transparent in 
all of their support structures. And for the good of this 
market it will be terribly important that we see those 
elements of financial accountability going forward to make 
a comparison among the competitors. (Owens, Analyst Call 
May 2, 2005) 
 The third type of competitor narrative was in regards to growth, when the CEOs 
claimed Nortel was growing faster than the industry:  
We have a better trajectory, that I showed you a few 
minutes ago, than any of our peers. We significantly 
improved our quality, operational cost structure. As I've 
indicated, we've outgrown the market in key segments. 
(Zafirovski, Analyst Call, February 27, 2008) 
 Partners, joint ventures, strategic alliances. CEO narrative from Dunn onwards 
consistently emphasized the importance of partnering with other firms to deliver the types 
of solutions that customers were seeking. As the industry moved from products to 
services and solutions, from differentiation to commoditization, from wired to wireless 
and from voice to data (and multimedia), the telecommunication manufacturing 
companies found themselves lacking the resources to develop the required capabilities. 
Some companies went out of business, while others merged (e.g. Alcatel and Lucent) and 
others again focused in specific markets (e.g. Cisco concentrated on Enterprise customers 
and solutions). From Dunn onwards, the CEOs chose an alliance strategy to complement 
Nortel’s core competencies, over mergers and acquisitions.  
 CEO narrative demonstrates the growing discussion about partners throughout the 
8-year period. Dunn initiated the discussion on partners in regards to developing the 
Enterprise business. In his discussion with analysts, he said: 
150 
 
So first on the Enterprise, we have talked about -- we are 
committed, focused and see a great business opportunity in 
the Enterprise space and we have been working very hard 
to improve our portfolio but also to improve our 
partnerships and our offerings to our customer bases 
(Dunn, Analyst Call, January 23, 2003) 
 Owens continued the alliance strategy: “So you can see a lot of emphasis on the 
issue of partnering in Nortel. I take it very seriously. We will provide the best solutions 
through the best partnerships we can engender” (Owens, Analyst Call, August 19, 2004). 
Owens cultivated joint ventures with LG and with the government organization, PEC. He 
also emphasized the importance of partnerships to employees, using the Symantec 
partnership announcement: 
Since I joined Nortel as your President and CEO, you have 
heard me talk about the importance of these types of 
relationships. They will become a way of doing business at 
Nortel, and are one way we will bring new value to our 
customers while ensuring our own competitiveness. At our 
recent leadership meeting, we spent a great deal of time 
talking about the importance of these types of strategic 
relationships as one way to build a successful future for 
Nortel (Dunn, CEO Email, December 7, 2004) 
 Zafirovski continued to promote the partnership strategy to analysts, in the 
context of Nortel’s situation:  
There's no silver bullet on the near horizon that will 
promise in one swoop to transport this company past our 
challenges. Our transformation is a careful mix of organic 
growth, continued commitment to innovation and R&D, 
our extensive ecosystem of partnerships and other 
opportunities designed to maximize our effectiveness, and 




Only days later, he announced a strategic partnership with Microsoft, an alliance that 
remained at the forefront of the CEO narrative throughout his tenure. 
We bring a lot to the party and they do as well. That is what 
makes relationships strong - where both parties can drive 
benefits. They are not always the easiest, but frankly Nortel 
has not been that great in partnerships as well. We are 
realising we cannot do everything ourselves. (Zafirovski, 
Financial Times Media Interview, June 20, 2008) 
 Suppliers and vendors. Some references were made about suppliers and vendors 
in the CEO narratives. Dunn’s narratives included discussions about the outsourcing of 
manufacturing to Flextronics, a significant operational decision for the corporation that 
resulted in the move of 2500 employees. Although Dunn did not complete this 
transaction (he was fired two months prior), Owens ensured its completion in June 2004. 
For the most part, references to suppliers by all three CEOs were in regards to the 
corporation’s cost structure; suppliers were considered a resource with which to negotiate 
lower costs: 
We will be driving process excellence through the 
implementation of three major initiatives: supplier life-
cycle management, which maps supplier capabilities 
including agility and volume capacity to the different stages 
in a product’s life cycle; smart, simple design or parts 
standardization; and Clean Sheet Analysis, a data-intensive 
best practice that enables Nortel to identify what a product 
or component “should” cost and then use that data in 
supplier negotiations. (Owens, CEO Email, June 27, 2006) 
 Once Nortel went into bankruptcy protection, the supplier relationship changed, 
as protection from creditors also included non-payment of outstanding bills. In his last 
email to employees, Zafirovski acknowledged this hardship:  “I will be thanking our 
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suppliers who did everything they could to ensure we could continue serving our 
customers” (Zafirovski, CEO Email, August 10, 2009). 
 Business media. Relative to other groups of actors at the industry level, CEO 
narratives included only a few references to the media, but during these times, the media 
was central to the narrative, positioned as either a hero or a villain. Narratives included 
three types of discussions: media attention (both negative and positive), CEO engagement 
with the media, and response to media attention. Narratives were purposeful in their use 
of the media to either legitimize decisions or establish the media as a villain, trying to 
diffuse Nortel’s strategic efforts.   
The constant second-guessing, wrong-headed speculation, 
and pessimistic assessments of people outside the company 
cannot continue to go unanswered. I've recently given a 
series of interviews making it clear we've bolstered the 
company's staying power and are executing a sound 
strategy to rebuild our foundation for the future. (Dunn, 
CEO Email, October 7, 2002) 
 
Of course, the press is mainly looking for updates on the 
status of our financial information, but we have been able 
to address other issues, and have been as forthcoming as we 
can be. I feel confident of our continued ability to be 
forthcoming and to have an open, credible relationship with 
the media and analyst community over the years ahead for 
the benefit of our company. I've done a lot of this in my 
life, and openness and trust with the media is important for 
any public company. There's a lot of good in Nortel to 




There is also the added skepticism regarding Nortel’s 
potential to again be a great, relevant (and much higher 
market cap) company. Concerns expressed on Nortel are 
around our scale and portfolio age and mix. I even 
remember a magazine cover story that labeled our efforts: 
“mission impossible.” And, to this day, I remember how 
ﬁred up my team got in response; to prove that it was 
possible and that we were going to return this company to 
greatness. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, March 17, 2008) 
5.2.3 Industry – Financial Markets Level 
 Financial markets included four distinct groups: analysts and shareholders; legal 
and litigation; external experts; and, regulators.  
 Analysts and shareholders (including institutional investors). The narratives 
spoke about this group throughout the case and were based either on upcoming 
engagement activities (e.g. conferences) or the outcome of the activities. CEOs also used 
the notion of shareholder value and investor value as a means to encourage the pursuit of 
financial objectives. Owens referred to the analysts when explaining how he prioritized 
the corporation’s objectives:  
I tell analysts that I spend 40 percent of my time on the 
activities associated with the restatement and the actions to 
make our financial accounting first-class going forward, 40 
percent on implementation of 2004 business and 
development of the 2005 business plan, and 20 percent on 
the strategy for the future. (Owens, CEO Email, December 
17, 2004) 
 Zafirovski evoked the need to deliver on shareholder expectations in an effort to 
increase the pace of change. “But let’s make no mistake, the pressure is on. If we’re 
going to deliver on the year, and on what the Street, our shareholders and all of you 
expect, we need to accelerate the pace of our execution” (Zafirovski, CEO Email, August 
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6, 2007). He was also clear with analysts about his priorities “And I can tell you that 
driving shareholder value is without a question number one imperative for the 
management team, for the Board, for me personally” (Zafirovski, Analyst Call, February 
27, 2008). 
 Regulators. The presence of regulators within the CEO narratives, which included 
industry, financial and governmental actors, increased over time. They first appeared 
when Standard and Poor removed non-US companies from its S&P500 index, then again 
with the restatement activity that began in late 2003. From the initial restatement activity 
and throughout Owens’ tenure, narratives included discussion about the role of 
regulators, including the SEC and OSC, and the various decisions they made in regards to 
the restatement activity. Although some narratives discussed industry regulation (e.g. the 
purchase of PEC solutions in January 2005), most regulator discussions were related to 
financial markets and governments. Financial regulators were concerned with the 
requirements around public companies for listing, and issuance of bonds and stocks, 
while government narrative centered not only around the new government business 
purchased by Nortel but also the role of government in Canada (and other nations) to 
support R&D and encourage growth in the telecommunications industry.  
 In 2006, narrative around regulators came with Zafirovski’s emphasis on 
integrity, which followed the independent financial review commissioned by the Board of 
Directors. In 2007, with the announcement of a further restatement, Zafirovski evoked 
regulatory requirements as the reason, saying, “Today’s regulatory environment requires 
us to restate in a situation like this” (Zafirovski, CEO Email, March 1, 2007). By mid-
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2009, regulator narrative had become common, with the ongoing bankruptcy protection 
proceedings. 
 Legal, litigation. Although narratives around legal entities and litigators were 
minimal during Dunn’s tenure, they climbed over time. They became prevalent when 
Dunn was fired and then returned in February 2006 for the settlement of the class action 
lawsuit that included a payment of $575M and 14.5% of equity. In 2007, narrative 
included discussion about the CDN $25M settlement with the OSC, related to the 
investigation on the financial restatements; a narrative that persisted through the latter 
half of the year. Finally, legal discussions surfaced during bankruptcy protection 
proceedings, specifically related to the rules and regulations (and laws) on what Nortel 
was and was not obliged to do during this period. 
 External experts. CEO narrative drew on external experts to legitimize Nortel’s 
strategy, such as industry experts and reports that positioned Nortel (and its products) as 
an industry leader (e.g. Gartner, Del Oro), for example: “the readers from Computer 
World voted our combined Microsoft/Nortel Unified Communications as the leading user 
solution in the marketplace” (Zafirovski, Analyst Call, August 1, 2008). 
 Experts were also drawn upon to legitimize what may have been perceived as a 
poor decision. When Nortel changed the pension plan, Zafirovski told employees:   
Pressures on pension plans have increased around the 
world. Employers in several major industries - steel, auto, 
airlines - cite the weight of legacy pension obligations as a 
major inhibitor to competing successfully in the face of 
rapid global change. Today’s announcement is about 
adapting our retirement plans to changing realities. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, June 27, 2006) 
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 Additionally, experts were brought in to assist Nortel in its transformation, to 
include Accenture, McKinsey, and KPMG, suggesting that the firm did not have 
sufficient internal resources. Experts were also used to explain the industry advancements 
and opportunities: “In 10 years, David Clark from MIT, one of the people that helped 
invent the internet, predicts 1 trillion devices will be connected to the networks. That 
provides enormous opportunities for productivity, education, entertainment, and 
communications” (Zafirovski, Financial Times, Media Interview, June 20, 2008).  
 Finally, experts were used to explain poor performance, attributing results to 
industry factors as opposed to Nortel-specific factors. Notably, Zafirovski defended his 
revised 2008 outlook, stating to analysts:  
In terms of a market versus competition, what we've seen 
including some confirming reports from Forrester for the IT 
purchasing survey results is that even the last 30 to 90 days 
anticipation of spend, were number of IT professionals 
having IT spend either in yellow or red is increased by 
anywhere from 10% to 25% in terms of a -- go from 23% 
to 35% of the IT managers are now predicting no growth to 
a decline versus the previous year. This is pretty consistent 
with what we are hearing from a number of our sales 
people, particularly in North America who do not believe 
this is a Nortel-specific. (Zafirovski, Analyst Call, 
September 17, 2008) 
5.2.4 Organizational Level 
 The organizational level is defined broadly as the actors who had upper echelon 
responsibility for firm performance. This includes the Board of Directors, the Top 
Management Team, and the CEOs themselves. 
 Board of Directors. The Board of Directors (Board) were a visible actor in CEO 
narratives throughout the case. Narratives included mention of changes in the Board’s 
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constitution, gratitude for their ongoing support, and (mostly) interactions between them 
and the CEO/Top Management Team.  
 The Board was referenced frequently during 2004 and 2005, primarily in 
reference to their involvement in the restatement process, including Dunn’s firing and the 
engagement of an external auditor on the review of Nortel’s finance organization. 
Another part of our announcement today is the Board's 
decision to ask Wilmer Cutler to examine the facts and 
circumstances that led to improperly recognized revenues, 
which were identified in the later stages of the restatement 
process by Nortel management. This is an appropriate and 
responsible follow-on action on the part of the Board. It is a 
tangible manifestation of good governance. (Owens, 
Analyst Call, January 11, 2005) 
The Board was often used to legitimize decisions, such as: 
However, I am pleased that the Board has approved my 
recommendation for a Nortel performance factor of 50% 
for our AIP, which will result in payments of $106 million 
to our employees. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, February 27, 
2008).  
 
 In February 2009, management recommended, and the 
Board concurred, that bonuses earned under the 2008 plan 
were not to be paid out given the company’s circumstances. 
(CEO Email, June 18, 2009) 
 Top Management Team. The CEO narratives spoke frequently about members of 
the Top Management Team and the collective group itself. This included organizational 
announcements produced by both Owens and Zafirovski, who made numerous changes 
within their leadership teams. Narratives also included leadership biographies, praise for 
contributions, appreciation for years of services, and changes in responsibility, along with 
lengthy discussions on the outcome of leadership meetings and explanations of changes 
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in reporting structures. Leadership, in general, dominated CEO narratives, especially 
those of Owens and Zafirovski. Once bankruptcy protection was initiated, narrative on 
leadership dropped from the texts. 
 CEO. The CEO narratives were written in the first person and all CEOs referred 
frequently to themselves in the narrative. CEOs expressed their emotions to employees, 
and provided their “assurance” and “commitment.” They had “confidence” in the 
employees, and made clear requests of employees. On the second day as CEO, Owens 
stated:  
Nortel is a truly great company. I'm very proud to be here 
with you. Let's put our arms around each other and stay 
focused on growing our business and taking care of our 
customers. And importantly, know that I and the senior 
leadership of this company care deeply about you, our most 
treasured asset. (Owens, CEO Email, April 29, 2004) 
 On September 17, 2008, Zafirovski was clear with employees about the 
challenges that lay ahead: 
I need your full commitment. It may sound odd since the 
above decisions will impact some of you. In return, you 
have my absolute commitment that I will continue to 
always put Nortel first in all my decision making, continue 
to look for expanded opportunities to promote our best 
performers, and do my very best to ensure timely 
communications and maximum redeployment for affected 
employees. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, September 17, 2008) 
5.2.5 Intraorganizational Level 
 The intraorganizational level is defined as the individual and groups of employees 
that made up the firm, including functional groups and the business units. 
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 Employees. Employees were a constant and significant group in the CEO 
narratives. CEO narratives included discussions about employees and to employees. All 
CEOs, throughout their tenure, spoke of employees through the media (in news releases), 
in analyst calls, and in shareholder letters. They thanked employees for past work, 
identified the employees as a competitive advantage, acknowledged employee well-
being, and set expectations of employees. In the CEO Emails, narratives included not 
only recognition, but also acknowledgement of problems raised by employees through 
satisfaction surveys, and the general challenges of working at Nortel.  
 Business units. Nortel’s structure over the years was modified periodically. 
Organizations changed names, R&D was decentralized and then centralized (and back 
again), sales organizations swung from a regional to a product structure, and services 
were pulled out of the product groups. These changes aside, the notion of business units 
remained throughout the case period. There were two organizations that served the main 
customer groups: Enterprise (serving businesses of all sizes) and Carrier (serving the 
telecommunications service providers). The products produced by the firm included both 
wired and wireless solutions used at most points in the network – from fibre optic 
equipment, to wireless base stations, to routers and voice over IP telephones.  
 CEO narratives contained business unit references throughout the case, with 
significant mention of the business units during analyst calls, especially when discussing 
financial results and overall business performance. CEO Emails included narrative on 
business units when discussing performance, organizational changes, new leadership 
responsibilities, and corporate strategy.  
160 
 
 R&D. R&D was an intraorganizational actor that showed consistently in the CEO 
narratives throughout the case. However, the mention of R&D as an activity versus a 
group of actors was not always clear. CEOs included R&D in narratives as a financial 
resource, as a cultural resource, as a competitive advantage and as a function. 
You will be well aware that in reference to many of our 
competitors, Nortel, even with these reductions in R&D, 
spends more on R&D than the others. We will continue to 
be very strong in R&D. But we are well aware that we have 
to have these numbers in balance and we're trying to realize 
the strongest R&D and the strongest technology future by 
virtue of synergies and by virtue of partnering with people 
who bring quality technology that can be bundled in 
solutions that we offer to both the carriers and to the 
enterprise customers. (Owens, Analyst Call, August 19, 
2004) 
 
And as we've said in R&D we spent $1.9 billion. We have 
a proud history of innovation, as a matter of fact we have 
developed many of the technologies that make the networks 
of today run very effectively. We seek to build on this 
legacy, we have an R&D group that makes still great 
products and solutions but does so with better efficiency, 
more focus, and greater speed. (Zafirovski, Analyst Call 
May 16, 2006). 
 Sales. The sales force at Nortel was protected throughout many of the 
restructuring activities and this was referenced in the CEO narratives often. Additionally, 
every CEO spoke about the annual sales conference, including new branding programs 
and the emphasis on the sales process. 
We’re marshalling our resources and rallying the company 
behind our sales force to win the competitive battles ahead. 




Our workforce actions are focused to disproportionately 
protect customer and sales facing roles as well as continue 
our focus on new innovative solutions. (Dunn, News 
Release, September 30, 2004) 
 
Our sales teams are the "G" in our BIG initiative - the 
growth engine for Nortel, and all of us have a big role to 
play in ensuring our sales teams get our full support. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, February 6, 2006) 
 
A significant part of this, as I said before, does not impact 
sales and go to market resources. A significant part of this 
are G&A slashes. (Zafirovski, Analyst Call, February 7, 
2007) 
 Marketing. The marketing function was included in the CEO narratives much the 
same way as the sales function. Marketing and sales were often included together and 
they were consistently mentioned as functions excluded from any of the work force 
restructuring and cost cutting activities. Nortel changed its branding periodically through 
the case; these branding changes were also included in the CEO narratives.  
 Operations. Operations were mentioned in CEO narratives, although to a lesser 
degree that the other groups. Operations were more loosely defined as any activity or 
employee involved in the ongoing work, outside of R&D, sales and marketing. 
Operations narratives discussed cost reduction activities, such as the following: 
Leaders in both Services and Operations agree that margin 
and total cost objectives can best be supported with aligned 
supply chain, deployment, and customer service resources. 
We are consolidating our service delivery and supply chain 
operations into one organizational structure to enable our 
services business to sustain a laser focus on executing the 
new services strategy. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, April 11, 
2006) 
 Zafirovski suggested that operations were just as important as strategy: 
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Let me just make one comment. We do not plan to fill a 
COO position. My perspective has been now for 30 years it 
is virtually impossible to separate execution and strategy. 
And at least for the foreseeable number of years, if not 
decades, I would not think of us having a COO position. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Analyst Call, October 17, 2005) 
5.2.6 Conclusion 
 In organizational path dependence, the interrelatedness between the focal level of 
analysis and the surrounding levels is a basic premise of the theory (Sydow et al., 2012). 
To study a particular path at the focus level of analysis, the upper and lower boundaries 
provide context; actors may recursively refer to actors and events with the various levels, 
and respond to them reflectively. By positioning the organization within these levels, the 
constitutive features of the path can be determined.  
 As the above analysis suggests, the focal level of analysis (Nortel, as an 
organization) was both structurally embedded within the industry (that was, in turn, 
embedded with the macroeconomic environment) and discursively embedded within 
these levels (see Figure 15). Notably, the CEO narratives specifically focused on 
customers, employees, industry conditions, the Top Management Team, the business 
units, partnerships, and R&D.   
 Level interrelatedness was usually expressed in terms of events. The recursive 
activities were evident in narratives, when the events took place. If an event was initiated 
by Nortel (e.g. a material decision such as a new CEO, restatement activity, etc…), the 
event was positioned in relation to levels and groups of actors. If an event was considered 
external (e.g. economic downturn), the influence of that event was described in terms of 
Nortel’s current performance, future performance and strategy.  
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Figure 15: Level Interrelatedness at Nortel 
Overlaid on Sydow et al.’s (2009: 692) Constitution of an Organizational Path 
 
 The actor-centered narrative that persisted throughout the case, which 
demonstrates Nortel’s embeddedness, is as follows. The economic downturn (positioned 
as such throughout the case) reduced customer spending and therefore customer needs 
had changed. To sustain and improve performance, Nortel had to meet these changing 
needs through the restructuring of the business units and realignment of the R&D 
organizations. The CEO and Top Management Team, with the Board’s direction, would 
lead the efforts, but success remained in the hands of the employees. 
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5.3 Triggering Events 
 Organizational path dependence theory argues that the path is initiated by a 
triggering event that reduces strategic options (Sydow et al., 2009). The triggering event 
can be identified either by the actors themselves or by observers (in vivo or retrospective) 
(Sydow et al., 2012). In reconstructing a strategic path it is therefore important to include 
data from various sources.  
 The case of Nortel suggested that more than one triggering event may have 
contributed towards the creation and persistence of an organizational path.  An initial set 
of events was identified from the event history database using visual and temporal 
mapping strategies, as shown earlier in the Nortel Event Map (and reproduced in Figure 
16). A second set of events was identified from the first order concepts produced by the 
grounded coding of CEO narratives (i.e. corporate challenge, corporate opportunity, 
difficult situation, financial restatement activity, financial return to profitability, global 
economy, industry challenge, industry opportunity, uncertainty / caution) (see Figure 17).  
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Figure 16: Triggering Events – from Event History Analysis 
 




 From the two sets of findings, an integrated list of triggering events was created. 
The events were further investigated to understand how the influence of each event was 
perceived by the organizational actors and by the observers (i.e. other actors within the 
case and analysis). This included an assessment of how the event either expanded or 
limited strategic options (see Table 23). An analysis of each event follows. 
Table 23: Triggering events and impact on strategic options 









Influence on Strategic 
Options 
1 2001   
Dot.com 
bust 
Industry  Dunn Negative Yes Strategic options 
constrained as firm has to 
restructure both 
financially and 
organizationally to prepare 
for revenue decline.  
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Reverse occurs due to 
erosion of cost structure 
and therefore financial 
flexibility. Strategic 
options further reduced. 












and 6 point 
plan 
Strategic options potentially 
increased due to new 
strategic plan by new 
CEO; opportunity to move 
off path.  










Erosion of stakeholder 
confidence potentially 
reinforces current strategic 
path. 













Strategic options further 
reduced, firm locked in. 
Immediate impact on cost 
structure (debt 
repayments) and unable to 
effect divestiture 
opportunities.  

















Strategic options eliminated, 
firm liquidates. 
 
5.3.1 Dot.Com Bust (2001) 
 In late 2001, Frank Dunn took over from John Roth, who had led Nortel through 
an acquisition period that involved more than $45B in spending. The stock had hit an all-
time high of CDN $124.50 in late 2000, but less than a year later, had fallen below CDN 
$2. As discussed in the previous chapter, the dramatic decline of Nortel’s stock, along 
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with its competitors and its customers, was based on an over capacity of network 
bandwidth, lack of application development, technological interoperability challenges 
and, as a result, a lack of capital available for further expansion. The entire industry 
suffered. Strategic options were reduced for all competitors in the industry, as customer 
spending had dramatically declined. 
 Dunn’s narratives persistently referenced the collapse of the telecommunications 
industry in 2001 as reason for Nortel’s rapid decline. The dramatic decrease in 2001 
annual revenues spurred the corporation and Dunn, in particular, towards one specific 
financial objective: return to profitability.  
To answer a key question on shareholders’ minds, the new 
executive and management team is committed to returning 
the company to profitability. This will not be easy. In the 
aftermath of 2001, caution tempers optimism. The 
consequences of last year’s events have not yet played out. 
Consolidations and restructurings continue and forecasting 
the climate ahead is, at best, difficult. (Dunn, 2001 Letter to 
Shareholders) 
 With a significant reduction in capital, strategic options were constrained. 
Although some companies chose mergers and acquisitions to manage through the 
downturn, Dunn stated to the Wall Street Journal that he would not choose this path, 
saying that Nortel had a “clear, winning formula that's going to create success for the 
company and its investors . . . and in that plan is not a merger” (Dunn, Wall Street 
Journal, Media Interview, April 28, 2002). Dunn also stated that Nortel would not change 
its product mix, instead it would continue to invest in all of its current businesses, “These 
core businesses are inter-related and deliver the right products aligned with the right 
opportunities” (Dunn, 2001 Letter to Shareholders). 
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We're not backing away from optical. We can provide a 
network for a wireline customer that could run wireless 
through it, or we could provide networks for wireless 
customer that could do wireline activity. (Dunn, Analyst 
Call, April 18, 2002) 
Months later, Dunn was still convinced of the corporate strategy: 
The senior leadership team has carefully reviewed and 
assessed our game plan---our roadmap to recovery---and 
has come to the conclusion that it's the right plan. We 
concluded we're in the right businesses, and we've got an 
outstanding portfolio to serve the needs of both carrier and 
enterprise customers. Our core businesses are aligned with 
the right growth opportunities and represent a solid 
competitive advantage. Our commitment to leading the 
next stage of network evolution is grounded in the reality 
that we have one of the strongest portfolios of products and 
technology in the industry. (Dunn, CEO Email, August 27, 
2002)  
 In 2003, Dunn continued to stick with the broad market and product portfolio that 
Nortel had established prior to the dot.com bust, suggesting that synergy was one of the 
company’s competitive advantages: “We face four market segments, but we really have 
one technology platform and evolution strategy. And that's really important and that's 
why you're starting to see this leverage” (Dunn, Analyst Call, April 24, 2003). 
5.3.2 Financial Restatement #1 (October 2003) 
 The initial announcement of the financial restatements, at the time, garnered 
relatively little attention in the CEO narratives. When Dunn first introduced the need to 




In the aftermath of a dramatic reduction that took place in 
the 2001 and 2002 time frame, both for the industry as well 
as Nortel, and as we entered into a period of relative 
stability that began to take hold as we entered 2003 for the 
company, Nortel proactively undertook a comprehensive 
review of our assets and our liabilities. We announce this 
action in conjunction with our 2nd quarter results. This has 
led us to the planned restatement that we announced today. 
… Again, I would like to emphasize that this process has 
no impact on a cash position or our operations going 
forward. (Dunn, Analyst Call, October 23, 2003) 
 However, the announcement of the restatement attracted attention from the 
financial markets, which was confounded as the restatement process continued into the 
following year and affected the reporting of annual results. Analysts began downgrading 
Nortel stock and the stock price began to fall further. The financial restatement was the 
beginning of a significant transformation activity, which involved an external audit of the 
finance organization, three subsequent restatements, millions of dollars of expense, and 
significant attention by the CEO, Board, Top Management Team, and financial markets.  
 In early 2004, when industry spending still had not returned to normal levels and 
Nortel’s cash was being depleted, CEO narrative began discussing the need for partners. 
Dunn apparently recognized that Nortel did not have the required resources to deliver 
solutions (versus products), but did not have the capital available for acquisitions, so 
strategic partnering was one of the only options available to broaden the firm’s 
capabilities. He reiterated, however, the need to remain in Nortel’s current markets:  
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We need to be able to deliver capability without owning 
everything... Yes, we need to find a partner. The biggest 
issue is where are these inflection points? We've got to hit 
those inflection points. But to say let's sit out of the market 
for two years and then hit the inflection point, our view is 
you lose a lot by not being in the market, not learning from 
your customers, not learning the challenges. So we'll be in 
the markets, that's part of that game, but the longer game is 
we're going to simplify all of this stuff. (Dunn, Network 
World, Media Interview, March 8, 2004) 
5.3.3 Firing of Frank Dunn and Ongoing Financial Restatement (#2) (April 2004) 
 Once Dunn was fired and the restatement investigation was initiated, the 
restatement activity became the firm’s strategic priority and dominated Owens’ narrative 
throughout the first year of his tenure. 
I tell analysts that I spend 40 percent of my time on the 
activities associated with the restatement and the actions to 
make our financial accounting first-class going forward, 40 
percent on implementation of 2004 business and 
development of the 2005 business plan, and 20 percent on 
the strategy for the future. (Owens, CEO Email, December 
19, 2004) 
 
The restatement process has been, as you know, a difficult 
and demanding experience for us. Very, very few 
companies have undertaken a financial review of this scope 
and magnitude. It has absorbed the time, talent, and 
resources of so much of this Company -- more than 600 
employees working full-time on this project, $100 million 
of our Company's resources, more than 80 Board and Audit 
Committee meetings since October 2003. (Owens, Analyst 
Call, January 11, 2005) 
 Owens, however, did not question Nortel’s business strategy. Soon after Dunn 
was fired, Owens’ narrative showed signs of support for earlier strategic decisions: 
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The company has been through a lot and the pathway 
forward has been set as generally a good one. My emphasis 
will be a bit more in the areas that I mentioned but in 
general, this company is and has been on the right track to 
go forward as far as the business side is concerned. 
(Owens, Analyst Call, June 2, 2004) 
 However, strategic options were still limited by the industry’s general malaise, 
and mergers and acquisitions were still on the mind of business analysts, “We will be the 
consolidator, not the consolidatee” (Owens, Network World, Media Interview, July 9, 
2004). But with limited cash and significant resources dedicated towards the financial 
restatement process, acquiring companies did not seem to be an option in the short term. 
The alliance strategy, as initiated by Dunn, continued: 
Partnering is extremely important to Nortel. No one can 
bring the complete solution set to the marketplace, and so 
you'll see us much more aggressive in our organization. 
(Owens, Analyst Call, August 19, 2004) 
 By 2005, Nortel’s cash position had improved slightly and Owens initiated the 
purchase of PEC, a US telecommunications company that served the US government, for 
$448M in cash. 
5.3.4 Daichendt’s Hiring and Departure (February and June 2005)  
 In early 2005, Owens hired ex-Cisco executive Gary Daichendt as President and 
Chief Operating Officer, stating in a corporate news release: 
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He is a world class leader with unquestioned integrity and 
one of the top technology executives in the world. Gary’s 
deep involvement in the spectacular growth of some of the 
world’s leading technology powerhouses and his unique 
track record have given him a special perspective and 
experience that will optimally position our great Company 
for our customers, shareholders and employees. (Owens, 
News Release, March 4, 2005) 
 Daichendt brought Gary Kunis, also an ex-Cisco executive, who was given 
responsibility for Nortel operations. The media and analysts responded favourably. Only 
a few months after the appointment, however, both Daichendt and Kunis left Nortel, 
explained by Owens as follows:   
Although I am disappointed with this outcome, it became 
increasingly obvious that our business views and 
management styles are different. Gary Kunis will also be 
leaving the Company... With respect to our product 
portfolio, we will increasingly focus on those areas where 
we can lead and where we see significant market 
opportunity. Make no mistake, we will continue to be a 
company that serves both carrier and enterprise customers, 
and we will lead with technology and innovation. (Owens, 
CEO Email, June 10, 2005) 
 Owens also made a similar announcement to the press on the same day, claiming 
that the two executives were leaving due to differences in management style. The markets 
responded with a 9% drop in the Nortel stock price. Owens emphasized that, although 
Nortel would start investing in areas that held market potential, the firm would continue 
to serve the same markets; the corporate strategy had essentially remained unchanged 
from Dunn’s initial strategy. 
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5.3.5 Zafirovski’s Hiring (October 2005) 
 The hiring of Zafirovski dominated CEO narratives (and media and analyst 
narratives) throughout October and November of 2005. Zafirovski was introduced to the 
analyst and the media a month prior to his appointment, in a news conference with both 
the firm’s chairman and Owens19. Owens introduced Zafirovski saying: 
Having known Mike personally now just for a few days, 
but having followed his reputation for a number of years I 
can tell you this is a great fellow we have coming in to be 
the CEO of Nortel.  
 
I can also tell you that in just the few days I have been 
together with him you can sense a real soul. There is a real 
soul in this gentleman who will take this Company that 
next step. (Owens, Analyst Call, October 18, 2005) 
 During the conference call, even before he had assumed his position as CEO, 
Zafirovski presented his strategic plan in response to a question from analyst Joan 
                                               
 
 
 19 Gordon Pitts of the Globe and Mail described Owens: “As he surrendered the CEO's job at 
Nortel Networks Corp., Bill Owens almost broke down yesterday, his eyes welling with tears, his voice 
choked with emotion. For Mr. Owens, the feelings of love and loss were so strong that 35 years of 
discipline as a U.S. naval officer could no longer keep them under tight-lipped restraint. It was the most 
touching moment in a fascinating and ultimately confusing press conference — another bizarre chapter in 




Engerbretson, America’s Network: “What would you consider to be Nortel’s three 
biggest challenges right now and three biggest opportunities?” Zafirovski answered: 
First of all, let me just I will be doing lots of listening and 
learning for the coming weeks and months. Of course, I 
have done some -- lots of homework over the last few 
months as well. This is not a, if you will, a commitment at 
this point in time, but some of the five or six things which I 
have discussed with Harry and Bill, my initial observations 
that are resonating with them. Those are very consistent 
due to the game plan which is in place right now. 
(Zafirovski, Analyst Call, October 18, 2005) 
Zafirovski then followed with a description of each of the following six priorities: 
financial transformation and integrity renewal; a clear strategic focus; profitability; 
innovation and R&D effectiveness; processes and automation; and, profitable growth.  
 Although Zafirovski claimed that these six priorities were only initial 
observations, they became his 6-point strategic plan, which he narrated throughout his 
tenure. He positioned the “new” strategy with employees within two weeks of his official 
appointment, as the BIG initiative: Business transformation (pricing and sales 
effectiveness, direct material supply chain group, services, organization, general and 
administrative effectiveness, R&D effectiveness), Integrity renewal and Growth 
imperatives (achieving profitable growth). As part of this strategy, he changed the 
corporate mission to Business Made Simple, which he defined as follows: 
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Business Made Simple is the way we will define Nortel 
internally and externally, and it's about simplifying our own 
business through our BIG initiatives, Six Sigma and an 
attitude of forceful optimism. It's also about how we will 
make Nortel easier for our customers to do business with, 
and most importantly, the value proposition we deliver to 
customers. The message is clear for our customers: Nortel 
is delivering the products and solutions that help simplify 
their networks, improve productivity as well as drive value 
creation and efficiency for consumers. (Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, February 2, 2006) 
5.3.6 Class Action Settlements (February 2006) 
 The class action settlement was announced by Zafirovski through a news release, 
on an analyst call, and to employees through a CEO Email. Although the settlement was 
significant, including a payment of $575M in cash and 14.5% of equity, Zafirovski did 
not link the impact of the settlement to the firm’s strategic options, rather he indicated 
that it was an end to past events and provided the firm with “financial flexibility.” 
The attention this settlement will get will no doubt be a 
temporary distraction as pundits and industry watchers may 
use it as an opportunity to re-tell the circumstances around 
the financial restatement and recent challenges facing the 
Company. It's important to recognize that the settlement is 
in relation to activities that are a part of our past, and a big 
part of moving forward is in closing this unfortunate 
chapter in our otherwise proud and distinguished history.... 
We've put an end to the costly litigation process and can 
look forward with renewed enthusiasm to future 
opportunities and to building a profitable, growing Nortel 
that's focused on our customers and returning value to all 
stakeholders. This will pave the way for us to go about the 
business of rebuilding confidence in Nortel and gives us 
additional financial flexibility through debt refinancing 
opportunities. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, February 8, 2006) 
Although the settlement did reduce uncertainty, it also reduced the corporation’s cash 
reserves and, consequently, options for acquisitions. 
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5.3.7 Financial Restatements #3 (March 2006) 
 In March of 2006, Zafirovski announced that the company would restate its 
financials for the third time. In his email to employees, he acknowledged their 
contributions and managed their expectations: 
What makes this company great is the way all of you have 
created new innovative market solutions while rising to 
meet the challenges of the past. Today marks another 
challenge; however, rest assured, today's restatement 
announcement is not going to slow down our commitment 
to rebuilding a high-performing company that we can all be 
proud of. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, March 10, 2006) 
Within the same announcement, and to analysts and the media, Zafirovski also claimed 
that Nortel would achieve a $1B reduction in margin improvement through the business 
transformation activities, suggesting that, due to slow industry growth, the reduction in 
Nortel’s cash reserves was becoming problematic. Soon after, he officially launched his 
‘6-point plan’, as follows: 
1. World-class management team, culture and processes 
2. Focus on the balance sheet, governance and 
business/finance controls. 
3. Drive to world-class cost structure and quality levels 
that will take us to a mid-teens operating margin. 
4. Our targeting a minimum of 20% market share. 
5. Investment for profitable growth. 
6. An increased emphasis on service and software 
solutions.  
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, March 13, 2006) 
 Although the plan had clear quantifiable objectives, it was very similar to the plan 
he initially presented in October 2005. Strategically, options seemed reduce due to low 
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earnings and high expenses; objectives focused primarily on the reduction of operating 
expenses. 
This is our roadmap for building investor value and a great 
company. The work will be challenging, exciting, and of 
course, foundational to return to a competitive and winning 
position. This is a process that will take three to five years 
and will require the dedicated focus of every single one of 
us. The challenges are huge and so are the opportunities. 
But I don’t think we want to stay where we are. (Call or 
write to me if you disagree!) Let’s make it happen together! 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, March 13, 2006) 
5.3.8 Financial Restatement #4 (March 2007) 
 The fourth financial restatement was positioned as being different from past 
restatements, as it was related to accrual issues from before 2000 and changes in revenue 
recognition rules. Scott Coleman, an analyst for Morgan Stanley, asked Zafirovski on the 
March 1, 2007 Analyst Call, “I guess just one question from my end which would be is 
this the last revenue recognition issue we're going to see from Nortel in your opinion?” 
Zafirovski responded as follows: 
Part of our challenge is that you're looking at the items, 
they're less than 1% of revenues, gross margin, SG&A, 
R&D. So if we were a "normal" company, the restatement -
- the amount would not have been material. The 
unfortunate fact, which is of course -- the much bigger part 
of our job is to turn Nortel into a profitable company. And 
if you were breakeven to a slight loss any impact on 
earnings becomes a material, both from a quantitative and 
also from a qualitative perspective. (Zafirovski, Analyst 
Call, March 1, 2007) 
Zafirovski’s reference to “normal” suggested that, although many companies go through 
restatements, any restatement for Nortel had a material impact. 
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5.3.9 Economic Meltdown (September 2008)  
 The economic meltdown is an obvious critical event, as it impacted many 
industries throughout the world. In the case of Nortel, CEO narratives leading up to the 
meltdown were conflicting. On the one hand, Zafirovski hinted at the potential 
difficulties that slow growth in 2008 would bring: 
Of course, the Telecom and enterprise markets are not 
immune to the more global economic developments. Not 
revolutionary statement. There is a concern over the U.S. 
economy and related what it could do to other economies 
globally. (Zafirovski, Analyst Call, February 27, 2008) 
However, his narrative after the June 2008 analyst meeting suggested that Nortel was 
succeeding in its strategic plan: 
As we told analysts, we are continuing to aggressively shift 
our investments to seize growth markets and the expanded 
opportunity in the converging telecom and IT worlds. We 
are well positioned to deliver the future of communications, 
and our strategy is increasingly resonating across all of our 
key stakeholders. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, June 16, 2008) 
But on August 1, 2008, upon announcing 2
nd
 quarter results, Zafirovski’s narrative to 
employees sounded desperate: 
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As a company, we need to redouble our efforts, or better, 
the effectiveness of our efforts. We need to continue to 
transform our thinking, planning and execution. We need to 
transform our carrier business; drive growth engines like 
Enterprise and MEN [Metro Ethernet Networks] forward; 
and, accelerate the evolution to services, applications and 
solutions offerings. We need to be obsessed with delivering 
differentiated business value to our customers. From sales 
to product engineering and operations to R&D, everything 
we do must start with this in mind. And, we need to buckle 
down and balance our expenses in line with our revenues. 
Clear guidelines have been communicated around 
managing our expenses and I expect us to all work together 
to follow them and achieve the savings I know we can. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, August 1, 2008) 
 Narrative from September 17, 2008, one day before the markets crashed, 
indicated that Nortel was in crisis. Zafirovski announced that the 2008 outlook would be 
revised downwards. He explained the situation to employees: 
To that end, we are undertaking a comprehensive review of 
our business and steps to reduce Nortel’s overall cost base 
and continue to mitigate the risks associated with our 4th 
generation carrier wireless investments. Additionally, we 
have decided to explore the divestiture of our Metro 
Ethernet Networks (MEN) in order to take advantage of a 
consolidating carrier marketplace. Combined, these three 
actions will strengthen our balance sheet, increase our 
liquidity and provide funds for restructuring or investments 
to increase scale in our growth areas. (Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, September 17, 2008) 
 Unfortunately, the desire to divest the Metro Ethernet Networks (MEN) was not 
realized within the expected period. The strategic decision to reduce the corporation’s 
product portfolio and markets in which it competed was made too late. The industry (at 
the time) did not value the MEN business to the extent that Nortel had hoped, given the 
economic situation. Nortel’s strategic options were once again reduced.  
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5.3.10 Bankruptcy Protection (January 2009) 
 In November 2008, CEO narratives indicated that Nortel’s cash reserves had been 
depleted and that the pending debt payments were imposing a significant threat. 
Zafirovski announced to the market and to employees that further headcount reductions 
would take place: 
That said, we have continued to use cash to run our 
business. Today, we announced we are taking immediate 
measures to preserve our cash and to deliver savings of 
$400 million annually. As I told you when we last spoke, 
the credit crunch has serious implications for Nortel and 
how we need to behave in this environment. We must 
preserve and/or generate as much cash as we can to give 
ourselves options. If we do not manage this part of our 
business, well, the future will be bleak. It's that simple. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, November 10, 2008) 
Zafirovski also spoke about the company’s competitive position: 
I believe Nortel can be a strong partner for our customers 
today and for the long-term. We have made very good 
strides in the past three years. Today, we have leading 
innovations and solutions ahead of the market and people 
who know how to deliver the business value our customers 
need. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, November 18, 2008) 
 But Nortel was unable to recover from the tumble of financial markets. Zafirovski 
explained to employees on the day Nortel filed for protection from creditors: 
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Just seven months ago, at our June 2008 investor 
conference, we summarized that the external market 
expectations for most of our growth segments were in the 
10% range for the next 3 years. We believed that we had 
the solutions, momentum and improving cost structure to 
do well in that environment. You know the changes in the 
external environment since then, from financial and capital 
markets to decreasing visibility and forecasts for our 
industry. Faced with an unclear view of 2009 - where most 
current predictions are for industry revenue declines of at 
least 10% (a net decline of over 20% from just two quarters 
ago) - we needed to act now while we have sufficient cash 
to fund our ongoing operations. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, 
January 14, 2008) 
 As part of his announcement, Zafirovski told employees that he, the executives, 
the Board, and the court appointed monitor, were working on a strategic plan that would 
be communicated to employees as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the protection process 
came with direct impact to employees and pensioners. On the one hand, severance 
packages were withheld and the pension fund went underfunded, while on the other hand, 
remaining employees and executives received retention bonuses.  
 CEO narratives throughout January, February, March, and April of 2009 focused 
on the ongoing business – retaining customers and continuing to sell. In each of his 
employee narratives, Zafirovski continued to acknowledge that employees were eager to 
see the new strategic plan.  
I know it is tough out there, with the combination of 
downturns in the overall economy and our industry, further 
amplified by our company-specific issues. And I know you 
are looking for answers. I can only commit to tell you the 
facts as soon as they are available. Most important, we 
must stay focused on the job at hand and keep our 
determination to deliver excellence every day. (Zafirovski, 
CEO Email, April 9, 2009) 
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 In May 2009, while announcing the first quarter results, Zafirovski told analysts, 
the media, and employees that Nortel was reorganizing from a matrix organizational 
structure to four independent strategic business units (with a centralized administrative 
function).  
We have made the necessary structural decisions to give 
Nortel the ability to optimize value, and preserve 
innovation platforms and employment to the greatest extent 
possible. Our businesses will have the opportunity to more 
effectively serve the discrete needs of their respective 
customers and market segments, while maintaining high 
customer service and network performance levels. 
(Zafirovski, News Release, May 11, 2009) 
At the same time, he explained to employees “maximizing the value of this company is 
the central principle that guides all of our decision making” (Zafirovski, CEO Email, 
May 11, 2009). 
 One month later, on June 19, 2009, Zafirovski announced the first potential sale 
of one of Nortel’s businesses, for $650M, which marked the beginning of the sale of all 
business units and the firm’s technology patents.  
5.3.11 Conclusions 
 Organizational path dependence theory suggests that only one critical juncture is 
required to initiate a path (Sydow et al., 2009). In the case of Nortel, the first triggering 
event was the dot.com bust. From this event, a series of further events followed, some of 
which appeared to broaden options, but eventually led to a reduction of options over time. 
In some cases, the CEOs acknowledged the influence of the events on strategic options, 
but not always. The acknowledgement was related to three factors:  event type, nature of 
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event, and the role of the CEO in the event. When the event was external, beyond the 
control of the organization, it was acknowledged as a potential threat to the firm’s 
strategy and performance. An internal event, on the other hand, if negative, was not 
acknowledged by the CEO as significant (even though it had reduced options), unless the 
event occurred under a previous CEO’s tenure. If the event was positive, the CEO 
claimed it as a trigger, suggesting strategic opportunity.  
 The events also appeared to occur not only between the first and second phase of 
the organizational path (as defined by theory), but also throughout each phase, with each 
event contributing towards the reduction in options and the movement towards lock-in. 
As shown in Figure 18 and Table 24, some events had more specific contributions 
towards the path than others. The 1
st
 event, the dot.com bust, established the initial 
conditions within the industry, by which Nortel was influenced. The 3
rd
 event, the firing 
of Dunn and the second financial restatement announcement, reduced options not only 
through investor confidence (and reduction of capital) but also within the firm, as 
significant resources were redirected towards solving the financial problems. The 6
th
 
event, the class action settlement, although dismissed within the CEO narratives as 
relatively uneventful, dramatically reduced Nortel’s cash reserves. The 9th event, the 
global economic downturn, effectively eliminated Nortel’s options, resulting in 
bankruptcy protection (and eventually, liquidation).  
185 
 
Figure 18: Triggering Events on Nortel’s Path 
Overlaid on Sydow et al.’s (2009: 692) Constitution of an Organizational Path 
 
Table 24: List of Trigger Events for Path Diagram 
Event, Year - Month Description Trigger Type 
1 2001 Dot.com Bust External initial condition 
2 2003 – October  Financial Restatement #1  
3 2004 – April  Firing of Dunn / Financial Restatement #2 Critical juncture 
4 2005 – February  
2005 – June  
Daichendt’s Hiring / Departure  
5 2005 – October  Zafirovski’s Hiring  
6 2006 – February  Class Action Settlements  
7 2006 – March  Financial Restatement #3  
8 2007 – March  Financial Restatement #4  
9 2008 – September  Economic Meltdown Triggering lock-in 





5.4 Non-ergodic Process: The Role of Triggering Events  
 In the previous section, triggering events in Nortel’s path were identified and a 
path of strategic lock-in proposed. PCA argues that the process of lock-in is non-ergodic, 
in that the final outcome is neither dictated at the outset nor entirely arbitrary (Sydow et 
al., 2012). At the start of the path, options are influenced by initial conditions, but choice 
exists; options will not necessarily narrow until an event triggers the initiation of the path 
(between Phase I and Phase II) (Sydow et al., 2009). Follows is a discussion on the non-
ergodicity of Nortel’s path, and how strategic options were reduced over time. The 
discussion draws on findings presented in the previous section. 
5.4.1 Non-ergodicity 
  The dot.com bust had a direct impact on the entire industry, limiting the 
availability of customer capital, and therefore reducing the overall market size. With the 
reduction in market size, competition amongst current competitors increased. 
Competitors within Nortel’s strategic group each chose different market positions. For 
example, Cisco chose to remain concentrated in the Enterprise market, not only with its 
current product portfolio but also with new application software and business solutions. 
Unlike Nortel, they were selective in their internationalization, concentrating sales in 
specific geographic locations and centralizing their operations mainly in North America. 
Alcatel and Lucent chose to merge, complementing their product lines but lowering 
overall costs. Other competitors (e.g. Global Crossing) went out of business while some 
chose to establish spin-off joint ventures (Nokia Siemens).  Nortel, unlike all of its 
competitors, did not change its strategy even though market dynamics shifted. Instead 
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they continued to serve the same global customer base, with the same sales and 
manufacturing locations, with the same portfolio of products, as this was historically 
considered one of the firm’s core competencies that gave the firm a competitive 
advantage; being “global” was a Nortel trademark. To reduce costs, Nortel cut headcount 
horizontally across the organization, thereby reducing the overall size of the firm but not 
its scope. This tactic reduced the cost base (from 90,000 employees to 30,000 employees) 
but employees were left to deliver upon the same customer commitments. 
 Although Nortel struggled to recover from the dot.com bust, with revenues 
dropping by more than 50% from 2001 to 2002, Dunn’s cost cutting strategy appeared 
successful; he declared profitability by mid-2003. The financial restatement and his 
consequent firing, however, triggered a confidence issue amongst the financial and 
industry analysts. With the restatement ongoing and the firing of Dunn, the market began 
to blame Nortel’s performance on not only on the economic environment but also the 
company’s internal management. The restatement triggered issues with the firm’s equity 
position and led to costly repairs in the firm’s financial structure, eventually reducing 
their financial flexibility for mergers or acquisitions.  
5.4.2 A Critical Juncture 
 With the change of CEO in April 2004, Nortel had an opportunity to affect 
strategic change. Owens, as successor, could have positioned the event as a failure of his 
predecessor and implemented drastic changes. Instead, Owens pointed to the firm’s 
financial model and financial processes as the source of the problem, and elected not to 
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undertake strategic change. He directed tremendous resources to resolve the financial 
issues, including the attention of his Top Management Team. 
 The hiring of Gary Daichendt as President and Chief Operating Officer suggested 
a second opportunity for affecting strategic change. As a former Cisco executive, 
Daichendt was known in the industry for his innovative and strategic customer-focused 
thinking. At a time when Owens was criticized for a lack of firm strategy (and, as he 
admitted himself, primarily focused on financial restatements), the addition of Daichendt 
expanded strategic options and was positioned as such in the CEO narratives and by the 
media and analysts. The hiring was considered an opportunity for Nortel to establish a 
concrete strategy in the wake of the financial restatements.  
 Daichendt’s departure, so soon after his hiring, reduced the perceived options that 
his hiring had alluded to. Although the details behind the departure were not provided, 
Owens stated that he and Daichendt had a difference of opinion on management style and 
strategy. Had Daichendt’s departure followed with the introduction of a new strategy (or 
even a revised strategy), the event would not have been pertinent. However, Owens did 
not set a new strategy; four months later he implemented organizational restructuring but 
did not change the corporate or business level strategies themselves. Nortel remained on 
the strategic path that Dunn had put in place years prior. 
 The hiring of Zafirovski in November 2005 presented another option for strategic 
change. Zafirovski was known as a strategic decision maker who had led Motorola’s 
success in the telephone handset market. Zafirovski’s hiring renewed investor 
confidence; the industry and the organization were ready for change.  
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 Zafirovski, however, did not change the corporate or business level strategies. As 
with Owens, he continued to implement the strategies set out by Dunn years earlier (e.g. 
the movement from products to solutions; the shift into the Enterprise business). 
Although Zafirovski’s strategy was positioned by Nortel and the media as “new,” the 
objectives were tactical in nature: emphasis was on cost reduction, quality improvement 
(i.e. six sigma) and process efficiency. 
 The class action settlements of early 2006, although positioned as a historical 
issue, triggered further problems with the firm’s equity position (dilution) and cash 
reserves (dropped by $0.5B). Although Zafirovski chose to report results that excluded 
the cash payout, the company was significantly impacted from a financial perspective. 
The settlement was a triggering event that further reduced Nortel’s ability to use 
acquisitions for growth. Whether Zafirovski understood this limitation, however, is not 
clear. When prodded by analysts about growth through acquisitions, Zafirovski 
repeatedly stated that he believed organic growth was preferred (as he felt that 
acquisitions often failed). However, with the reduction in cash reserves and the ongoing 
financial challenges, internal growth was questionable. Zafirovski chose to manage 
internal growth through cost-cutting by outsourcing manufacturing, offshoring R&D (i.e. 
engineers) to lower-cost labour regions, and selling off components of the business (e.g. 
UMTS). 
 The financial restatements of 2006 and 2007 indicated that Nortel continued to 
incur costs in their financial restructuring activities. The restatements also caused concern 
in the business community, putting into question Zafirovski’s ability, or anyone’s ability 
for that matter, to strategically move away from the financial problems that plagued the 
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company. Although Zafirovski positioned the third and fourth financial statements as 
routine, the persistence of the financial restatement narrative led to negative responses by 
the media, analysts and employees. 
5.4.3 Lock-in 
 According to the theory, when lock-in occurs, the organization cannot move off 
path; even new members are forced to join the path (Sydow et al., 2012). Actors are 
either unable to affect strategic change or believe that no other options remain. 
  The September 2008 economic meltdown was the major event that effectively 
eliminated Nortel’s strategic options. Although Zafirovski communicated to the market in 
June 2008 that Nortel’s business outlook was positive and that the third quarter results 
would be better than industry average, options at that time were limited by the firm’s 
limited cash reserves and pending debt repayments. The day before the global markets 
collapsed, Zafirovski issued a warning and restated the quarter’s outlook. At the same 
time, he communicated that Nortel was interested in divesting its core asset, the optical 
portfolio. But with the market crash on the following day, any interested parties no longer 
had the ability to purchase the portfolio at Nortel’s asking price; the firm was unable to 
sell and apparently unwilling to reduce the price. By the end of 2008, Nortel’s cash 
reserves were depleted, due to significant reduction in sales revenue.  
 In January 2009, Nortel was forced into bankruptcy protection, unable to pay back 
outstanding debt. Although Zafirovski positioned the event as short term, and (for the 
first few months) spoke about the creation of a “New Nortel” with a new strategy, Nortel 
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was unable to acquire capital or garner customer confidence. By May of 2009, the firm 
had restructured into separate business units and only one option remained: liquidation. 
5.4.4 Summary 
 A series of events established Nortel’s organizational path, some of which 
expanded strategic options, while others reduced them. Nortel had the opportunity to 
change its strategic path not only during the CEO successions of Dunn, Owens, and 
Zafirovski, but also upon the hiring of Daichendt. Executive succession, especially 
following poor performance (firm and industry), offers firms a chance to change strategy 
(Hutzschenreuter at al., 2012). 
 None of the CEOs, however, chose to change the firm’s strategy. The initial 
strategy of the firm, when Dunn became CEO, was one of corporate related 
diversification, with a business level differentiation strategy. The firm’s core 
competencies were innovation, R&D, and a global reach. Innovation was the firm’s self-
proclaimed competitive advantage. The organization was structured as a transnational 
firm, with global product development and regional sales. Over the course of the eight 
years, this strategy and structure changed very little. But does strategy alone lock in a 
firm? The CEOs had choices on how to implement the strategy but, over time, these 
options were reduced. Why? The following section discusses the self-reinforcing process 




5.5 Self-Reinforcing Processes  
 This section discusses the self-reinforcing processes at Nortel that initially 
appeared to be rent-seeking but, over time, became deeply imbedded into the 
organization. The resultant web of processes created rigidity in the organization, reducing 
flexibility of moving off path and limiting the apparent options available to strategic 
decision makers (i.e. although different options were available, they were not chosen). 
 The self-reinforcing processes presented here were identified from the event data 
(qualitative and quantitative). The CEO narratives were not used in this analysis, to 
separate the analysis of the narratives in path dependence from the determination of the 
path’s constitution itself. Four overarching firm-level processes were found in the 
analysis including: cultivation of core assets, the market model, the financial model, and 
growth modes. These processes are summarized in Table 25, including their effects as it 
relates to organizational path dependence theory, and discussed as follows. For each 
process, the analysis considers when the process was initiated, the expected resultant 
effects (coordinating, complementarity, learning and adaptive expectation), and the 
outcomes related to the firm’s organizational path. The section concludes with a synthesis 
of the analysis, to illustrate how the processes became embedded into the organization 
and contributed towards strategic lock-in. 
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Table 25: Self-Reinforcing Processes in Nortel's Path 






















































Innovation, R&D and 
technology leadership 
 X X X 
Market model Initial 
Condition  
Broad market portfolio, 
serving carriers and 
enterprises, world-wide 
X X X X 
Financial model Dunn Improve operating margin 
through reduced sales, 
general and administrative 
costs – downsizing, 
offshoring, outsourcing, 
focused R&D, six sigma 
X  X X 
Growth modes Dunn  Organic growth through 
partnerships 
 X   
 
5.5.1 Cultivation of Core Assets: Innovation, R&D and Technology Leadership 
 Throughout Nortel’s history, innovation, research and development, and 
technology leadership were a central tenant for the firm. These capabilities were 
identified as the firm’s core assets, long attributed as the key capabilities that provided 
competitive advantage. In its self-reported history (see Appendix F), the company clearly 
position’s Nortel as an ongoing leader in telecommunications.   
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From Alexander Graham Bell's original telephone patents 
to the anywhere, anytime connections of today, Nortel has 
been at the forefront of innovation in the ever evolving 
history of communications. Since its 1895 founding as 
Northern Electric and Manufacturing, supplying 
telecommunications equipment for Canada's fledgling 
telephone system, Nortel has grown to become a global 
leader in delivering communications capabilities that 
enhance the human experience, power global commerce, 
and secure and protect the world's most critical 
information. (Nortel self-reported history, from 
www.nortel.com, downloaded May 11, 2011) 
  As an initial condition, these core assets were positioned as capabilities that 
required protection and nurturing. Nortel’s marketing and advertising consistently 
focused on the innovation capabilities of its products and of its role in the industry. 
Through the latter part of the 20
th
 century, Nortel’s operating environment supported a 
culture of innovation and R&D, where ideas were rewarded with generous bonuses and 
promotions. During this time, Nortel had led a number of telecommunication revolutions 
(i.e. Digital World, Fibre World). With thousands of patents, the firm was considered a 
leader in the industry; Nortel was often being first to market with products that 
revolutionized voice and data solutions, and led to the convergence of technologies and 
multimedia applications.  
 The processes and procedures that existed at Nortel supported the development of 
differentiated products through extended time-to-market processes, with resource-
intensive research. Employees were some of the highest paid in the industry, in particular 
the engineers. University engineering graduates, at all levels, were targeted by the firm 
even prior to graduation.  
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 When the industry started to shift in the first few years of the 21
st
 century, 
customers were no longer willing to pay a premium for the high technology equipment. 
New competitors joined the industry and with a lower cost base. With the advancements 
in technology, new entrants were able to copy the solutions in which Nortel had heavily 
invested. Huawei, for example, a Chinese company, entered the industry at the turn of the 
century and was an immediate competitor. Huawei’s ability to provide the same quality 
of products at a lower cost meant they could compete on price in an industry that 
traditionally competed on quality and innovation. Capital-poor customers started to 
demand lower prices. 
 As core assets, however, innovation, R&D, and technology leadership were 
deeply embedded into Nortel’s culture and operating structure. Nortel engineers were not 
only highly paid, but also afforded a work environment that supported their innovation. 
They were encouraged to attend industry seminars and conferences, which often included 
Nortel employees as key note speakers. Thousands of patents had been built up over the 
years, some of which had received awards. Relationships with university engineering 
faculties existed throughout North America; Nortel engineers and researchers worked 
together on new innovations. 
 The effects of these core assets over the decades were beneficial: Nortel created 
new product markets such as fibre and optical networking, and led the industry globally 
in this area. The processes created complementarity effects through Nortel’s industry 
partnerships in terms of development standards, education, patents, and innovations. The 
firm’s relationships with university researchers, industry experts, standards bodies, and 
user groups were deeply rooted into the firm’s culture and operations.  
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 Learning effects influenced the ongoing persistence of these core assets as well. 
The firm’s R&D processes had been developed over decades and were deeply rooted into 
the operating processes. Although the development process had been modified over the 
years (with an effort to reduce time to market), it was dominated by a theme of 
innovation and technology leadership; employees accepted and supported the need to 
produce innovative and high quality products, even if they incurred more resources. Over 
the years, employees became so proficient in the process that it was the standard way of 
doing business.  
 Adaptive expectation effects were realized through the culture of innovation and 
technology leadership. Nortel engineers were admired by industry, customers, and 
employees alike. R&D employees and teams were respected and rewarded. The emphasis 
on the powerful position of R&D encouraged others in the organization to be creative and 
innovative in their work. 
 Throughout the period of the case, these core assets remained at the forefront of 
the firm’s strategy. Nortel continued to pursue competitive advantage though 
differentiation, stressing the importance of innovation and technology leadership. 
Although Nortel had lost its position as a market leader, its primary objective was to 
return to that position.  
5.5.2 Market Model 
 The market model at Nortel, which consisted of the product markets and 
geographic markets, was an initial condition, developed in the 1990s by both CEO Jean 
Monty and CEO John Roth. In the mid-nineties, Jean Monty internationalized the firm, 
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establishing sales offices through the world and creating manufacturing centres of 
excellence outside of North America. John Roth furthered this strategy by continuing to 
expand not only throughout all five continents, but also into the enterprise and wireless 
product markets.  
 As discussed previously, all CEOs pursued this market model. Nortel consistently 
referred to itself in historical reports and material filings as a global telecommunications 
equipment manufacturer. In all of its material press releases and securities filings, Nortel 
characterized its market model (and leadership position) in the same (repeated) way. The 
following “About Nortel” extracts, the first from 2002 and the second from 2009, support 
this finding. 
Nortel Networks is an industry leader and innovator 
focused on transforming how the world communicates and 
exchanges information. The company is supplying its 
service provider and enterprise customers with 
communications technology and infrastructure to enable 
value-added IP data, voice and multimedia services 
spanning Metro and Enterprise Networks, Wireless 
Networks and Optical Long Haul Networks. As a global 
company, Nortel Networks does business in more than 150 
countries. (News Release, “About Nortel” extract, dated 
January 17, 2002) 
 
Nortel is a recognized leader in delivering communications 
capabilities that make the promise of Business Made 
Simple a reality for our customers. Our next generation 
technologies, for both service provider and enterprise 
networks, support multimedia and business critical 
applications. Nortel’s technologies are designed to help 
eliminate today's barriers to efficiency, speed and 
performance by simplifying networks and connecting 
people to the information they need, when they need it. 
Nortel does business in more than 150 countries around the 
world. (News Release, “About Nortel” extract, dated 
January 14, 2009) 
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 The market model was deeply ingrained into Nortel’s operations for two reasons. 
First, the carrier business was Nortel’s traditional customer segment, and the area in 
which Nortel had made significant contributions (e.g. fibre world in the 1980s and optical 
world in the 1990s). Nortel’s R&D capability was grounded in this product market. 
Second, in the late 1990s, John Roth spent over $45B on acquisitions to supplement the 
Enterprise and Wireless portfolios, including the $9B purchase of Bay Networks, a leader 
in the Enterprise market.  
 This market model was established in the 1990s in response to the 
commercialization of the internet. As the industry predicted significant bandwidth 
requirements for the turn of the century, John Roth positioned Nortel for growth. As a 
global business serving multiple product and geographic markets, Nortel had an 
opportunity to realize synergy through the transfer of both operational resources from the 
front end of the value chain (production, manufacturing, shopping, sales, customer 
service) and core competencies from the back end of the value chain (research and 
development). Nortel foresaw the merging of voice and data into multimedia solutions, 
and with a core competency in both of these areas (especially with the acquisition of Bay 
Networks), the firm was positioned for the future. 
 When Dunn became CEO he started to shift the market model from a focus on 
products to one on solutions (a combination of services and applications). He also 
increased investment in Enterprise, which was expected to grow faster than the Carrier 
business. Owens continued this approach, as did Zafirovski. 
 The effects of the market model, as a self-reinforcing process, touched upon all 
four types: (1) coordinating – transnational organization serving multiple product and 
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geographic markets; (2) complementarity – synergies across business units and markets; 
(3) learning – delivery of complex, high technical solutions; and, (4) adaptive 
expectations – a culture of being “all things to all people.” The market model dominated 
Nortel’s position as a global provider of telecommunications solutions to all types of 
businesses, and this model persisted throughout the period of the case. 
5.5.3 Financial Model  
 The financial model was initiated by Frank Dunn, when he took over as CEO. His 
predecessor, John Roth, had begun to make changes in the financial model, in direct 
response to the industry changes; as Nortel revenue dropped by 50% in 2001, the 
necessity to reduce costs was obvious. 
 Frank Dunn, however, had options. Nortel’s cost base had high fixed costs for two 
reasons: the market model and the operating model. Not only did Nortel serve businesses 
worldwide, it also had offices in over 150 countries and manufacturing facilities the 
world over. Additionally, Nortel employees were paid above the industry average. Added 
to this challenge was the lagging time-to-market for many of Nortel’s products. At a time 
when competitors were developing new products quickly and at a low cost, Nortel 
continued to delivery later and at a higher cost, but with little differentiation, or at least 
differentiation that the customer was willing to pay for. 
 Dunn chose to pursue higher operating margins by reducing sales, general, and 
administrative expenses. To do so, he used cost cutting measures such as reducing travel 
costs and broad downsizing. The downsizing, however, was not based on product or 
geographic markets, it was done horizontally across the firm; departments were tasked 
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with eliminating employees, not particular functions. This resulted in a reduction in the 
workforce but not in customer deliverables. With fewer employees available to create, 
build and deliver solutions, sales and delivery of contracts were negatively affected. 
 Dunn also pursued outsourcing as a means to lower costs, starting with the 
outsourcing of most manufacturing facilities to Flextronics. Additionally, a large portion 
of the firm’s Information Technology organization was outsourced at the turn of the 
century. Nortel chose to protect its core R&D assets and outsource complementary assets 
that other firms could perform at a lower cost. 
 The financial model stayed in place during Owens’ tenure. As with Dunn, Owens 
continued to restructure the organization, lay off employees, and implement rules and 
procedures that would reduce costs (i.e. travel policies, restructuring of the stock option 
plans). He continued to focus on increasing the operating margin by reducing expenses.  
 Zafirovski, faced with the same challenges as his predecessors, also tackled the 
financial model in the same way. He continued to restructure the organization and 
downsize the number of employees. Additionally, he relocated employee functions to 
lower cost areas and redirected R&D investment towards growth areas (but also reduced 
the overall R&D investment). The decision to reduce and redirect R&D resources eroded 
the firm’s competency in this area. The decision was also in direct conflict with the firm’s 
desire to cultivate R&D as a core asset and to serve a broad range of customers and 
product markets. While the firm continued to emphasize its position as a global leader in 
both the carrier and enterprise businesses, the reduction in R&D and the relocation to 
areas away from the knowledge base reduced the firm’s capability to deliver innovative 
products in a timely manner.  
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 Zafirovski also implemented a form of six sigma; a quality and cost initiative that 
he adopted from GE and Motorola. ‘Lean Six Sigma’ was implemented within the firm as 
a key driver for process improvement, with the goal of reducing costs, increasing time to 
market and improving overall quality. The program became central to Nortel’s efforts of 
reducing expenses and was complemented by ‘Own it’ – an employee-driven (grass 
roots) cost-cutting program.  
 The elimination of costs had the desired effect of reducing the overall cost base, 
however, the firm struggled with the rate at which it was able to realize the benefits. 
Regardless, the model became ingrained into the firm’s operations in two ways. First, the 
model had a coordinating effect, in that the entire firm became critically cost conscious. 
Transparency and scrutiny in financial reporting (primarily due to the financial 
restatement process) was prevalent throughout the organization.  
  Second, the model had a learning effect. While the industry slowly recovered, the 
pressure to reduce costs was ongoing. Restructuring, downsizing, offshoring, and 
outsourcing became familiar mechanisms to the Nortel executive and the employees. 
Nortel streamlined processes in each of these areas: reorganizations happened frequently 
and were expected, employee layoffs and restructure of work was habitual, moving 
headcount to lower-cost areas was initially resisted but became a standard tactic 
(especially in Zafirovski’s tenure), and outsourcing of non-core activities had been used 
since the late 20
th
 century.  
 Finally, the model had adaptive expectation effects, specifically as it related to the 
Lean Six Sigma program. Zafirovski promoted the importance of this initiative not only 
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within the firm but also with analysts and in material documents. A six sigma black belt 
(level of achievement) was considered a top honour.  
5.5.4 Growth Modes 
 In the late 1990s, Nortel grew exponentially. As discussed previously, CEO John 
Roth spent over $45B acquiring companies that would allow Nortel to grow the 
enterprise and wireless businesses. When the dot.com bust hit, however, and industry 
revenues declined by half, growth became less of a priority for all industry players, who 
were seeking ways to simply sustain the business. Some firms merged, while others 
restructured their business operations or changed their product focus. Nortel did neither, 
opting instead for the cost cutting approaches explained in the previous section. 
 When Dunn began his tenure, the firm started focusing on partnerships, mainly 
strategic alliances, for growth. With little cash available for acquisitions, Nortel chose to 
grow organically and through partnerships. The only exception to this was the purchase 
of Nortel Government solutions (PEC) by Owens, a firm that served the US military 
market. Nortel also pursued some formal arrangements such as the joint venture with LG 
and a strategic alliance with Microsoft (the performance of which was never quantified).  
 The need for growth became increasingly important as Nortel pushed further into 
the Enterprise and Services businesses. Zafirovski managed this need by restructuring the 
organization such that headcount was reduced in slow growth areas and increased in 
services. In some cases employees simply moved from a product organization into a 
services function, even if they lacked the expertise. This was problematic for Nortel, as 
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the firm sought to become a solutions provider when its strength lay in product 
development. 
 The partnership growth strategy had a complementarity effect: by combining 
resources and capabilities with others in the industry, Nortel was able to provide solutions 
to customers without significant investment. Given that Nortel’s cash position was 
strained, this approach provided flexibility and opportunity. The Microsoft relationship, 
in particular, signalled to the market that Nortel had valuable resources and capabilities. 
 The growth strategy also had learning effects. Partnerships with industry players, 
formed through not only formal relationships but also strategic relationships, became 
embedded into the firm’s operating environment. Nortel’s firm boundaries became 
blurred. With resources lacking, this became the model for growth.  
5.5.5 A Deep Structure of Embedded Processes 
 The four processes discussed in this section were each deeply embedded into the 
organization. Core assets and the market model were initial conditions that had been part 
of the fabric of Nortel for at least a decade. The financial model and growth modes were 
new, initiated by Dunn when he began his tenure (and spurred by the industry malaise). 
Owens and Zafirovski continued to embed these processes within the firm throughout 
their tenures as well, as evident in the firm’s material reports. In combination, these 
processes became tangled together, but not as a complementary group of processes, rather 
they were in conflict. As show in Table 26, each of the processes had positive effects but, 
in combination, they worked against each other. The effect of this web of processes is 
discussed in the following section. 
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Table 26: Outcomes of Nortel's Self-Reinforcing Processes 
Type of Effect Self-Reinforcing Process Cumulative 
Outcome 
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5.6 Organizational Path Dependence and Strategic Lock-in at Nortel 
 The two processes that were initially present when Dunn began his tenure –core 
assets (innovation, R&D, technology leadership) and the market model (global, carrier 
and enterprise) – emphasized Nortel’s historical corporate and business level strategies. 
The company was a multinational that used a transnational structure to deliver high 
205 
 
technology solutions worldwide. Innovation was at the core of the firm’s competitive 
advantage and R&D was the firm’s core asset.  
 The two processes that were initiated by Dunn and cultivated by the remaining 
CEOs – the financial model (cost reduction) and growth model (partnerships) – were in 
response to the industry conditions and the firm’s lack of cash. These processes became 
just as embedded as the previous two, however they were in direct conflict. The 
horizontal workforce reductions eroded capabilities across the firm, as did the relocation 
and reduction of R&D resources. The emphasis on streamlining processes and removing 
costs out of the business went against Nortel’s culture of innovation. In terms of growth 
modes, although partnerships for Nortel were not new, Nortel was historically the leader 
of industry partnerships, whereas in this case, Nortel was required to partner to deliver 
solutions. Nortel’s culture of “not invented here” made this growth mode strategy 
challenging. 
 The interaction of these processes resulted not only in a lack of resources to 
deliver innovative solutions but also an inability (or desire) to move from a differentiated 
business strategy to one of low cost. Nortel, therefore, became stuck on a path where they 
were unable to provide either differentiation that the customer was willing to pay for or 
low cost commodity products. Nortel’s culture of innovation was challenged, leaving the 
firm (and the industry) questioning Nortel’s identity. Customer needs were no longer 
being met and the challenge of delivering solutions to such a broad (global) portfolio was 
a strain on the organization. The ongoing interaction between these four processes and 
the triggering events (discussed previously) led Nortel down an increasingly rigid path 
that resulted in lock-in (see Figure 19). 
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Figure 19: Constitution of Nortel's Organizational Path 
Overlaid on Sydow et al.’s (2009: 692) Constitution of an Organizational Path 
 
 As illustrated, the constitution of Nortel’s organizational path involved a complex 
interplay between levels, actors, processes, and events. The path constitution analysis 
indicates that the actors at the focus level of analysis (the CEOs) were, at times, aware of 
the options to move off path, but chose to invest (from one tenure to another) in the self-
reinforcing processes that appeared to be rent-seeking but were often in direct conflict 
with each other. 
 The initial event (#1) of the dot.com bust, which was brought on by an economic 
downturn in 2001, initiated the implementation of the financial model and growth mode 
processes, by Dunn. Although these processes were mutually exclusive from the market 
model and focus on innovation and R&D (initial conditions), Dunn chose to run the 
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business with this dual focus, as did Owens and Zafirovski. The structure of the firm, 
however, could not support it. Dunn’s efforts to manage the financial model in such a 
way that led to his dismissal (event #2) is symptomatic of his struggle to manage the 
organization as an innovation engine (differentiation strategy) while emphasizing the 
need for efficiency (low-cost strategy). Although Owens had an opportunity to change 
the strategy during his tenure (event #3), the dismissal of Daichendt (event #4) reinforced 
the current market model while the cost of restructuring the finance organization reduced 
flexibility. Zafirovski was positioned as the turn-around CEO (event #5) but he too was 
constrained by the conflicting self-reinforcing processes. On the one hand, he emphasized 
Nortel’s innovation capability, but on the other hand, he had to reduce costs in order to 
meet debt repayments. The class action lawsuit (event #6) came at an inopportune time, 
drastically reducing Nortel’s cash position. The financial restatements that followed 
(event #7 and #8) further eroded investor confidence, making it difficult for Nortel to 
raise funds. But Zafirovski persisted with the four processes, still operating with the same 
broad customer base, product portfolio, and global scope; he stressed innovation, R&D 
and technology leadership, while promising to reduce costs and leverage partnerships. By 
the time the economy collapsed (event #9), Nortel was stuck; the firm could not move off 




CHAPTER 6.   CEO Narrative Infrastructure and Intertextuality 
6.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, a path constitution analysis on Nortel indicated that the 
firm became stuck on an organizational path that resulted in bankruptcy protection (and 
eventually, liquidation). The analysis showed that at the centre of the path were the 
organizational level actors, namely the CEOs, who chose to pursue similar courses of 
action. In combination with triggering events that occurred both within the firm and 
outside of the firm, Nortel was eventually unable to move off path (although the 
opportunities did exist initially). The CEOs could have chosen a different market model 
and invested in new core assets, but they chose to stay with historical assets, which were 
in conflict with the newly initiated financial model and growth modes. The question 
remains if whether or not the CEO narratives also influenced Nortel’s strategic path, and 
if so, how.  
 To determine the answer to the research question, the narratives themselves must 
be investigated for their textual characteristics. This chapter therefore presents the 
preliminary step in answering the research question by first identifying the textual 
relationships between the different sources of CEO narratives, over time and between 
CEOs (see Figure 20). The chapter is divided into two sections: first, the structural 
relationships between the sources of narratives are explored (Genette, 1997); second, 
using the results of the grounded coding, a discursive analysis is performed on the CEO 




Figure 20: CEO Narrative Analysis (Step 5) 
 
 Results indicate that CEO narratives create an infrastructure that represents CEO 
strategizing; narratives build from the past into the present and provide a discourse of 
direction on the future. Even through CEO succession, intertextuality remains high. 
CEOs draw on themes that represent the self-reinforcing processes of path dependence, 
further solidifying the processes in the organization. These results are discussed as 
follows. 
6.2 Structural Textuality 
 In this first of two sections, the structural characteristics of the sources of CEO 
narratives are presented, using Genette’s (1997) approach discussed in the theory chapter 
(see Table 27). The purpose of this analysis is to understand the extent of structural 
relationships between the texts. As suggested in Figure 21, the CEO narratives 
theoretically create a narrative infrastructure, but the characterization of this 
infrastructure is unknown. It’s only through an analysis of intertextuality that it is 
possible to determine the extent to which the texts are related. This section therefore 
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looks at structural characteristics in the following order: how the narratives are produced 
and in what context (paratextuality and architextuality); and, the connection of narratives 
between each other, either implicitly (metatextuality) or directly (hypertextuality).  
Table 27: Genette's Types of Transtextuality  
(As summarized by Allen, 2000: 98-104) 
Textual 
Characteristic 
Genette’s definition, as quoted by Allen (2000) 
Intertextuality “a relationship of copresence between two texts of among several texts” (Genette, 
1997: 1) 
Metatextuality  When a text “unites a given text to another, of which it speaks without necessarily 
citing it (without summoning it), in fact sometimes even without naming it” 
(Genette, 1997: 4) 
Hypertextuality “any relationship uniting a text B... to an earlier text A... upon which it is grafted in a 
manner that is not that of commentary”(Genette, 1997: 5) 
Paratextuality “elements which lie on the threshold of the text and which help to direct and control 
the reception of a text by its readers” (Allen, 2000: 100) – e.g. titles, sub titles, 
book jackets 




Figure 21: Nortel CEO Narrative Infrastructure (Descriptive) 
 
6.2.1 Paratextuality and Architextuality 
 In this section, each of the different sources of CEO narratives is discussed in 
terms of descriptive features (paratextuality) and how they were generally accepted 
(architextuality). The purpose is to position the texts within a narrative framework, for 
the subsequent discursive analysis. 
 Analyst Calls .  Generally, participation on analyst calls is controlled; only 
registered analysts covering the firm are authorized to ask questions, although the public 
can listen in on the calls. With Regulation Fair Disclosure (SEC, 2000), the call 
transcripts must be made available after the call, thereby ensuring full disclosure with all 






























































include both the opening narrative from the CEO and CFO, and the question and answer 
period.  
 The analyst call transcript itself is broken down into two sections: the first section 
is a summarized version of the call, including a bulleted list of any documentation used in 
conjunction with the call (e.g. PowerPoint slides); and, the second section is the verbatim 
transcript, about 10 to 15 pages long, Arial 10 point font, 8x11 ½ . In the case of Nortel, 
the PowerPoint slides were made available on the Nortel website (in the Investor section). 
 Analysts typically filed a report soon after an earnings call, often quoting portions 
of the call and the associated 10-K (or 10-Q). Media would also file articles soon after the 
call, using direct quotes from the call and quoting analysts who they had interviewed 
soon after. Stock price often moved if there was analyst consensus on either positive or 
negative news.  
 Within the firm, analyst calls themselves were rarely discussed. CEO narratives, 
however, would reference an analyst report or news article produced after the call to 
either legitimize a decision or argue its validity. 
 Letters to Shareholders. Letters to Shareholders were made available in the 
firm’s marketing version of the annual report (not the official 10-K). In all but one case, 
the CEO letter followed the Chairman’s letter (the exception was the combined letter in 
2001). The annual report was primarily a marketing document, with supporting financial 
information, whereas the 10-K was primarily a financial (regulatory) document. The 
Letter itself included a picture of the CEO, a salutation, pictures, tables and figures, a 
complementary close, and a hand written signature. In one instance, Zafirovski included 
his Letter in one of his CEO Emails, below his complementary close, and encouraged all 
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employees to read it. The Letter was not considered newsworthy by the media or 
analysts. 
 News Releases (8-Ks).  Corporate news releases were issued by Nortel when a 
material change occurred within the firm. The company would issue the release on the 
newswire and also file an 8-K, which would detail the material change (as per SEC 
regulations) and attach the news release as an appendix. In certain instances when the 
news was not considered financially material, a news release was issued without a 
corresponding 8-K. Most news releases that included CEO narrative (i.e. CEO quotes) 
reported on one (or more) of the following: financial performance (announcement of 
quarterly or annual reports), the financial restatement process, a change in executive 
leadership, a business acquisition or partnership, a divestiture, or a major material event 
such as bankruptcy protection or change in financial guidance.  
 All news releases were made available on the firm’s public website. News 
releases were also posted internally on the employee ‘Global Web’ home page, the main 
webpage for the firm’s corporate intranet. Due to regulations, material information had to 
be communicated to all stakeholders at the same time; therefore, when the firm issued 
material information through a news release, it was posted on the business wire and on 
Global Web in parallel. Soon after a release was issued, a CEO Email was sent to 
employees to introduce the material information and provide a hyperlink to the news 
release; as such, employees found out about material information at the same time as the 
market, and no sooner. If an employee was not near his or her computer at the time, it 
was possible that a customer or other external stakeholder would receive the news first.  
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 CEO quotes in news releases were similar in nature from one news release to the 
next, depending on the type of information being communicated. For example, upon 
releasing financial results, all three CEOs upon started their quotes with “I’m very 
pleased...” The quotes usually confirmed the material information being presented. 
Sometimes quotes used in the news releases were also repeated in the CEO Emails. 
 Media Interviews.  Most of the interviews were with Zafirovski and contained a 
small number of quotes (with only a few exceptions). Quotes rarely offered a new 
perspective on firm strategy or direction, focusing more on either the personal 
background of the CEO or reinforcing narrative previously shared elsewhere. 
 CEO Emails.  CEO Emails were electronic in nature, using HTML coding once it 
became available. Zafirovski’s emails were also made available on the firm’s intranet 
(i.e. Global Web). Links to these archived emails were included in later CEO Emails. 
 Although the emails were distributed internally, some of them made their way 
into the public domain
20
. The emails were signed by the CEOs; they did not contain a 
confidentiality disclosure. Once the emails were distributed, there were often follow-on 
emails from other Nortel executives reinforcing the CEO’s original narrative and 
providing additional narrative specific to the leader’s area of responsibility.  
                                               
 
 
 20 Mark Evans, a Canadian blogger and journalist, published seven of Mike Zafirovski’s emails on 
his blog, All About Nortel, which was hacked in August 2012. All data was lost.  
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 The CEOs issued emails, on average, every 4 to 6 weeks, with the exception of 
Binning, who issued an email only when a purchase offer was made on a business unit or 
the business unit was actually sold. The emails were triggered either by material 
information (coupled with a news release) or by an internal event such as the annual sales 
conference, annual leadership meeting, strategy planning process launch, annual 
compensation review, or job satisfaction survey. These events served as the narrative 
plot. 
 Findings from the detailed CEO Email analysis (see Appendix G) suggest that the 
CEO Email represents an intraorganizational strategy narrative, whereby the CEO 
attempts to establish a one-on-one discourse with every employee. Using rhetorical 
history, the Nortel CEOs defined, developed and confirmed organizational norms, values 
and beliefs to shape employee behaviour and reconstructed past events to legitimize 
executive decisions and actions.  
 The informal and personal nature of the CEO Email also allowed CEOs to 
develop their own individual identity within the organization, in context to the 
organization’s identity. However, with the communicative purpose being to shape 
employee thinking and behaviour, the CEO Email retained a monological tone that 
reaffirmed the CEO’s role as the master architect of the firm’s strategy, even with 
attempts at levelling. 
 The CEO Email narratives were found to be both optimistic and inclusionary. 
They had temporal awareness and concern for the past, present and future, were realism-
based, and emphasized present-day activity. The narrative, however, had limited spatial 
awareness, even though Nortel was a global enterprise.  
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 The tone of the emails displayed minimal certainty. Although the CEO’s tone was 
highly familiar, with a significant use the first person, all four CEOs were cautious in 
their narratives. 
 Conclusion. Through analysis of paratextuality and architextuality, this section 
has provided context on the five sources of CEO narratives included in this study. 
Findings indicate that each of the different types of texts had a unique purpose. Although 
each contained strategy narrative, the readership differed: analyst calls were a live 
discussion with the analyst community, CEO Emails were a one-way narrative with 
employees, the Letter to Shareholders was directed to shareholders in general, news 
releases had an even broader appeal and, finally, media interviews were directed towards 
the readership of the media source (who brokered the conversation). Follows is an 
analysis on the textual relationships that may have existed both within and between each 
of these sources. 
6.2.2 Metatextuality and Hypertextuality 
 Metatextuality refers to the reference of one narrative to another, although not 
necessarily explicitly. Within their own narratives, the CEOs often referred to other 
narratives, including both their own and those produced by others within and external to 
the corporation (see Table 28). The texts, in this case, went beyond the different sources 
of CEO narratives and included narratives produced through events, such as sales 
conferences, analyst events, leadership meetings, and the annual general meeting. These 
references were made consistently over time and between CEOs within three sources of 
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narratives: shareholder letters, analyst calls, and CEO Emails. References to other texts 
within CEO news release or media interview quotes were minimal.  
Table 28: References to other Texts 
References to: Total 
References 
Sales Conference 19 
Annual General Meeting 24 
Analysts/investors/events 97 
Board Meetings and Decisions 130 
Employee Survey 73 
Industry Data 27 
Leadership Meeting 60 
Media Articles 63 
Corporate News Releases 167 
External Experts 84 
Total 744 
 
 These findings suggest that the shareholder letters, analyst calls and emails all 
contained metatextual characteristics with other types of texts, while the news release 
quotes and media interview quotes did not. For example, shareholder letters often 
referred to industry data on market positioning, technology innovations, and product 
leadership. On the analyst calls, the CEOs referred to quarterly and annual reports, 
corporate events, Board meetings, news releases, external experts, and the annual general 
meeting. Within the CEO Emails there were references to both internal and external 
events and reports produced by external analysts and experts.  
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 Between CEOs, Dunn differed from Owens and Zafirovski in his references to 
other texts. While the latter two had the highest references in analyst calls, Dunn’s were 
greatest in the Letters to Shareholders.  
 In all cases, the CEOs referenced other texts within their emails consistently. As 
the main written text between CEO and employee, this finding suggests that the CEO 
Emails were positioned within the organization as central narratives, drawing in other 
texts to form a foundation for the narrative, and connecting to supporting texts to expand 
the narrative’s reach. 
 Hypertextuality exists when there are explicit references within a text to another 
text. In totality, this occurred 205 times within the texts, with 189 of them in the CEO 
Emails. Hypertextuality increased over time within the emails, likely due to 
advancements in technology; once Zafirovski was CEO, embedded hyperlinks to a 
website, document, previously issued email, and other electronic sources became 
common email practice.  
6.2.3 CEO Narrative Infrastructure 
 The analysis of structural textuality suggests that the sources of CEO narrative 
were interconnected through either direct or indirect references and also through events. 
As suggested in Figure 22, the CEO narratives were produced as a form of conversation 
with actors within and external to the organization, at varying levels. The infrastructure 
created by the narratives suggests interaction between the levels over time, as recursive 
activity initiated by events, and leading to further events. Although Figure 22 illustrates 
the pattern of narrative activity only over a 6-month period (due to visual limitations), 
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this pattern is evident throughout the entire 8-year period. In most cases, CEO narratives 
were triggered by either an internal event or an external event, and usually when the 
event had material consequences. The obligation of the firm to communicate material 
events was a significant impetus for CEO narrative production.   
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 Figure 23 proposes a model on how CEO narratives are initiated by events. As the 
model suggests, events can be initiated either by the firm or by external actors. Although 
material events will initiate narratives, other events may also be the impetus, such as a 
legal or regulatory decision (e.g. the class action lawsuit, Standard and Poor’s decision to 
remove Canadian companies for the S&P 500), or even a media article written about the 
firm.  
 These textual relationships suggest that a CEO narrative infrastructure existed at 
Nortel, through structural relationships. The question that remains: were they also 
connected through discursive themes? Follows is this analysis. 




6.3 Discursive Themes 
6.3.1 The Centrality of Actors 
 Before discussing the discursive themes themselves, it’s important to draw upon 
an earlier finding on the centrality of actors within the CEO narratives. The Path 
Constitution Analysis used the grounded coding from the CEO narratives to determine 
how the central actors in the analysis (i.e. the CEOs) interacted with the various levels of 
analysis (macroeconomic, industry, firm-level and intraorganizational). The CEO 
narratives were dominated with references to actors, but most specifically customers, 
employees and the Top Management Team. In addition, the CEOs frequently referred to 
themselves within their narratives in terms of their role and responsibilities, their 
expectations of employees and their emotions (e.g. confidence, assurance, and 
commitment). See Table 29. 
Table 29: CEO Narratives and the Centrality of Actors 
Narrative Illustrative Quote 
Dunn, CEO Email, 
October 11, 2002 
I thank you for your energetic efforts, and I ask you to join me in 
renewing your commitment to rebuilding our foundation for the 
future around our four core businesses and our ability to deliver 
value to our customers. 
Dunn, Letter to 
Shareholders, 2002 
 You might say these are Nortel Networks family values – guiding 
how we do business and behave as a company. Going to the heart 
of our culture and corporate governance, these values revolve 
around always putting the customer first, striving for industry-
leading quality in every aspect of our business, pursuing 
breakthrough innovations that benefit our customers, always 
acting with integrity, and being an employer that treats its people 
as its strength. 
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Narrative Illustrative Quote 
Owens, CEO Email, 
April 29, 2004 
It will take some time to reestablish our complete credibility, but 
there are certain truths. First and most importantly, we are 
blessed with a wonderful group of people -- strong, smart, and 
devoted to our company. Second, I want you to know how 
committed and confident I am in working with you to grow our 
business to an even stronger level. Third, while confidence has 
been shaken, I know we will work to restore it for our customers, 
our suppliers and our many shareholders. 
Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, October 25, 
2006 
There is nothing more important than an absolute and unwavering 
focus on the customer. One of the ways I try to remain true to that 
principle is by spending at least 50% of my time focused 
externally, including talking to the people who have put their 
trust in us: the companies whose businesses depend on our 
products. I don't think that there's anything more important to the 
success of our business than listening to the voice of the 
customer. And I encourage you to think the same way. 
Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, March 13, 
2006 
I have great expectations of our people to make Nortel better. 
However, to truly maximize Nortel’s strength, we must develop a 
mindset where we seamlessly work together to put our customers 
ahead of all else. For this to occur, we must knock down the silos 
and perhaps, remove some layers. We can’t have the passion of 
our leaders/employees diluted by too many filters. 
Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, May 4, 
2007 
So let me be clear. My executive team and I are not the ones who 
will ensure a bright future for Nortel alone. Each and every one 
of you has a part to play. Each and every one of you is part of 
team Nortel. We need you in the game. 100%. Without 
reservation. The sum of all of your efforts, if channeled with the 
right attitude in the right places, can make an incredibly powerful 
difference. 
 
 The centrality of actors within the narratives suggests two important findings: 
first, CEOs embed their narratives within a specific context, and second, this context may 
reflect the CEOs’ strategic focus. Although numerous actors were mentioned in the 
narratives, the focus on customers, employees, and top management suggests that the 
CEOs, during the period of the case, were exceptionally concerned about meeting 
customer needs, and were taking an authoritative approach to the implementation of the 
firm’s strategy.  
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6.3.2 Major Discursive Themes and Primary Narratives 
 Through the grounded coding and first order concepts, second order themes were 
identified to understand the general nature of the CEO narratives and the persistence of 
themes over time and between narrative sources (see Table 30).  As the table indicates, 
some sources of narrative had a higher prevalence of discursive themes than others, for 
two reasons: (1) how frequently the source text was issued, and (2) the length of the 
source’s text. For example, analyst calls were held relatively frequently (at least once per 
quarter) and lasted over an hour. The CEO quotes from the analyst calls were robust, 
consisting of about 75% of the total content. On the other hand, the CEO quotes from the 
news releases and interviews were limited. Letters to Shareholders were issued only once 
per year, but the dominant themes occurred frequently in these specific narratives from 
one CEO to the next. The Letters, compared to the other narratives, were traditional 
stories, telling the “tale” of the previous year and of the future to come. 
Table 30: Discursive Themes in CEO Narratives 
Major Discursive Themes 





















































Mechanisms Processes and practices of 
strategy implementation 
High High Low Low High 
Customers Needs, satisfaction, value, 
engagement 
Med Med Low Low High 
Financial Issues Performance, restatements, 
structure, objectives 
High Med Low Low High 
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Major Discursive Themes 





















































Strategy Corporate and business 
strategies, business model, 









Low High Low Low High 
Top Management 
Team and Board 
of Directors 
Roles and responsibilities, 
authority, decisions 











Med Med Low Low High 
Organizational 
Identity 
Core values, corporate 
behaviour, culture, history, 
reputation, vision, identity 
High High Low Low High 
 
 Although the consistency of themes across all narrative sources suggests the 
existence of a narrative infrastructure through textual relationships, the relative 
occurrence between sources suggests that some sources of CEO narratives had a greater 
influence than others. The Letters to Shareholders are rich narratives, which embody the 
firm’s performance and strategic direction, within the context of the industry. The 
Letters, however, are issued only once per year, and as suggested in the previous 
discussion on structural relationships, they were minimally related to any other sources of 
narrative. The Letters neither referred to other sources of narratives nor were referred to 
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by others, with one exception: the CEO Email, which either linked to the Letter when it 
was issued, or directly included it (in one instance). 
 The CEO quotes from the news releases and interviews were relatively few and 
contained minimal reference to the discursive themes, suggesting that these two sources 
of narratives were relatively inconsequential. However, the entire news release (not just 
the CEO quote) was strongly structurally linked to the CEO Emails, not only through 
textual references but also with electronic hyperlinks.  
 The analyst calls and the CEO Emails frequently and consistently contained 
narrative around the discursive themes. Although these two narrative sources were not 
strongly structurally related, they were both laden with text about strategy formulation 
and implementation. Notably, the intended audiences for these two narratives were 
different. The analyst calls were directed not only directed at analysts but also at 
shareholders and the business media; the business media frequently quoted the CEO’s 
narrative from the analyst calls, within their articles, when reporting on the firm’s 
material reports. The CEO Emails were directed at employees. 
 Through the analysis of structural relationships and discursive themes, this section 
concludes that a narrative infrastructure existed at Nortel, through the CEO narratives, 
and that this infrastructure was dominated by two primary sources of narratives: the CEO 
analyst call and the CEO Email. The other three sources of narratives – the Letter to 
Shareholders and the quotes from the CEO news releases and media interviews – 




6.3.3 The Dominant Narrative 
 The dominant narrative that occurred throughout the period of the case was the 
influence of the economy on the telecommunications industry, the customers changing 
needs, and the changes required by Nortel to meet those needs. In particular, the CEOs 
reinforced the firm’s corporate and business level strategies repeatedly, identified the 
firm’s strengths and competitive advantages, and the processes that were required to 
succeed. As part of this rhetoric, they emphasized the important of leadership, 
responsibility, and accountability in terms of not only financial transparency but also 
leading change. Employees were encouraged to take action, to lead, and to push ahead in 
the face of adversity. The undertone in this narrative was the need to achieve results 
quickly and at the lowest cost possible, through downsizing, restructuring, offshoring, 
outsourcing, and partnerships. A selection of illustrative quotes, from both CEO Emails 
and the analyst calls, with a few from the Letters to Shareholders, provides insight into 
how this narrative unfolded over time (see Table 31). Using quotes from each of the 
CEO’s narratives, the consistency in the narrative from one CEO to the next is 
demonstrated. 




Influence of the global economy and the industry 
Dunn, Analyst 
Call, July 24, 
2003 
The real question, at what pace do they start moving forward on those 
programs, and that's going to be determined in the shorter term by the -- 
some external forces such as the economic -- the global economic 










But I will tell you that competition has been difficult in our marketplace, not 
only for us but for our competitors.  We have seen consolidation of major 
telecoms companies, which gives them more profound bargaining power, 
and we are seeing the real presence of the new Chinese competitors, 
Huawei, ZTE and UTStarcom.  Nevertheless, we are doing well even 




Our transformation and renewal will continue to unfold against a backdrop 
of not just industry, but global business and economic change. I realize the 
world will not stand still and neither will Nortel. We will continue to take 
bold and difficult steps to ensure we are in control of our destiny 




Technology Leadership -- We must strengthen our position as an industry 
leader and innovator that's ahead of the curve.  Our commitment to 
innovation has to intensify.  We must be an influential "thought leader" of 
innovation by stimulating a creative culture in our labs that recognizes and 
rewards new ideas and inventiveness.  We have to translate our 
innovations into solutions that our customers see as second to none in 
addressing their needs. 
Owens, Analyst 
Call, April 28, 
2004 
To our Nortel Networks customers, we will not let this distract us. We 
remain committed to our business strategy of technology and solutions 
leadership, and in helping customers drive their business success, reduce 




Globally, carriers then and today continue to face increasing volumes of 
traffic and mounting operating costs without commensurate revenue 
growth. Their challenge is to manage investment and drive out operating 
costs. Enterprises facing increasing growth in their traffic need to see 
distinct productivity improvements from the network capabilities they are 




The writing is on the wall: customers want to see their business applications 
integrated with their telephony systems. Microsoft, IBM, SAP, and others 
are integrating their desktop interface with telephony capabilities using 
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA). 




As an industry leader, we’re committed to designing and building the next-
generation Metro Optical Ethernet, optical long-haul, and wireless 






We continued fostering a vibrant culture of innovation in our labs and 
business units, maintaining significant R&D investments. Investment in 
R&D fuels the future – it’s the lifeblood of our industry and company. 
Very little is accomplished in this industry without R&D investments that 









We'll start out on our journey toward this envisioned future confident in 
Nortel Networks ability to achieve even the most audacious challenges.  
We certainly demonstrated this capability the past year, as well as in years 
gone by, when we undertook such bold missions as Digital World, OPEN 
World, and FiberWorld, to mention just a few of the pace-setting 
achievements that earned us our well-deserved reputation as an industry 




Because of our heritage and our solutions portfolio, we have an enormous 




I want to talk about our strategy going forward. We are organizing Nortel 
around the converged networks of the future. We will go from 4 principle 
business units to 2. One is a carrier-focused organization, the other is the 
enterprise-focused organization. We'll have a strong element of customer-
facing emphasis. 
Owens, Analyst 
Call, May 2, 
2005 
Nortel continues to spend on R&D at a higher percentage than our other 
competitors do. We take science and technology as something very special 
at Nortel. It's a bit of a -- the franchise and the legacy of Nortel will 
continue to spend strongly on R&D as we go forward. I'd like to tell you 
that we're smarter and therefore we get more for every dollar. I'm not sure 
I can tell you that. 
Owens, Analyst 
Call, June 1, 
2005 
We recognize that the competition from the Chinese vendors is very strong. 
We believe that we have a lot of discriminators with regards to this that 
help us as we deal with relationships that we have held with many of these 
customers for years -- that is Nortel's reputation for quality, for the five 9s 
reliability, with our growing element of security solutions that are possible 
for enterprise and for carrier customers. We realize that cost structure is 
very important as we look at that competition in that marketplace and 





But we are a global company. And that is a compliment or a criticism to say 
when somebody normally says a company is American, it typically carries 
a negative connotation. You are provincial, you are not necessarily 






If you look at the assets, I would argue most CEO's would kill to have this 
on their balance sheet, a company with an innovation, DNA which has 
produced some of the great innovations in the communications industry 




We believe that it marks a seismic change in the industry, and it can be 
added to the long list of Nortel innovations that have transformed 
networks over the years - including Digital World (the world’s first line of 
fully digital telecom systems), FiberWorld (telecom systems based on 
fiber optic technology), and successive waves of next-generation wireless 
technology.  
Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, April 3, 
2009 
Nortel has always been at the forefront of communications innovation – 
whether wireless, optical or in the enterprise space – and it’s good to see 











This is leadership that yields positive and profitable results, and helps 
inspire people to demonstrate a powerful spirit of performance.  That is 
our style for getting things done and for winning in a highly competitive 
marketplace.  As customers make every dollar of investment count, we're 
embroiled in a fierce battle for market share that shows no signs of 




The bottom line is Nortel Networks is on the move again. We are well 
positioned to go on the offensive and continue to create new realities for 
ourselves, our customers and our industry in 2004 and beyond, just as we 





All of these steps are a reflection of a new tone at the top at Nortel. So too is 
another announcement today, the announcement by 12 members of my 
senior management team to return their return to profitability bonus 
payments, and to disclaim their remaining 2003 restricted stock units. This 






I leave you this time with three actions we all must ascribe to if we are to be 
successful. It is my expectation that you will embrace them fully. 
 Lead and Energize Those Around You  
 Execute with Urgency  




You are central to the transformation of Nortel -- your teamwork, 






It's still the right time for Nortel, but only if we make it so. How do we 
ensure our success? I've said time and again, there is no silver bullet. It is 
our collective confidence, passion, leadership and accelerated execution 
that will get us there. 
Each of us has a role to play in determining Nortel's future. This is a career-
defining moment for all of us. It's when leaders and champions and are 
made. It's when greatness occurs. 




The industry continues to go through unprecedented change and challenges.  
This is not just a situation Nortel Networks is facing.  It's reflective of the 
broad and deep decline the industry is going through, a decline which is 
deeper and certainly more extended than expected.  This accounts for our 
decision to reduce our breakeven and take further action to reduce the 
workforce, as difficult as that decision is because of the disruption and 
stress it causes our employees and their families.  Deciding to undertake 
additional workforce reductions was not easy, and I hope those affected 








Call,  June 2, 
2004 
We will reduce cost as time goes on. Now, that doesn't necessarily mean 
employee reductions; it means processes and finding ways to get our cost 
levels as low as possible, because we know, in this world, that cost is an 
important element as we compete with not only our present competitive 
marketplace but also the growing presence of companies like Huawei in 




As I communicated to the market last summer, Nortel will continue its 
strategy of partnerships and alliances to speed solutions to market and 




I can't underscore enough that the success of Lean Six Sigma is foundational 
to rebuilding Nortel as a great company. It will require commitment and 
sign-up by every single employee, and each of you has a very important 
role to play in its success. I am counting on you to drive it with forceful 
optimism and rigor. 
Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, 
September 19,  
2007 
While we have accomplished a great deal over the past 18 months, there is 






And of course any time you announce this kind of an action, 2100, net 
reduction additional 1,000 employees will be moving to areas with higher 
growth and lower cost, as I've assured the employees twice previously, we 
do everything possible to redeploy the impact of the employees, feel 
absolutely terrific that at least 30% of the jobs impacted in the last 
restructuring will be able to transfer and redeploy employees elsewhere. 
This again will be a very organized and methodical process. But we will 
not blink. We will ensure we can compete against any company, any place 





In order to take significant costs out, we are re-examining our management 
cost structure, looking at our go to market processes as well as some 
duplications inherent in a matrix organization. 
6.3.4 Mechanisms as Self-Reinforcing Processes 
 The previous section illustrated the dominant narrative that existed throughout the 
period of the case. The dominant narrative repeatedly provided context to both analysts 
and employees, along with the business media and shareholders, on Nortel’s corporate 
and business level strategies, competitive advantage, and the mechanisms that Nortel 
would undertake to sustain the business and eventually grow. Each of these two sources 
of CEO narratives, however, appeared to have different objectives. The CEO analyst calls 
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were significantly related from one to the next. This textual relationship within the 
narrative source suggested that the analyst calls served as an ongoing discourse between 
the CEO, CFO, and the analysts. CEOs drew upon their earlier narratives (of previous 
calls). If a discrepancy existed within the narrative, from one call to the next, analysts 
were quick to point it out during the question and answer period. Notably, CEO 
succession did not influence change in this flow of discourse. The narrative on the call 
was presented in a standard way: the CEO and CFO provided the results in context of the 
industry and past performance, discussed the current performance, and reinforced the 
firm’s strategy or described how it may have changed. These calls provided a discourse 
of direction. 
 The CEO Emails, on the other hand, not only provided a discourse of direction, 
but also included specific requests by the CEO. As described in Appendix G on the 
analysis of the CEO Email macrostructure, the CEOs closed their emails with an “ask” to 
reinforce urgency and importance of the issue, emphasize relevant organizational values, 
and define expectations of employees. 
 Using the grounded codes, a list of CEO Email “asks” was established to identify 
these mechanisms as potentially self-reinforcing processes that could have contributed to 
the firm’s organizational path and lock-in, as outlined in Table 32. The table indicates if 
the mechanism was an initial condition or if it was initiated by a particular CEO. The 
effects of the mechanism are evaluated in the same manner as the self-reinforcing 
processes from the previous chapter. Follows is a discussion that illustrates how the 
CEOs requested employees to carry out these mechanisms, through the CEO Emails. 
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(Note: For this analysis, the Binning emails were not included given that Nortel had 
decided to liquidate by the time Binning was appointed). 
Table 32: Mechanisms in CEO Emails 

















































Focus on return to 
profitability by executing 
on the business plan, 
reduce expenses 
Dunn, carried on by all CEOs 
(using different 
terminology) 
X   X 
Live the core values Initial condition, carried on by 
all CEOs with emphasis on 
integrity 
X  X X 
Support the leaders, follow 
the plan, lead by example 
Dunn, carried on by all CEOs 
(Owens more sympathetic) 
X   X 
Collaborate across business 
units and functions 
Dunn, carried on by all, as 
necessity to achieve synergy 
 X X X 
Understand and 
communicate the Nortel 
strategy, market Nortel 
Owens, as part of the recovery 
from financial restatements, 
carried on by all 
X   X 
Support and seek 
partnerships 
Dunn, carried on by all X X  X 
Let go of the past negative 
events 
Owens and Zafirovski, look 
ahead 
X   X 
Listen to and serve  the 
customer 
Dunn X X X X 
Innovate in products and 
solutions 
Initial condition  X X X 
Follow me Dunn, Owens somewhat, 
Zafirovski, strong 
   X 
Work quickly Zafirovski X   X 




 Dunn’s requests were dominated by a desire to restore the firm’s profitability. 
With the significant decline in sales, restructuring the firm’s business model and 
preventing any further depletion of the firm’s cash reserves was critical. 
Restoring the company's profitability will be a major 
milestone, and is going to be a major focus of our attention 
and energy during the next six months.  There's likely to be 
more rough pavement on our journey to profitability, but, 
as you know, I'm passionately committed to reaching that 
goal.  I hope you are too, because I need your total 
commitment.  Nortel Networks needs your commitment.  
This endeavor must continue to be an inspiring mission for 
all of us.  Nothing could be more urgent for the company 
and its employees than its return to profitability. (Dunn, 
CEO Email, October 7, 2002). 
 
Returning to Pro Forma Profitability by the Second Quarter 
2003 -- This remains job #1. (Dunn, CEO Email, January 1, 
2003) 
 While stressing the importance of profitability, Dunn continued, however, to 
emphasize the importance of Nortel’s traditional core values (an initial condition, 
consisting of customers, people, quality, innovation, accountability, and integrity) and the 
need to draw upon the firms core assets. 
Clearly, much of our success in 2003 can be credited to the 
superiority of our products and solutions. Now is the time 
to take advantage and push the value of those tangible and 
intellectual assets even further. Today many of our R&D 
activities are structured along specific business categories 
working in silos. We need those teams to work together 
cross-functionally to develop new innovative offerings that 
build on our collective talent and expertise and clearly 
excite the market. I challenge our R&D teams and leaders 
to make that happen now - beginning today. (Dunn, CEO 
Email, January 29, 2004) 
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 At the same time, Dunn initiated a new theme of leadership and the need for 
employees to be leaders themselves, a theme that was carried out by the CEOs that 
followed. “It's also about leaders knowing their accountabilities and then demonstrating 
leadership behaviors and living our core values” (Dunn, CEO Email, June 26, 2003). 
 When Owens took over from Dunn, he continued the narrative on the need to 
return to profitability, with an emphasis on protecting the firm’s cash reserves. 
Cash is king, and we need to generate and preserve cash. 
(Owens, CEO Email, May 4, 2005) 
 
Our $50 million travel savings goal is a company-wide 
challenge. We must do this and we are interested in your 
ideas on additional actions we can take to cut travel and 
living costs. (Owens, CEO Email, January 10, 2005) 
 
Our first priority is business performance. We are all very 
focused on delivering our financial commitments for the 
fourth quarter and the year. As we wind down the year, I 
am asking all of you to maintain that focus and intensity on 
delivering the business. (Owens, CEO Email, December 2, 
2005) 
 Owens also requested employees to help restore confidence in the firm by 
understanding and communicating the Nortel strategy and brand. 
Please take time to familiarize yourself with our messages 
and recognize the very important role all of you play in 
being brand ambassadors for Nortel. Playing that role is a 
tangible way all employees can contribute to the success of 
our company. (Owens, CEO Email, November 8, 2004) 
 
Please get behind this and other strategic relationships that 
will help define the new Nortel going forward. (Owens, 




It is vital that all employees know our strategy so that 
together we can align our teams, functions, resources and 
objectives to achieve our goals. In addition, each and every 
one of us ought to be able to articulate the Nortel strategy, 
whether internally or externally, to any of our stakeholders. 
Please invest the time to view the Nortel strategy 
presentation and align your priorities accordingly. Doing so 
is an investment in our future. (Owens, CEO Email, 
September 21, 2005) 
 Zafirovski had the most employee requests, simply because his tenure lasted the 
longest of all CEOs. In addition, however, his requests became more specific as time 
went on, with a sense of urgency towards action. When he first became CEO, he 
immediately launched a program to reduce costs (in line with the previous CEOs) and 
asked employees for their support. 
Bill is leading the Business Transformation project, and 
along with six teams who are being assisted by McKinsey 
consulting, we now have 35 people working full-time on 
these initiatives. They are meeting weekly, and every third 
week the teams are reporting results to me and the cabinet 
leadership team to ensure measurable progress. Thanks in 
advance for your full support in making these teams 
successful. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, December 20, 2005) 
 
You can do your part by helping Nortel get the word out on 
Business Made Simple by downloading email signature 
files, using the new presentation templates and by viewing 
our new television and print ads we are bringing to market 
(click here for more information and a message from our 
CMO). As well, please start thinking and acting on the 
specific ideas you have to help our business be more 
simple, responsive and proactive. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, 




Each of the BT teams has dedicated full-time and part-time 
members who provide assistance from their areas of 
expertise. If any of these teams contact you for assistance 
or information, please give your full attention and 
support.... There’s a lot more work required than what these 
teams will be doing. You can begin having an immediate 
effect by doing your part to simplify processes in your own 
areas. Set aside turf issues, organization and office politics 
as we foster a performance-oriented culture. (Zafirovski, 
CEO Email, March 1, 2006) 
This program eventually included Six Sigma methods, which Zafirovski encouraged 
employees to support. The emphasis on reducing costs was ongoing. 
I can't underscore enough that the success of Lean Six 
Sigma is foundational to rebuilding Nortel as a great 
company. It will require commitment and sign-up by every 
single employee, and each of you has a very important role 
to play in its success. I am counting on you to drive it with 
forceful optimism and rigor. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, May 
11, 2006) 
 
Underlying all these actions is the need for every employee 
to stay focused on delivering superior execution and 
performance. We must execute our road map, which 
includes the 6-point plan, Business Transformation, Lean 
Six Sigma and the many contributions of our employee 
teams through our Own It! initiative. (Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, June 27, 2006) 
 As time went on, Zafirovski became clearer in terms of what he wanted from 
employees: 
As I've said, our journey will take two to three years and it's 





Take individual responsibility to go above and beyond the 
expected to positively influence revenues and margin 
generation, reduce unnecessary costs, improve customer 
satisfaction, improve work environment, and embrace new 
processes like Own It!, Lean Six Sigma and the revamped 
time-to-market. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, June 9, 2006) 
 
We have the right plan, and we have the right people to 
execute big, big things. Now, it’s up to every one of us to 
execute on that plan. And this means YOU -- not just your 
leaders. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, September 20, 2006) 
 As with the two previous CEOs, Zafirovski continued to emphasize the need to 
listen to and serve customers. 
There is nothing more important than an absolute and 
unwavering focus on the customer. One of the ways I try to 
remain true to that principle is by spending at least 50% of 
my time focused externally, including talking to the people 
who have put their trust in us: the companies whose 
businesses depend on our products. I don't think that there's 
anything more important to the success of our business than 
listening to the voice of the customer. And I encourage you 
to think the same way... 
 
We listen to our customers and commit to providing them 
with powerful tools to help them reach their goals. I am - 
and we all are - on this mission. This promise is a huge 
responsibility, and we must all shoulder our part of the load 
if we are to be successful.  
 
Every action we take in our daily jobs and every interaction 
with our customers needs to be focused on carefully 
listening to their voice. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, October 
25, 2006) 
 As Zafirovski’s tenure moved into 2007, the focus on cost reduction continued 
with greater urgency, an urgency which never subsided. 
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 We must intensify our focus on the company’s 
profitability. And that means accelerating our business 
transformation programs. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, 
November 7, 2006) 
 
We need to keep the pressure on our Business 
Transformation efforts and reset our cost structure to 
become more competitive. We need to keep simplifying 
our processes, both for our own efficiency and to deliver 
more seamlessly for our customers. And we need to win - 
new clients, new battles. Now! Not tomorrow. The clock is 
ticking. We have strong momentum, and we must not blink, 
even for a minute. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, January 29, 
2007) 
 
And there is no mistake that 2007 must be a year of 
accelerated progress. We need to make - and we will make 
- the important steps forward necessary to build a Nortel 
that is strong, profitable and among the great places to 
work. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, March 16, 2007) 
 
But let’s make no mistake, the pressure is on. If we’re 
going to deliver on the year, and on what the Street, our 
shareholders and all of you expect, we need to accelerate 
the pace of our execution. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, August 
6, 2007) 
 
But let’s make no mistake, the pressure is on. If we’re 
going to deliver on the year, and on what the Street, our 
shareholders and all of you expect, we need to accelerate 
the pace of our execution. ...I need all of your resolve to 
identify and drive out all unnecessary costs. (Zafirovski, 
CEO Email, August 6, 2007) 
 
From sales to product engineering and operations to R&D, 
everything we do must start with this in mind. And, we 
need to buckle down and balance our expenses in line with 
our revenues. Clear guidelines have been communicated 
around managing our expenses and I expect us to all work 
together to follow them and achieve the savings I know we 
can. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, August 1, 2008) 
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 When the class action suit was settled, however, and significantly impacted the 
firm’s cash reserves, Zafirovski encouraged employees to focus on the future and not on 
the cost of the settlement. 
It's important to recognize that the settlement is in relation 
to activities that are a part of our past, and a big part of 
moving forward is in closing this unfortunate chapter in our 
otherwise proud and distinguished history. (Zafirovski, 
CEO Email, February 8, 2006) 
 While Zafirovski was pushing employees to quickly reduce costs, he also 
emphasized the need to understand and implement the business strategy. 
I encourage you to listen to the [analyst] presentations to 
learn more about our strategy and the future of Nortel. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, November 17, 2006) 
 
Let’s use this success to fuel the adoption of this important 
technology with other customers, and let’s keep “changing 
the game” to benefit our customers and position Nortel to 
win. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, January 15, 2007) 
 
We must also not lose sight of the fact that long-term 
shareholder value comes from driving customer value - and 
that is what we are all focused on, every day. (Zafirovski, 
CEO Email, May 23, 2007) 
 
I know that you share my enthusiasm for the future of this 
company and will continue to work with me to restore 
Nortel's rightful place as a technology and thought leader. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, May 23, 2007) 
But Zafirovski emphasized the need to implement innovation in a cost effective manner. 
We have to be completely on our game and offer customers 
advantage on quality, performance, delivery, innovation, 
and competitive cost structure. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, 




We need to stay focused on our customers, on executing 
our Business Transformation plan, on driving new revenues 
in growth areas, and on aligning costs with market 
benchmarks to ensure our ability to compete and to invest 
R&D dollars in areas with the maximum return potential. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, March 16, 2007) 
 Additionally, the leadership role of the employee in the turnaround of the firm 
was emphasized. 
So let me be clear. My executive team and I are not the 
ones who will ensure a bright future for Nortel alone. Each 
and every one of you has a part to play. Each and every one 
of you is part of team Nortel. We need you in the game. 
100%. Without reservation. The sum of all of your efforts, 
if channeled with the right attitude in the right places, can 
make an incredibly powerful difference. (Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, May 4, 2007) 
 
You’ve often heard me say that it’s important to focus on 
the “who” before the “what.” This remains a foundational 
pillar of my management philosophy. This job we have 
undertaken, this historic effort to re-create Nortel, is one 
that can only be powered by you. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, 
July 10, 2007) 
 
Here's what I need from you. Every day, I need you to ask 
yourself: "Did I do everything within my capabilities today 
to drive this company forward? Did I exceed my own 
expectations? Did I help bring in orders? Did I fix 
something that was broken? Did I remove obstacles for my 
team so they can be their best?" More than anything, every 
day I need you to ask yourself: "Did I have an impact?" 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, June 16, 2008) 
 Even while Zafirovski was downsizing the employee base and moving the firm 
into bankruptcy protection, he continued to seek employee support (as the other CEOs 
did in the past). 
242 
 
I need your full commitment. It may sound odd since the 
above decisions will impact some of you. In return, you 
have my absolute commitment that I will continue to 
always put Nortel first in all my decision making, continue 
to look for expanded opportunities to promote our best 
performers, and do my very best to ensure timely 
communications and maximum redeployment for affected 
employees. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, September 17, 2008) 
 
I ask you to maintain your focus on our objective. Work to 
drive down costs and drive up sales. Understand the 
realities of a tough marketplace, but use them to seize share 
and have faith that we will succeed in the end. (Zafirovski, 
CEO Email, November 18, 2008) 
 
Most importantly, during this restructuring process, we 
must reach out to customers and explain what is taking 
place, and why. I want to personally assure them that 
Nortel is here to serve them and is dedicated to our 
relationship with them. Our sales teams are on the front 
lines, but in this environment, we must all be ambassadors 
for Nortel. (Zafirovski, CEO Email, January 14, 2009) 
 
As I told you on Wednesday, our focus now must be on 
preserving the company. That is going to be the only way 
forward. To do that, I need you to focus on our customers 
and help each other do the work that needs to be done. 
(Zafirovski, CEO Email, January 16, 2009) 
 
We must not and cannot let up on serving our customers 
through the integration process. The more seamless our 
transition to our acquirers, the more successful it will be for 
everyone. I ask that you do everything you can in the weeks 
and months ahead to ensure Nortel’s legacy is a robust and 
vibrant one (Zafirovski, CEO Email, August 10, 2009) 
 On his last day at Nortel, Zafirovski once again asked employees to support the 
firm’s leaders, as he (and the CEOs before him) had consistently requested. 
These are very important and deserved moves, and my last 
request to you is that you support them with your best 
efforts and dedication. I know you will. (Zafirovski, CEO 
Email, August 10, 2009) 
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 The effects of the mechanisms employed by the CEOs to encourage employee 
action all included adaptive expectation effects (see Table 32). The illustrative story 
board presented above demonstrates how the CEOs consistently asked employees cut 
costs, learn the strategy, innovate, lead, follow, etc... Given the strategic role of the CEO 
and the authoritative nature of their narratives, a request within a CEO Email, directed to 
an employee, likely carried significant influence within the firm. In some instances, the 
CEOs specified that the adoption of certain behaviours would result in recognition, career 
development, and promotion.  
 As discussed previously in the section on structural textuality, and as outlined in 
Appendix G, the CEO Emails were found to be an important tool in the process of 
strategizing. The textual analysis suggested that the CEOs used the emails to define, 
develop, and confirm organizational norms, values, and beliefs; to shape employee 
behaviour; and to reconstruct events to legitimize executive decisions and actions.  With 
its monological tone, the CEO Email reaffirmed the CEO’s role as the master architect of 
the firm’s strategy. The CEO Email emphasized present-day activity and the need for 
immediate action.  
 When integrating the textual analysis of the CEO emails (from Appendix G) with 
the narrative analysis discussed here (on discursive themes), it suggests that the CEO 
Email, as a specific source of narrative, played a central role in not only representing the 




 Findings from the narrative analysis suggest that the CEO narratives form a 
narrative infrastructure but that the strength of the infrastructure varies between and 
within sources of narratives (see Figure 24). Both the CEO Emails and the analyst calls 
have a strong textual relationship within their narrative types. The CEO Emails establish 
an ongoing discourse of behaviour between the CEO and the employees, while the 
analyst calls establish an ongoing discourse of direction between the CEO and the 
analysts (and indirectly, the investment community and the business media). The Letters 
to Shareholders, although published less frequently, were also connected through textual 
relationships; the Letter used rhetorical history to tell the Nortel story and position the 
firm for the future. The CEO quotes embedded within the news releases and media 
interviews were loosely embedded in the narrative infrastructure, lacking structural 
textuality with the other sources of narratives. 
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Figure 24: Narrative Infrastructure at Nortel 
 
Note: dark shading represents stronger intertextual relationships 
 The discursive themes were closely connected through the sources of narrative, 
creating a dominant narrative that changed little throughout the period of the case. As 
discussed, this narrative included themes pertaining to corporate and business level 
strategies, the external environment (macro level and industry), the firm’s competitive 
advantages, and the mandate to restructure the business model and reduce costs, while 
protecting core assets such as innovation and R&D. The mechanisms found in the CEO 
Email narratives, in particular, emphasized the need for employees to focus on reducing 
costs while satisfying customer needs through innovative solutions.  
 The discursive themes and mechanisms did not change over time; rather, they 
became deeply embedded into the CEO narratives, especially the analyst call and the 
CEO Email narratives. The discursive themes and mechanisms that existed prior to Dunn 
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remained embedded (and were reinforced) in the narratives, as did those that that were 
introduced by each subsequent CEO. Although the CEOs had an opportunity to change 
the dominant narrative upon their appointment, they did not. Instead, each of them 
continued to emphasize the corporate and business level strategies put in place by their 
predecessor, and reinforced the necessity to cut costs, achieve financial objectives, and 
focus on the customer. All CEOs perpetuated the narrative of Nortel’s history of 
innovation and technology leadership. They told the same story. 
 In the following Chapter, the way in which this narrative infrastructure influenced 




CHAPTER 7.   CEO Narratives and Organizational Path Dependence 
7.1 Introduction 
 In Chapter 5, the constitution of Nortel’s organizational path was identified, along 
with the self-reinforcing processes that led to lock-in. Chapter 6 discussed the 
characteristics of the CEO narratives, established the identity of the narrative 
infrastructure, and identified the discursive themes and mechanisms that persisted within 
the infrastructure over time and between sources of narratives. In this chapter, the results 
of the path constitution analysis and narrative analysis are joined together to understand 
the influence of the CEO narratives in Nortel’s organizational path (see Figure 25, next 
page). The chapter also discusses findings on the role of self-reinforcing processes, initial 
conditions and critical events in the organizational path dependence process, and 
proposes an elaborated model of the constitution of an organizational path. The second 
half of the chapter further develops the findings from the research and theorizes on the 
influence of narratives in CEO strategizing and strategic change, and closes with a 
discussion on the role of rhetorical history in organizational path dependence. 
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Figure 25: Conceptual Framework (Step 6) 
 
7.2 Summary of Findings from Path Constitution Analysis and Narrative Analysis 
 The Path Constitution Analysis presented in Chapter 5 (and shown here again in 
Figure 26) demonstrated that Nortel established an organizational path based on four self- 
reinforcing processes, two of which were developed prior to Dunn’s appointment 
(preservation of core innovation assets and the market model) and two of which were 
initiated by Dunn and cultivated by the subsequent CEOs (the financial model and 
partnership growth mode). In combination with critical events, the firm’s strategic 
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options became constrained. Even though the CEOs, at times, had opportunities to move 
off path (e.g. CEO succession, executive leadership additions), they either were unaware 
of the opportunity or unable to affect change. The large expense of the class action 
lawsuit, along with the collapse of the global economy, were significant critical junctures 
that dramatically reduced options, with the latter solidifying the firm’s path and eventual 
lock-in. 
Figure 26: Constitution of Nortel's Organizational Path 
Overlaid on Sydow et al.’s (2009: 692) Constitution of an Organizational Path 
 
 The narrative analysis in Chapter 6 found that the CEO narratives, collectively, 
created a narrative infrastructure, through both their structural and thematic relationships. 
The strength of this infrastructure (reproduced here in Figure 27), however, was 
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inconsistent between sources of narratives. Two types of texts were found to be dominant 
– the analyst calls and the CEO Emails – with the Letters to Shareholders supplementing 
the dominant themes, although less frequently. The CEO quotes in the news releases and 
media interviews were found to be secondary in nature; although they were textually 
connected to the other sources, their influence in creating the infrastructure was minimal.  
 The three primary sources of CEO narratives each had different objectives. The 
Letters to Shareholders told the story of Nortel through rhetorical history, positioning the 
firm and its strategy in the context of the industry, promoting the company’s competitive 
advantages, and identifying the industry malaise as reasons for constrained growth. The 
Analyst Call narratives established a discourse of direction by identifying the firm’s 
performance within the context of the firm’s strategy and the industry dynamics, 
confirming or modifying the previously articulated strategy, and establishing expectations 
of future performance (but with minimal discussion on how). The CEO Emails 
established a discourse of behaviour, reiterating the strategy and strategic decisions made 
previously, and identifying the types of behaviours employees were expected to display 
to help the firm achieve the strategy. 
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Figure 27: Narrative Infrastructure at Nortel 
 
7.3 Self-Reinforcing Processes, Dominant Themes and CEO Mechanisms 
 Through this narrative infrastructure a dominant theme emerged, described in 
terms of a strategic direction, as well as explicit mechanisms on  how the strategy was to 
be realized. By integrating the themes discovered in the narrative analysis with the earlier 
path constitution analysis, a relationship is evident (see Table 33). The dominant theme 
expressed in the CEO narratives corresponds to the self-reinforcing processes identified 
through the Path Constitution Analysis. In addition, the mechanisms identified within the 
CEO Emails also correspond to the processes. This relationship reflects the degree in 
which the trajectory of the firm was not only represented in both material documents and 
CEO narratives, but also enacted through the mechanisms outlined in the CEO Emails. 
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Table 33: The Embeddedness of CEO Narratives in Nortel’s Organizational Path 
Self –reinforcing Processes 
(Identified through Path 
Constitution Analysis, using event 
data; Chapter 5)  
Dominant CEO Narrative 
(Identified through analysis of 
all CEO narratives; Chapter 6) 
Mechanisms  








Through rhetorical history, 
promote Nortel’s innovation 
and technology leadership as 
the firm’s competitive 
advantage, which must be 
recovered. 
 Live the core values.  
 Recreate Nortel.  










Emphasis on continuing to 
serve customers around the 
world, in carrier and 
enterprise, with an emphasis 
on wireless and solutions 
(instead of products). 
 Collaborate across business 
units and functions.  
 Understand and 
communicate the Nortel 
strategy, market Nortel.  
 Listen to and serve the 
customer.  













focused R&D, six 
sigma. 
New cost model given industry 
pressures, scrutinize spending 
and investment, everyone is 
responsible to manage costs. 
Sometimes drastic measures 
must be taken. 
 Focus on returning to 
profitability by executing on 








Provide solutions through 
partnerships (not 
acquisitions). 
 Support and seek 
partnerships.  
7.4 The Influence of Material Filings 
 The influence of CEO narratives in organizational path dependence is complex. 
As Table 33 suggests, narratives produced by the organization interact to produce an 
organizational path through a process that can be described by first categorizing the 
sources of narratives into material and non-material. As a public corporation, Nortel was 
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required by securities regulations to produce material documentation, such as financial 
reports, annual reports, news releases, announcements of leadership changes, and 
regulatory issues. Securities rules and regulations indicated what had to be reported, by 
when and to whom. As the top authority within the firm, the CEO was often involved in 
the production of these narratives, which were shared through the news releases, analyst 
calls, and annual reports. These material events were likely well-orchestrated, given the 
legal authority of the CEO. When reporting to the financial markets, firms do not have 
significant leeway; they must be precise in their reporting of financials. Additionally, 
public firms must provide strategic direction that will be familiar to the market in order to 
gain legitimacy (Martens et al., 2007). Material filings, therefore, had to include an 
accurate representation of past events and a legitimate representation of the future.  
 Nortel’s material filings (i.e. 8-Ks, 10-Qs and 10-Ks) clearly identified the firm’s 
corporate and business level strategies (i.e. the market model), competitive advantage 
(i.e. core assets), financial performance and objectives (i.e. the financial model) and 
growth strategies; in other words, these filings contained specific narrative on the rent-
seeking self-reinforcing processes that the firm chose to pursue (as described in Chapter 
6). 
 Nortel’s analyst calls were textually linked to other material filings. As a material 
event, the CEO’s narrative was confined to what had been produced elsewhere in other 
material documents. The reporting of financials during the call had to reflect the financial 
reports. The strategies, as well, had to reflect the financial reports, along with the 
strategies that had been presented in the previous analyst calls and reports. Regardless of 
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which CEO was narrating the call, the narrative itself was closely tied to the past and 
other material filings. 
 The Letters to Shareholders had more leeway in the way in which the strategy and 
performance story could be told, but the strategy itself was once again confined to what 
had already been communicated through the material filings (including the analyst calls).  
 The CEO Email narratives also had leeway, but were confined by the framework 
established through the material filings and reinforced through the analyst calls. As 
presented in Appendix G, CEOs used rhetorical history to shape organizational identity, 
legitimize decisions and actions, and decouple the identity from undesirable 
characteristics. At the same time, the CEOs closed the email with an “ask” as a means to 
reinforce the urgency and importance of an issue, emphasize relevant organizational 
values, and define behaviour expectations of employees. 
 This analysis suggests that the chain of CEO narratives is initiated within the 
domain of material documents, as illustrated in Figure 28. Strategy narratives are initiated 
(for public firms) within material documents. The publication of these documents leads to 
a chain of narratives, most of which are authored by the CEO. External sources of CEO 
narrative reinforce the original narrative, while internal sources of CEO narrative not 
only reinforce the narrative but also provide specificity of the mechanisms for achieving 
the strategy. The material nature of the initial narrative constrains future narrative, 
reinforcing what was previously said and making it difficult to move off path. 
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Figure 28: The Constraining Nature of Material Sources of Narratives 
 
7.5 The influence of CEO Narratives in Organizational Path Dependence  
 In the case of Nortel, the firm’s strategy was repeatedly expressed through 
material documents such as financial reports, Letters to Shareholders, and news releases. 
Even in these material documents, Nortel’s historical competitive advantage of 
innovation and technology leadership was articulated. In parallel was the evident pressure 
to reduce costs, restructure the business model, and grow the business.  
 The content of the CEO analyst calls perpetuated this narrative, providing some 
insight into growth modes (partnerships, not acquisitions) and means to reduce costs (six 
sigma, reorganization, reduction in R&D, downsizing and offshoring). Due to the textual 
relationships from one analyst call to the other, the calls further embedded the narrative 
into the narrative infrastructure. Even with the change of CEO, the narrative could not be 
easily changed, as CEOs were constrained by what was said in the past. When Zafirovski 
took over from Owens, for example, he could not change the narrative on firm 
performance as he was constrained by how performance was narrated previously. 
Additionally, although he had leeway in modifying the narrative of the future, Zafirovski 
was still restricted by the actual resources and capabilities of the firm. Too drastic a 
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change in strategy would have been questioned by analysts and Zafirovski may have lost 
the legitimacy that they had afforded him (based on his reputation).  
 The CEO Email narratives reinforced the firm’s strategies, competitive advantage, 
and financial imperatives, while at the same time, told employees what to do. CEOs 
specified the desired employee behaviour, emphasizing their authority by requesting 
employees to support their leaders, follow the plan, work quickly, and lead by example. 
 As a result, not only did the CEO narratives reinforce the firm’s strategic path, the 
force of the narrative infrastructure itself acted as a self-reinforcing process that was 
initially rent-seeking but eventually contributed towards lock-in. Figure 29 shows how 
the CEO narratives pulled the four self-reinforcing processes together, like a needle and 
thread, further embedding them into the firms operating environment. Lock-in occurred 
due to the firm’s inability to deliver on their corporate and business level strategies within 
the given financial constraints. As the dominant narrative suggests, the CEOs repeatedly 
emphasized the firm’s need to satisfy the broad customer base through innovative 
solutions and technology leadership, but at a lower cost, more quickly, with less R&D 
investment, and with less people.  
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Figure 29: The Influence of CEO Narratives on Organizational Path Dependence 
Overlaid on Sydow et al.’s (2009: 692) Constitution of an Organizational Path 
 
7.6 CEO Narratives as a Self-Reinforcing Process 
 The CEO narratives, expressed as a narrative infrastructure, behave as a self-
reinforcing process in the organizational path dependence process due to the authoritative 
nature of the CEO role. As the firm’s grand strategy architect (Hutzschenreuter et al., 
2012), the CEO and, by extension, the CEO’s narratives, are influential. For material 
documents, the CEO’s responsibility is legal in nature, whereby the CEO is held liable 
for the financial reports. Within the organization, the CEO has relational-legal authority 
over the employees (Fanelli et al., 2009). The Nortel CEOs expressed this authority in 
their emails by correlating behaviours with outcomes (e.g. career development, bonuses).  
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 The effects of the narrative infrastructure – and the narratives themselves – as a 
self-reinforcing process, fall into each of the four categories defined by theory: 
coordination, complementarity, learning and adaptive expectation. First, the narratives 
have a coordinating effect. By telling a consistent story about the strategy of the 
organization, the structure, the priorities, and the means in which to achieve the strategy, 
all stakeholders are drawn towards that goal. For the financial markets, the benefit is in 
understanding where and when to invest, and how to evaluate opportunities. For internal 
stakeholders, the coordinating effects are directly related to the work. Knowing the firm’s 
strategic direction, organizational structure, priorities, systems, and processes encourages 
cross-functional cooperation and increases effectiveness. 
 Second, the narratives have a complementarity effect. CEO narratives that cross 
organizational boundaries connect actors through a common narrative. This encourages 
the interconnectivity of actors and activities. For example, if industry players understand 
a firm’s capabilities, it may lead to collaborations and partnerships.  
 Third, the narratives have a learning effect. As stakeholders learn the strategy, 
they become proficient at both telling the strategy story and implementing it. The more 
adept they become at both, the more the narrative will persist. This applies not only to 
employees, but also to external stakeholders, who may (over time) learn to appreciate a 
firm’s core competencies and competitive advantage. Consequently, this outcome may 
lead to the development of corporate reputation, which in itself can be a resource 
(Mahon, 2002). 
 Fourth, the narratives have an adaptive expectation effect, specifically as it relates 
to the internal sources of CEO narratives. When the CEO, through narrative, explicitly 
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requests employees to behave in a particular way, employees are likely to feel pressured 
to deliver given the power of the CEO over the employee’s work environment. 
Additionally, employees may be tempted to draw upon CEO narratives when trying to 
influence colleagues to support them. Adaptive expectation can also apply to external 
sources of narratives. Persistent CEO narratives that contribute towards developing a 
corporate identity and reputation may influence others, less familiar with the narrative, to 
adopt the same point of view (Mahon, 2002). 
7.7 Initial Conditions and Rhetorical History 
 The notion of corporate reputation and identity leads the discussion to initial 
conditions. In the case of Nortel, the CEO narratives drew upon Nortel’s history to 
articulate its competitive advantage of innovation and technology leadership; an 
advantage that Nortel no longer had. The CEOs argued that, although the firm was 
underperforming, these core assets could still provide the type of advantage that had 
historically contributed to Nortel’s leadership; employees simply had to “recover” it. 
Although the cultivation of these cores assets was a self-reinforcing process used by the 
CEOs within their narratives, the notion that innovation was Nortel’s competitive 
advantage was already a widespread belief in the industry – that is, the firm’s corporate 
reputation was an initial condition. This raises the question, therefore, as to the influence 
of initial conditions at the initiation of an organizational path and, consequently, 
downstream. 
 At Nortel, for example, the firm’s only apparent competitive advantage was its 
innovative capability and synergies realized by its diversified but inter-related businesses. 
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As a common belief, both within and external to the firm, what choice did the CEOs have 
when trying to promote Nortel’s strengths? Although it may have been prudent to change 
the firm’s strategy, through defamiliarization in the narrative (Barry & Elmes, 1997), 
Nortel’s legitimacy may have been questioned if the narrative departed (too quickly) 
from the firm’s historical advantages. 
 Changing the firm’s competitive positioning may have raised legitimacy issues 
within the firm as well. Innovation was part of Nortel’s culture and engrained into almost 
every aspect of the firm’s operations. If the innovation capability at Nortel was at least 
ignored or, at worst, deemed no longer relevant due to the commoditization of some 
products, the firm’s capability to operate may have been jeopardized; employees may 
have resisted due to the longstanding culture of innovation. 
  Research suggests that there may be a means for a firm to disentangle from the 
past, in order to move off path (or avoid creating an organizational path). Making claims, 
through CEO narratives, with stakeholders (internal and external) through the use of 
rhetorical history can be considered a strategic resource that can lead to competitive 
advantage (Suddaby et al., 2010). Rhetorical history is defined by Suddaby et al. (2010) 
as the “strategic use of the past as a persuasive strategy to manage key stakeholders of the 
firm” (p. 157). The authors argue that history within organizations can be used as a 
resource, shaped in ways that can “confer identity, motivate commitment, and frame 
action amongst organizational stakeholders” (Suddaby et al., 2010: 160).  
 In the CEOs narrative, they created a rhetorical history that reminded stakeholders 
of what the organization once was and what it could, once again, become. Although it 
was clear that the company’s financial model needed to change, given the impact of the 
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dot.com bust, it was not clear what kind of company needed to emerge. Instead of 
redefining Nortel’s strategy (its products and markets), the CEOs retained Nortel’s 
historical business strategy (global reach, products in both carrier and enterprise markets) 
and drew on past success to emphasize capabilities and core competencies. 
 Golant and Sillince (2007) argue that when an organization remains faithful to its 
accepted archetype, it obtains legitimacy from its stakeholders. Within their narratives, 
the CEOs drew upon Nortel’s past archetype, which external stakeholders, such as the 
media and analysts, had grown to not only accept but also admire. Nortel was known in 
the industry for critical innovations and the patents held by its engineers were a testament 
to its ability to innovate. By using rhetorical history whilst it was trying to recover, the 
CEOs were able to garner support from financial markets and its own employees. 
Although the firm was competing with no apparent competitive advantage, in fact at a 
disadvantage due to financial restatements and lack of cash and capital, analysts 
repeatedly graded Nortel stock as a buy or hold. 
 By drawing on the past, through the use of rhetorical history, the CEOs were also 
able to reinforce stakeholders’ social judgments of Nortel’s reputation. As Mishina, 
Block, and Mannor (2011) argue, social judgements are path-dependent. When observers 
have a particular understanding of an organization’s reputation, they interpret cues to 
confirm their understanding. For example, in the case of Nortel, the firm had a reputation 
as a technology leader and innovator. By continuing to claim this identity, even while it 
was underperforming, the CEOs were able to draw upon the firm’s reputation. When 
positive events concerning innovation or R&D occurred, it cued observers to reinforce 
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their previously held beliefs. This would explain why the market waited patiently (over 6 
years) for the firm to recover. 
 Arguably, Nortel could have used rhetorical history to, over time, change the 
strategy narrative. As it became increasingly apparent that the cost structure was not 
sustainable in the given business model, it may have been wise to either merge with 
another firm or divest major portions of the businesses. Nortel did neither. Instead, the 
CEOs continued to define Nortel as a global technology leader, serving both carrier and 
enterprise businesses with a broad portfolio of products and solutions. Nortel never 
wavered from its original rhetorical account, which contributed towards lock-in. 
7.8 Critical Events  
 CEO narratives have been identified as a self-reinforcing process in 
organizational path dependence, in addition to the four processes identified through the 
path constitution analysis. The path constitution analysis also suggests that organizational 
path dependence may not occur in three easily identifiable stages, as theory suggests. The 
organizational path may, in fact, be more susceptible to events that occur not only at the 
initial critical juncture (when the path is initiated), but also throughout the organizational 
path; internal or external events may push the firm towards lock-in or provide an 
opportunity to move off path.  
 At Nortel, four events dramatically reduced Nortel’s strategic options: the 
dot.com bust that cut the firm’s revenues in half; the financial restatement problems and 
the firing of Frank Dunn; the class action settlement ($500M cash and 14.5% equity 
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payout); and, the global economic downturn. In each of these cases, Nortel’s strategic 
choices were reduced. 
 Conversely, Nortel also had opportunities to move off path. For example, each of 
the CEOs could have changed the firm’s strategy when they began their tenure. As 
Hutzschenreuter et al. (2012) suggest, CEO succession after poor performance provides 
newly appointed CEOs with legitimacy to change the strategy. Additionally, the hiring of 
Daichendt was acknowledged both within the firm (by Owens himself) and outside of the 
firm (by the analysts and the media) as an opportunity for strategic change. These 
examples suggest that actors may, in fact, know that their options are being reduced and 
are simply incapable of changing the path. Owens tried but admittedly failed to change 
the strategy with the hiring and departure of Daichendt. Zafirovski tried to implement a 
new strategy upon his own appointment but was constrained by the firm's resources and 
capabilities. Additionally, although Zafirovski dismissed the lawsuit settlement as an 
event related to historical issues, it can be assumed that he understood the financial 
implications of the settlement on the firm’s cash reserves and equity position. 
 Actors, therefore, may know very well when an event has reduced their options; 
they simply might not publicly admit it. CEOs may not acknowledge a critical event, 
even when they are fully aware of its implications. 
7.9 Actors and Path Constitution Analysis 
 As the previous discussion suggests, and in line with theory, organizational path 
dependence has, at its core, actors. The actors exist not only within the focal level of 
analysis, but also in each of the levels representing the upper and lower boundaries of the 
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environment; they may be individuals, groups, or organizations. Regardless, they are 
actors thinking and acting – through text and talk. Although Path Constitution Analysis 
recognizes the role of actors, Sydow et al. (2012) separate this constitutive feature from 
level interrelatedness and suggest that actors may not “necessarily refer reflexively to 
contextual or situational features in their strategic behaviour” (p. 6). 
 The results of this research suggest that organizational path dependence is a 
multilevel, actor-centred process where actors are structurally embedded within multiple 
levels, by the very nature of the strategy process. Strategies cannot be developed in a 
vacuum; firm’s must position themselves within the industry and do so in light of their 
resources and capabilities. By forming a strategy, the firm has implicitly interacted 
recursively and reflexively with multiple levels both within and external to the firm. 
Additionally, as the discussion on corporate reputation suggests, simply through the 
development of an organizational identity, the constitution of a firm’s path is affected; 
self- reinforcing processes and critical events can occur both within and external to the 
firm. To recognize the multilevel, actor-centered process, an elaborated model of the 
constitution of an organizational path is therefore proposed in Figure 30. This model is 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter, as a significant academic contribution. 
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Figure 30: Elaborated Model of the Constitution of an Organizational Path 
Overlaid on Sydow et al.’s (2009: 692) Constitution of an Organizational Path 
 
 This elaborated model highlights the multilevel nature of organizational path 
dependence and the recursive and reflexive interaction between actors that reside within 
the levels. As the Nortel case suggests, organizational path dependence occurs at the 
focal level of analysis (in this case, the firm level, with the CEO as the central actor), but 
even before the path is initiated, actors influence the range of strategic options. Self-
reinforcing processes, developed in the past, may present themselves as initial conditions. 
Resources and capabilities, both tangible and intangible, constrain options while at the 
same time present opportunity for change. Organizational identity and corporate 
reputation, intangible assets that are brokered by employees and stakeholders 
respectively, can restrain options for strategic change while at the same time provide the 
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 Triggers may occur throughout the organizational path, not only at the critical 
juncture. These triggers may be direct outcomes of the effect of self-reinforcing process 
(e.g. financial restatement issues) or they may be indirectly related, initiated by external 
actors or events (e.g. the economic downturn). Organizational path dependence is a 
complex temporal process that is highly influenced by initial conditions not only at the 
onset but also throughout the process; the process itself is laden with the agency of actors 









CHAPTER 8.   Conclusion 
 In this chapter, a summary of the research findings are provided, followed by 
academic contributions. The limitations of the study are then discussed, with suggestions 
on further research. The chapter closes with a discussion on how this research can be 
applied to practice. 
8.1 Summary of Findings 
 The purpose of this research was to investigate the influence of CEO narratives in 
organizational path dependence. Findings suggest that CEO narratives, due to their 
authoritative nature, create a narrative infrastructure across both time and space, but the 
strength of this infrastructure is not evenly distributed across all narrative sources. 
Textual relationships exist within sources of narratives, such as material documents, 
whereby the narratives are interconnected over time; changing the narrative is 
constrained explicitly by what was said and done in the past. Non-material sources of 
narratives have greater intertextuality between types of texts. CEO Emails, for example, 
draw on other narratives, through rhetorical history, to tell the strategy story.  
 The narratives within material texts (in this case the analyst calls) provide a 
discourse of direction while the non-material, internal sources of narratives (in this case 
the CEO Emails) provide a discourse of behavior. The non-material, external narratives 
(i.e. the Letters to Shareholders) use rhetorical history to tell the firm’s story. The initial 
CEO narrative, however, begins with the firm’s material filings. 
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 When the CEO narrative infrastructure is strong, defined by the degree of 
intertextuality and the dominant narrative, the collection of CEO narratives acts as a self-
reinforcing process. This process is rent-seeking, in that the narratives are used by CEOs 
to give sense on the firm’s strategy and other self-reinforcing processes active within the 
organization. The purpose of the sensegiving is to encourage both thinking and acting by 
organizational stakeholders, in order to influence behaviour and gain capital. The force of 
the narrative infrastructure, as a self-reinforcing process, results in coordinating, 
complementarity, learning and adaptive expectation effects. Stakeholders, through the 
narratives, are able to make sense of the firm’s strategy, which encourages coordination 
of activities, collaboration across boundaries, a deeper purpose, and the development of 
intangible capabilities. The CEO narrative infrastructure encourages the adoption of other 
self-reinforcing processes at play in the organization, further embedding the processes 
and cementing the organizational path. 
 Due to the material nature of CEO narratives, however, CEOs are constrained by 
what they initially say and what was said before them. Therefore, although the CEO 
narratives are initially rent-seeking, they not only perpetuate the organizational path but 
also make it difficult for the organization to move off path. As such, the positive rent-
seeking effects initially obtained through CEO narratives can be depleted, trapping the 
organization into a CEO narrative that may no longer be valid. 
 CEO narratives are also constrained by the firm’s initial conditions, defined by 
their resources and capabilities. To tell the firm’s “strategy story,” authors can attempt to 
defamiliarize themselves from the past to affect strategic change (and move off path) but 
to obtain legitimacy they must articulate the firm’s competitive advantage by drawing on 
269 
 
core competencies. CEO narratives, therefore, are constrained by the tensions of trying to 
both familiarize with the past (to gain legitimacy) and defamiliarize from the past (to 
affect change). 
 Firm resources and capabilities include not only tangible resources but also 
intangible resources such as corporate reputation and organizational identity. Beyond the 
capabilities of the firm, the perception of who the firm is and what it can accomplish can 
influence strategic options, either expanding them or restricting them. Corporate 
reputation, for example, can provide firms with room to manoeuvre if previous 
performance was above industry average. On the other hand, organizational identity, and 
more generally, corporate culture, may constrain strategic options, especially if the 
strategic change is significantly different than what the culture supports.  
 Rhetorical history, as a resource in itself, offers CEOs an opportunity, through 
narrative, to expand strategic options when constrained by initial conditions. By 
reinventing the past through a recombination of historical facts, CEOs can retell the 
firm’s story (Suddaby et al., 2010). In the case of Nortel, rhetorical history was attempted 
by the CEOs within their narratives, but in lieu of leveraging history for strategic change, 
their narratives strengthened the firm’s historical strategic position, which was at odds 
with its mechanisms of strategy implementation.  
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8.2 Academic Contributions  
8.2.1 CEO Strategizing and Firm Trajectory 
 This thesis brought together two streams of research: organizational path 
dependence and strategy-as-narrative, to investigate how CEOs, as the grand architect of 
firm strategy, may strategize over time. The thesis contributes to the literature by 
identifying how narrative is used in strategizing activities. Due to issues of access, 
research on CEO activities is limited. With a unique data set of an internal source of CEO 
narratives (the CEO Emails), the research has illuminated how the role of narrative in 
strategy, as a temporal process, can influence the firm’s trajectory. 
 The thesis also highlights the role of CEO narratives in strategic change, not only 
during a CEO’s tenure but also in the case of CEO succession. Although research 
suggests that strategic change may be undertaken when firm performance is poor, this 
research suggests that strategic change by a new CEO is constrained by the previous 
CEO’s narratives and the firm’s resources and capabilities. In other words, with each 
CEO succession, there are initial conditions that may influence the CEO’s strategic 
options. Although it may appear that the CEO can create a new path, succession implies 
that a path already exists. New CEOs join the path and, depending upon the strength of 
the path and where the path is in terms of path dependence, it may not be possible to 
move off path. This finding confirms, empirically, Hutzschenreuter et al.’s (2012) 
suspicions that path dependence may be correlated to strategic change upon CEO 
succession, illustrating how self-reinforcing processes, including CEO narratives, reduce 
the new CEO’s strategic options. 
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8.2.2 Narratives, Intertextuality and Narrative Infrastructures in Strategizing 
 The research also provides further insight into the specific role of narratives in 
strategizing activities. As Fenton and Langley (2011) suggest, texts (and by extension, 
narratives) are central to strategizing activities in organizations. The influence of these 
narratives, however, appears to depend (in part) on two variables: first, the authoritative 
nature of the author and, second, the reader of the narrative. Although generally, 
narratives are considered as a means to gain capital, the type of capital sought will 
influence the content of the narrative and, by extension, the narrative infrastructure.  
 The research also provides insight into the characterization of the narrative 
infrastructure, by identifying intertextual relationships, both structural and discursive. 
Although some earlier studies have investigated intertextuality and the emergence of 
dominant themes (e.g. Deuten & Rip, 2007; Riad et al., 2012), this research was unique 
in that it brought together five different sources of narrative that were produced over an 
extended period of time, by four different authors, and supplemented by a large set of 
event data (both qualitative and quantitative). The scope of the dataset supported an in-
depth study of how different sources of narrative are related through textual 
characteristics and how these relationships form a narrative infrastructure. Uniquely, this 
research demonstrated that, although sources of narrative can form a narrative 
infrastructure through intertextual relationships, some sources of narrative are more 
dominant than others, thereby having a greater influence. These findings provide a path 




8.2.3 Sources of CEO Narratives as Part of the Strategy “Genre”  
 Although research in genre and genre systems was not a primary objective of this 
research, the results of the narrative analysis suggest that sources of CEO narratives can 
be considered strategy genres and part of a larger genre chain of strategizing. Genres are 
defined as “conventionalized discursive actions in which participating individuals or 
institutions have shared perceptions of communicative purposes as well as those of 
constraints operating on their construction, interpretation and conditions of use” (Bhatia, 
2004: 87, in Cornut, Giroux & Langley, 2012). The strategic plan, as an example, is 
considered a strategy genre that can be used by strategists within the organization to 
coordinate strategy-based activities (Cornut et al., 2012), such as formulating a strategy, 
gaining consensus and mobilizing action.  
 Genre chains are created through intertextual relationships that exist between 
different types of genres. Paltridge (2006) illustrates this concept by identifying the 
genres involved in a job application: the job advertisement, the position description, the 
letter of application, the resume, the job interview, the offer, and the negotiation. In terms 
of financial management, a genre chain in financial disclosure may contain an earnings 
call announcement, an earnings release, an earnings call, a quarterly report, and an annual 
report (Crawford Camiciottoli, 2010).  
 The sources of CEO narratives, like strategic plans, each presented with 
distinctive characteristics, as explained in the structural analysis of Chapter 6. Targeted 
towards different audiences, for different purposes, the different types of narrative 
sources represented different methods of strategizing. For example, through the analyst 
calls, the CEO narratives developed a discourse of direction while the CEO Emails 
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developed a discourse of behaviour. Collectively, however, the narratives embodied 
dominant strategy themes that persisted over time. This finding suggests that within 
Cornut et al.’s (2012) strategy genre sits the Analyst Call and the CEO email, along with 
the Letter to Shareholders, the News Release, and the Media Interview.  
 Findings also suggest that there is an overlap of the strategy genre with the 
financial reporting genre. Analyst calls are considered to be a financial reporting genre 
(Crawford Camiciottoli, 2010), however this research suggests that analyst calls can also 
be considered a strategy genre. Similarly, the 10-K annual report is considered a financial 
reporting genre, while the Letter to Shareholders, embedded within the annual report, is 
considered a strategy genre (Segars & Kohut;  2001).  
 In terms of genre chains, the genre chain of financial disclosure, as described by 
Crawford Camiciottoli (2010), contains elements of a potential genre chain of 
strategizing (e.g. the earnings call, the annual report’s Letter to Shareholders), suggesting 
that these two categories of genres and genre chains are closely intertwined. 
 Notably, although Letters to Shareholders are considered a strategic 
communication tool ( Segars & Kohut, 2001), the findings from this research suggest that 
Letters do not persist within the genre chain of strategizing; they may be limited to  a 
transactional activity – valuable  at the point of issue but minimally thereafter. It 
therefore puts the value of the Letter to Shareholders into question not only for 
practitioners but also for researchers.  
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8.2.4 Organizational Path Dependence 
 The research contributes to the organizational path dependence literature in three 
ways. First, the research provides a deeper understanding of the role of self-reinforcing 
processes in the path dependence process and their relationship with initial conditions. 
Theory (Sydow et al., 2009) has discussed the role of self-reinforcing processes and their 
associated rent-seeking effects, but research on how these processes develop and interact 
has only just begun (e.g. Koch, 2011). This research was able to distinguish between self-
reinforcing processes as initial conditions and those developed over time, and further 
investigated the interaction within the set. The findings suggest that self-reinforcing 
processes do not actually “take over” from initial conditions (Sydow et al., 2009) once a 
path is initiated, rather the processes that present themselves as initial conditions may 
reduce the scope of strategic choice not only at the start but also throughout the path. 
Additionally, the initial self-reinforcing processes may influence the way in which future 
processes become embedded into the organization’s environment. As in the case of 
Nortel, the initial self-reinforcing processes were in conflict with the newly introduced 
processes; in combination, the overall effectiveness of all processes (i.e. the integrated 
set) was reduced. 
 Second, the research connects organizational path dependence theory with the 
resource-based view (Barney, 2001), by suggesting that initial conditions, at the 
organizational level, can be defined as the firm’s resources and capabilities. At Nortel, 
the firm’s resources and capabilities had been cultivated over time to create a core 
competency in innovation, which was credited for the firm’s historical competitive 
advantage. As an initial condition, this core competency directly influenced the firm’s 
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strategic choice even before the path was created. It also influenced strategic options 
throughout the organizational path as innovation had become, over the years, a self-
reinforcing process, and a core value. This finding illuminates the importance of the 
resource-based view in organizational path dependence theory by categorizing initial 
conditions at the firm level. 
 Third, the research investigated the role of critical events, which may either 
expand or reduce strategic options. Path dependence theory suggests a main critical 
juncture initiates an organizational path (Sydow et al., 2009). This research, however, 
suggests that more than one critical juncture can occur, and that a critical juncture may, in 
fact, trigger final lock-in.  
 The relationship between the triggering events and the self-reinforcing processes 
is complex. Although a triggering event may appear distinct, the influence of an event 
may be different depending on the constitution of the organizational path. For example, 
the economic meltdown was an external event that was beyond Nortel’s control and 
therefore could be held fully responsible for Nortel’s eventual locked-in state. However, 
other firms in Nortel’s strategic group managed through the downturn successfully (i.e. 
they still exist). The downturn had a greater negative influence on Nortel’s strategic 
options due to rigidity created by the firm’s self-reinforcing processes, including the CEO 
narratives. This finding suggests that the identification of triggering events must be 




8.2.5 An Elaborated Model of the Constitution of an Organizational Path 
 The research also contributes towards research methods on Path Constitution 
Analysis (PCA; Sydow et al., 2012) and the characterization of an organizational path. As 
a new method of characterizing an organizational path, the application of PCA is 
minimal. This research applied PCA on a complex organization, systematically 
identifying the constitutive features of the path, and providing a model for further 
research. Through the application of PCA, findings suggested that the analysis of level 
interrelatedness and multiple actors should be an integrative process. This led to an 
elaborated model of the constitution of an organizational path, as shown again in Figure 
31. 
Figure 31: Elaborated Model of the Constitution of an Organizational Path 














Series of potential triggers which may occur throughout the path
Self reinforcing processes: initial or developed during path, internal and/or external to the firm
277 
 
 This elaborated model highlights the multilevel nature of organizational path 
dependence and the recursive and reflexive interaction between actors that reside within 
the levels. As the Nortel case suggests, organizational path dependence occurs at the 
focal level of analysis (in this case, the firm level, with the CEO as the central actor), but 
even before the path is initiated, actors influence the range of strategic options. Self-
reinforcing processes, developed in the past, may present themselves as initial conditions. 
Resources and capabilities, both tangible and intangible, constrain options while at the 
same time present opportunity for change. Organizational identity and corporate 
reputation, intangible assets that are brokered by employees and stakeholders 
respectively, can restrain options for strategic change while at the same time provide the 
organization with reprieve (if the reputation is outstanding).  
 Triggers may occur throughout the organizational path, not only at the critical 
juncture. These triggers may be direct outcomes of the effect of self-reinforcing process 
(e.g. financial restatement issues) or indirectly related, initiated by external actors or 
events (e.g. the economic downturn). Organizational path dependence is a complex 
temporal process that is highly influenced by initial conditions not only at the onset but 
throughout the process; the process itself is laden with the agency of actors positioned 
within all levels of the upper and lower boundary. 
8.2.6 Rhetorical History 
 Finally, the research provided insight into the role of rhetorical history in the 
organizational path dependence process. As a relatively new concept in the literature, 
rhetorical history is considered as a strategic resource (Suddaby et al., 2010). This thesis 
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suggests that, in the path dependence process, rhetorical history can expand the firm’s 
strategic options and also allow the firm to disentangle itself from past events. The 
research also provides examples of how rhetorical history is used within different sources 
of CEO narratives. For example, in the CEO Emails, the CEOs often drew upon the past 
to recreate history through the sequencing and sensemaking of events. By reassembling 
events, they used narrative to suggest causality, creating room to manoeuvre and affect 
change.  
 The research also provides insight into the relationship between the ability to use 
rhetorical history and the firm’s resources and capabilities (both tangible and intangible). 
The findings suggest that, although rhetorical history requires the reassembling and 
repositioning of the past, the firm is constrained by the degree of embeddedness of the 
firm’s capabilities. At Nortel, for example, the CEOs could not have easily shifted their 
rhetoric from one of innovation to one of low cost, as they would have lost legitimacy 
both within the firm and outside of the firm. As Suddaby et al. (2010) suggest, rhetorical 
history is a strategic resource that must be developed as a capability. This research 
illuminates the inherent difficulties in developing this capability.  
8.3 Limitations  
 Although the research is comprehensive in nature, grounded in theoretically 
supported qualitative research methods, three specific limitations exist. 
 First, Nortel is an extreme case (Yin, 2003), which limits the transferability of the 
results. However, this research had multiple purposes. Although the overarching 
objective was to investigate the influence of CEO narratives in organizational path 
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dependence, the findings and academic contributions extend beyond the notion of path 
dependence and lock-in, to the role of CEO strategizing in organizations, sources of CEO 
narratives and their associated purpose, and theorizing on the influence of resources and 
capabilities on a firm’s trajectory. Although replication of this study could be difficult 
due to access issues (i.e. for the CEO emails), the study’s research methods could be 
replicated in different organizational environments, regardless of where the firm sits on 
the organizational path. 
 Second, the distinction between event data and CEO narrative data is not 
straightforward. Although the CEOs do not narrate all external firm-level documentation, 
they often participate in developing or, at the very least, approving the narrative 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). For example, the material filings from Nortel, such as 
the financial and annual reports, are authorized by the CEO. Although the event data was 
kept separate from the CEO narrative data in the analysis, the CEO’s influence suggests 
that the path constitution analysis may have been influenced, indirectly, by CEO 
narrative. This issue is mainly evident in the identification of actors and events and is 
partly a theoretical problem; in organizational path dependence, the critical events can be 
identified either by the researchers or the actors involved in the process. Therefore, it is 
necessary to use the CEO narratives during the first step of the path constitution analysis, 
to determine which actors (and events) the CEOs deem significant. Although the use of 
the CEO narratives in this case was directed by theory, it does suggest that there may be 
limitations to the method. 
 Third, the study focused specifically on CEO narratives and not the larger body of 
strategy narratives that exist in organizations. Although CEO narratives are considered 
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authoritative, the degree of their influence, given the study’s focus, is not deeply 
understood. Therefore there is a gap in this research on how the CEO narratives were 
connected to other strategy narratives, and how the CEO narratives were consumed by 
stakeholders. In addition, due to the retrospective nature of the analysis, the research did 
not include the CEOs’ own sensemaking and how this influenced their narratives. 
Notably, the analyst calls, which were added into the research only after the research 
proposal, contained insight into the author’s sensemaking, specifically during the 
Question and Answer period, where in-vivo interaction between the CEO and the 
analysts was evident. In hindsight, the analyst calls were an important addition to the 
dataset. 
8.4 Further Research 
 To further understand the role of CEO narratives in organizational path 
dependence or, more broadly, the firm’s trajectory, research could investigate not only 
the narrative themselves but also the production of the narratives and the way they are 
consumed. Understanding how the narratives are produced, the way they are written and 
how they are consumed may provide a richer understanding of the role of texts in 
organizations, and specifically strategizing (Fenton & Langley, 2011). As suggested in 
the limitations, an investigation of this type must include not only reader sensemaking but 
also their subsequent behaviour. Such an analysis would provide a more comprehensive 
perspective on the role of narratives, the creation of a narrative infrastructure and firm 
trajectory. Although this type of research study would be complex, arms-length 
281 
 
observation methods would be appropriate, to ensure that the researcher and research 
methods do not contribute towards the narrative.  
 In this vein, investigation into the sensemaking of readers of the CEO narratives 
and sensemaking of the CEOs vis-à-vis other narratives would generate further insight 
into the recursive process. Why do CEOs choose to respond to some narratives over 
others? What influence do CEO narratives have over actors within the system? Do these 
narratives generate capital after all? If so, what kind of capital? This type of investigation 
would build a narrative model that would include both sensegiving and sensemaking 
activities, and provide further insight into how CEOs strategize in organizations. Notably, 
a sensemaking / sensegiving framework should ideally include not only written and 
formal CEO narratives, but also informal narratives, such as meetings and discussions 
(admittedly, this would be a challenge for researchers).  
 Further research could also be undertaken to understand the role of rhetorical 
history in CEO narratives and in organizational narratives generally. Given the 
constraints of initial conditions in the organizational path dependence process, rhetorical 
history is an important construct in enabling strategic change. How do firms develop the 
capability for rhetorical history and how do CEOs draw upon rhetorical history (as a firm 
resource) in their narratives? How much leeway does a CEO have in rewriting the past, in 
relation to the legitimacy that the CEO seeks within the narratives? On a larger scale, this 
research stream could investigate the use of rhetorical history across the organization and 
the types of conflicts that may arise between narratives due to variance in how history is 
retold. In larger organizations, specifically multinationals, do many versions of the firm’s 
history exist? If rhetorical history is used to gain legitimacy, and multinationals are faced 
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with variance in their legitimacy issues (due to varying institutional logics), then 
rhetorical history might be used, through narrative, differently from one subsidiary to the 
next. As a result, this variance may influence a firm’s corporate identity and reputation. 
 In terms of organizational path dependence, further research could focus more 
deeply on the characterization of self-reinforcing processes and their influence on both 
the firm’s performance and trajectory. The self-reinforcing processes as defined by 
organizational path dependence theory (Sydow et al., 2009) are similar to Kostova’s 
(1999) strategic organizational practices, defined as a “particular way of conducting 
organizational functions that have evolved over time under the influence of an 
organization’s history, people, interests, and actions and that have become 
institutionalized in the organization” (Kostova, 1999: 309). By connecting these two 
streams of research, it may be possible to understand how institutional environments 
influence an organizational path, not just initially but throughout the organization’s 
trajectory, through strategic organizational practices. 
8.5 Implications for Managers 
 Findings from this research have several practical applications, discussed as 
follows. 
 First, findings suggest that CEO narratives, specifically in public companies, are 
closely linked to the firm’s material information. Practitioners should be aware that 
material filings will directly influence what the CEO can say in the future. This constraint 
can restrict the CEO’s ability to change strategic direction, given that any contradiction 
between the material and non-material CEO narratives may influence the firm’s ability to 
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attract resources. CEOs should therefore treat material events as not only a regulatory 
task but also an important trigger of CEO strategy narratives. For example, the class 
action settlement at Nortel, which occurred during Zafirovski’s tenure, was a significant 
material event that the firm was regulated to report. However, instead of positioning the 
event within the context of the firm’s organizational path, Zafirovski chose to downplay 
the impact of the event in his narrative, even though it had obvious implications on the 
firm’s financial flexibility. This example illustrates the conflict that arises when deeply 
rooted organizational events are dismissed as transactional. Managers should therefore 
consider the implication of how events (even non-material events) are narrated to 
stakeholders and the influence of this narrative on the firm’s organizational path. 
 Second, CEOs should consider the relative importance of their sources of 
narratives based on their intended purpose. For example, firms invest resources into their 
Letters to Shareholders and research has indicated that these Letters can be used as a 
strategic communication tool (Segars & Kohut,  2001). However, this thesis suggests that 
the Letters have minimal relationship to any other narrative sources and that the narrative 
itself provides minimal benefit to the organization. Analyst calls, on the other hand, or 
informal employee communication (e.g. CEO Emails), as both direction setting and 
behaviour setting activities, appear to be worthwhile areas of investments for the firm, 
given their level of influence on identifying and implementing a strategic direction. It 
follows, however, that CEOs need to consider their authoritative role within the 
organization, and the resultant influence of their words on stakeholder behaviour. As the 
research suggests, CEO narratives can draw coordinating, complementarity, learning and 
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adaptive expectation effects, but in so doing, the same narratives may contribute towards 
strategic lock-in. 
 Third, CEOs and their firms should consider characterizing their organizational 
path on a consistent basis. Given the authority of the CEO position and the power 
structures that accompany it, firms are susceptible to lock-in. This susceptibility is further 
amplified if the organization's culture is one that supports autocratic and hierarchical 
decision making. To avoid the trap of becoming locked in, CEOs must consider how they 
are contributing towards the development and persistence of the path in their narrative 
activities, whether they are text-based narratives, such as reports, or talk-based narratives, 
such as analyst calls, Board meetings, customer meetings, etc... The role of monitoring 
the firm’s path should be assigned to someone (or group) that sits outside of the CEO’s 
direct decision making body to avoid group think. Such a role would encourage the 
understanding of available options that may not be evident to those involved in the day-
to-day and ongoing strategic leadership of the company. This role is similar to a strategy 
office function, however, the separation from the Top Management Team is a unique 
requirement that may be difficult to implement. 
 Fourth,  CEOs should consider the way in which rhetorical history is enacted 
within the organization. The notion that rhetorical history is a means of strategizing 
highlights the importance of aligning the way in which historical events are employed to 
shape organizational identity. If a firm is undergoing strategic change, elements of the 
firm’s history may continue to be important and can therefore serve as strategic 
resources. However, if the vision of the organization is unclear, managers may use 
history incorrectly (as in the case of Nortel), creating barriers to change.  
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 Fundamentally, this research provides guidance to managers on the influence of 
narrative in organizations. Kuhn (2008) suggests that communication is constitutive of 
organization. Although findings from this research do not go that far, the research does 
suggest that what is said, by whom, when and how, can explain and influence future 
behaviour. In terms of the CEO narratives, due to the authoritative role of the CEO, the 
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P480: 2006_11_15 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Nortel Government Solutions 
Update.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P498: 2006_11_17 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Investor Conference Update.rtf Zafirovski 
P508: 2006_12_19 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Our Time to Lead.rtf Zafirovski 
P512: 2007_01_15 Nortel CEO Email MZ - BT's selection of Metro Ethernet 




CEO Email (ATLAS.ti number, date, CEO, Email title) CEO 
P516: 2007_01_17 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Nortel and Microsoft Alliance 
Comes Out of the Gate Strong.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P517: 2007_01_29 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Our Must Do's for 2007.rtf Zafirovski 
P520: 2007_02_06 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Peter Currie to Step Down as 
CFO.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P524: 2007_02_27 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Transforming Nortel into a High-
Performance Enterprise.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P525: 2007_02_28 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message from Mike Z.rtf Zafirovski 
P527: 2007_03_01 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Today's Announcement.rtf Zafirovski 
P533: 2007_03_16 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Our 4Q2006 and Full-year Financial 
Results.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P552: 2007_03_23 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Announcement of Senior 
Convertible Notes Offering.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P553: 2007_03_26 Nortel CEO Email MZ - My Letter to Shareholders.rtf Zafirovski 
P558: 2007_03_28 Nortel CEO Email MZ - More on the $1.15 billion 
Convertible Senior Notes.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P563: 2007_04_02 Nortel CEO Email MZ - April 2007 Quick Pulse Employee 
Survey.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P564: 2007_04_02 Nortel CEO Email MZ - CFO Transition Update.rtf Zafirovski 
P575: 2007_05_04 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Back on Offense.rtf Zafirovski 
P577: 2007_05_09 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Barrios appointed President 
Caribbean and Latin America Region.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P578: 2007_05_11 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Mark your Calendars - Special 
webcast with Mike Zafirovski.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P582: 2007_05_23 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Ontario Securities Commission 
Settlement Approved.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P586: 2007_06_05 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Nortel's Enterprise Momentum and 
Today's Industry News.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P590: 2007_07_10 Nortel CEO Email MZ - The New Nortel Powered by You.rtf Zafirovski 
P591: 2007_07_31 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Landmark win for Nortel 
Government Solutions.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P592: 2007_08_01 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Dion Joannou Org Notice.rtf Zafirovski 
P597: 2007_08_06 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Accelerating the Pace.rtf Zafirovski 
P599: 2007_09_17 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Our Call to Action.rtf Zafirovski 
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CEO Email (ATLAS.ti number, date, CEO, Email title) CEO 
P600: 2007_09_19 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Organization Announcement.rtf Zafirovski 
P604: 2007_10_01 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Pavi Binning to join Nortel as EVP 
and Chief Financial Officer.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P607: 2007_10_15 Nortel CEO Email MZ - SEC Settlement Reached.rtf Zafirovski 
P613: 2007_11_07 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Making Our Strategic Vision a 
Reality.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P618: 2007_11_19 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Business and ESAT Update.rtf Zafirovski 
P622: 2007_12_20 Nortel CEO Email MZ - A few final words....rtf Zafirovski 
P629: 2008_01_08 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Appointment of Global Sales 
Leader.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P645: 2008_02_04 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Accelerate to Win.rtf Zafirovski 
P655: 2008_02_27 Nortel CEO Email MZ - A Year of Tough Challenges...and 
Huge Opportunity.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P680: 2008_03_26 Nortel CEO Email MZ - ZMAIL State of the Business and 
The Road Ahead.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P688: 2008_05_05 Nortel CEO Email MZ - ZMAIL Making 2008 a Breakout 
Year.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P694: 2008_05_20 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Nortel Response to Tragedies in 
Asia.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P719: 2008_06_16 Nortel CEO Email MZ - The Power of Momentum.rtf Zafirovski 
P725: 2008_08_01 Nortel CEO Email MZ - ZMAIL Driving Growth and 
Profitability.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P729: 2008_09_17 Nortel CEO Email MZ - ZMAIL Shaping a Clear Strategic 
Path for Growth and Profitability.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P731: 2008_09_18 Nortel CEO Email MZ - The Path Forward.rtf Zafirovski 
P734: 2008_11_10 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Moving Forward.rtf Zafirovski 
P736: 2008_11_18 Nortel CEO Email MZ - The Path Ahead.rtf Zafirovski 
P743: 2008_12_18 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Moving Nortel Forward.rtf Zafirovski 
P745: 2009_01_14 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Mike Zafirovski Message to 
Employees.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P748: 2009_01_16 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P750: 2009_01_23 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P751: 2009_01_30 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P752: 2009_02_06 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
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P755: 2009_02_13 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P758: 2009_02_25 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P761: 2009_03_02 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P765: 2009_03_12 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P767: 2009_04_03 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P768: 2009_04_09 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P772: 2009_05_11 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P779: 2009_06_19 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P784: 2009_07_20 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P788: 2009_07_21 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Organization Notice.rtf Zafirovski 
P789: 2009_07_22 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Statement on Wireless Asset 
Auction.rtf 
Zafirovski 
P791: 2009_07_25 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P797: 2009_08_10 Nortel CEO Email MZ - Message to Employees.rtf Zafirovski 
P798: 2009_08_10 Nortel CEO Email PB - Todays Organizational 
Announcement.rtf 
Binning 
P804: 2009_09_14 Nortel CEO Email PB - Nortel Selects Avaya as Successful 
Bidder for Enterprise Solutions Business.rtf 
Binning 
P812: 2009_10_07 Nortel CEO Email PB - Today's Announcement.rtf Binning 
P822: 2009_11_13 Nortel CEO Email PB - Nortel concludes sale of CDMALTE 
Access to Ericsson.rtf 
Binning 
P826: 2009_11_16 Nortel CEO Email PB - Q3 2009 Financial Results.rtf Binning 
P830: 2009_11_23 Nortel CEO Email PB - Today's Announcement.rtf Binning 
P837: 2009_11_25 Nortel CEO Email PB - Today's announcement.rtf Binning 
P841: 2009_12_08 Nortel CEO Email PB - Today's announcement.rtf Binning 
P844: 2009_12_18 Nortel CEO Email PB - Today's Announcement.rtf Binning 
P850: 2009_12_23 Nortel CEO Email PB - Today's Announcement.rtf Binning 
P860: 2010_02_24 Nortel CEO Email PB - Today's Announcement Related to 






APPENDIX B.   CEO Email Samples 
Frank Dunn 
 
From:  FrankDunn, OfficeOf [NASH:8442:EXCH] 
Sent:  October-07-02 3:07 PM 
To:  All Nortel Networks Employees 
Subject: OUR RESOLVE AND WILL TO WIN 




There's a sentiment I've been hearing a lot recently in e-mails and conversations across the 
company. It was nicely summed up in an e-mail I got from an employee last week:  
 
"Hey Frank, we don't seem to be getting the credit we deserve for all the hard work and progress 
we've made during the past year...a lot of us in my group are feeling wounded by negative reports 
that would have us believe the industry and the company are going to the dogs. It's frustrating 
and demoralizing. It's leaving many of us feeling a little depleted. Isn't it time for us to get more 
aggressive in communicating our story -- the progress we've made and how we're building a 
strong market position?" 
 
The answer to that question is "yes." So let me start with a few salient facts. 
 
THE STATE OF NORTEL AND THE INDUSTRY 
 
Despite the fact we're going through the worst slowdown in the industry's history, we are making 
significant progress, and you have my personal assurance we're going to be more aggressive in 
getting our story out. The constant second-guessing, wrong-headed speculation, and pessimistic 
assessments of people outside the company cannot continue to go unanswered. I've recently 
given a series of interviews making it clear we've bolstered the company's staying power and are 
executing a sound strategy to rebuild our foundation for the future.  
 
We've made solid progress in terms of our top priority -- returning the company to profitability 
before the end of June 2003 -- particularly when it comes to reducing our cost structure. As you 
know, I'm driving to a breakeven business model at less than US$2.6 billion in quarterly revenue. 
 
As for our long-term viability, the facts speak for themselves. We expect to end this year with 
more than $3 billion in cash and to have a breakeven and better business model for 2003. I 
believe we have the ability to weather a downturn. 
 
But there's more to our story than financials: 
 
* We have streamlined and simplified our corporate structure as part of our performance-based 
business model, a structure tightly aligned with our customers through four clear, accountable 
business units -- Wireless Networks, Wireline Networks, Enterprise Networks, and Optical 
Networks.  
  
* We have a powerful vision of network transformation driving our innovation. We're enabling the 
multiple networks of the past to converge into single packet-based networks that are more 
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intelligent, cost-effective, and easier to manage. Make no mistake: being a key player in this 
transformation is a big opportunity for us, one you'll be hearing a lot more about very soon. 
  
* We have the right product mix and product quality to generate cost savings and profitable 
revenue streams for service providers and to deliver value-added capabilities for enterprises.  
 
* Most important, underpinning it all, we have a base of talented employees. I've said many times 
that our customers tell us we have the best people in the business. It bears repeating. You 
remain our strongest competitive advantage. 
  
We need to stay focused on these real and lasting strengths and not be distracted by misguided 
speculation and misinformation circulating in the market and in our own rumor mills. We're 
rebuilding our foundation for the future and we need to concentrate.  
 
I'm not saying we should be blind to realities. No one knows better than you how tough things are 
right now for our industry and our company. It's a frustrating, demoralizing time in telecom. Hardly 
a week goes by without another round of news about stagnant revenues, falling stock prices, 
bankruptcies, or corporate scandals. But the state of our industry and the state of Nortel Networks 
are not as gloomy as you so often hear.  
 
Yes, it's going to take new thinking for the industry to regain its momentum. Yes, we all need to 
address new challenges. There are legitimate questions about the right business models, the 
demand for products and services, where investment will come from to fund future growth, and 
what will get the growth engine humming again. 
 
But we should be inspired by these challenges and by the rewards of getting the industry and 
Nortel Networks moving ahead. We can't allow the negative news and speculation about our 
viability to destroy our optimism or our faith in our industry or our company.  
 
RESOLVE, CONFIDENCE, AND STRAIGHT TALK 
 
On September 25, I had the opportunity to address a public policy forum in Washington attended 
by regulators and government and industry representatives. One of my key messages was that 
everyone associated with telecom has to show resolve to make the changes needed to get the 
full power of communications back to work, driving economic growth and innovation.  
 
In the same way, we have to demonstrate resolve, confidence, and the will to win to ensure 
Nortel Networks remains an industry leader, an innovator, and a company that's synonymous 
with the future of telecom. Our resolution and will to win must be grounded in consistency and 
unity of purpose, strong and visible leadership, and a total conviction that rebuilding for the future 
is a mission worth fulfilling and worthy of our very best efforts.  
 
Resolution, confidence, willpower, and unity of purpose are the means to get us through the 
current downturn and to keep our spirits up as we look to the longer term. It's critical to keep our 
spirits up. Very little is achieved without confidence in the future and a spirit of great performance. 
 
I'd like to summarize our situation by providing straight, to-the-point answers to what I think are 
the key questions on people's minds today: 
 
* Do we have staying power? Yes we do.  
 
* Do we have the financial strength to execute our business plan? Yes we do.  
 




* Are we making progress in restoring profitability by June 2003? Yes we are.  
 
* Do we have a strategy for rebuilding for the future? Yes we do, and we're making progress. Let 
me assure you our business model is positioned for success, not bankruptcy.  
  
* Is it time for us to be more aggressive in telling our story? Yes it is, and our communications will 
shift into overdrive as we announce third quarter results on October 17.  
 
I believe in the long-term success of this company. I'm charged up and energized by the progress 
we're making. We've managed to do more with less and are meeting industry-wide challenges 
head on. With your help, we've become more efficient, more disciplined, and more focused on 
customer needs.  
We continue to deliver value to our customers, and we will not let anything deflect us from this 
mission. 
 
My confidence in your abilities is unwavering. Your talent, ingenuity, hard work, and dedication 
are why we continue to succeed. Your efforts day in and day out are giving us a strong foundation 
for the future. Don't ever overlook the significance of your personal contributions, and always 
maintain your resolve and will to win. Above all, don't stop believing in our industry and don't stop 
believing in Nortel Networks. 
 
As we move ahead, we need you to help us communicate the facts about Nortel Networks. 
Neither I nor the senior leadership team can do it alone. We're always looking for feedback, so 
feel free to send me an e-mail if you have any questions or comments or suggestions on how we 






From:  CEO, OfficeOf [NASHF:8442:EXCH] 
Sent:  December-17-04 11:27 AM 
To:  The People of Nortel 
Subject: A Challenging but Promising Year 
Audience: The People of Nortel  
 
It's been a few months since I last wrote to you at length, and as we near the end of what I'd 
characterize as a "challenging but promising year," I want to share my thoughts with you. When I 
joined you, I realized that one of the great strengths of Nortel was its people, and my thinking on 
this is unchanged. You have stuck with the company during these most difficult of times. We are 
very near the end of our restatement period, and we are now on the cusp of a very special time 
for Nortel as we enter 2005. A lot has happened.  
 
Importantly, our customers have been very loyal to us, and our business is solid. I have visited 
with most of our major customers. While they watch the progression of our restatement, they 
have the faith that we will handle it correctly, that we will be there for them for the long-term, and 
that we will continue to develop and support them with the quality products we've brought them 
for decades. Sometimes, keeping them with us hasn't been a given. Our competitors have 
attempted to benefit from our problems, and many of them have been aggressive in their 
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attempts to do so. But through your efforts we have, as far as I can tell, held onto all existing 
contracts and have seized some new opportunities.  
 
But I will tell you that competition has been difficult in our marketplace, not only for us but for our 
competitors. We have seen consolidation of major telecoms companies, which gives them more 
profound bargaining power, and we are seeing the real presence of the new Chinese competitors, 
Huawei, ZTE and UTStarcom. Nevertheless, we are doing well even through the difficulties of the 
last nine months.  
 
Bill Kerr and our financial teams have done a splendid job and have now brought us to a point 
that we can see the light on the restatement finality. We have also enlisted Accenture to help us 
establish the process and install SAP throughout our global Nortel organization to make us a truly 
world-class  
Finance organization.  
 
As you know we have announced that we expect to file our financial statements for 2003 and for 
the first and second quarter of 2004, commencing January 10, 2005, and the financial statements 
for the third quarter of 2004 as soon as practicable thereafter. I know that there has been great 
frustration with the delays. As you can imagine, I am one of those most frustrated (and 
embarrassed) by the delays. I can tell you, though, that the most important thing for us to do is to 
do them RIGHT!  Nothing would be worse than not completing them thoroughly and accurately, 
and later having to redo them again. We must start from a fully audited, accurate basis as we go 
into 2005, and we will!   
 
Having said that, MY principal focus is on doing business! Many important initiatives are now in 
process. As you know, we have brought Clent Richardson on board as our Chief Marketing 
Officer and Dion Joannou as our Chief Strategy Officer. We have been especially well-served by 
their efforts. Together with the rest of the senior team, we are working on a number of strategic 
initiatives from partnerships to acquisitions -- many of which are "company changing."  As time 
goes on you will be more aware of these, but you're seeing signs already as we closed on the 
agreement for "securing the Internet" with new partner Symantec. Clent has been of central 
importance with many new and exciting developments, including our ingenious "This is the Way" 
campaign. He has been on the road continually, speaking both internally and externally about our 
new directions and our new messaging. Dion, Clent, Brian McFadden and Albert Hitchcock have 
also been working with the rest of the senior team to explore new futures -- looking forward and 
determining whom we need to partner with and where Nortel will place its bets. This executive 
team will be more and more visible as we chart our path to a new Nortel.  
 
Services, one of our strategic new initiatives, is converging on a business that will involve 
significant revenue in the future. Our Federal business is well on its way to a substantial 
acquisition that will put us on the map quickly in this most important $60B market. With Security, 
we are now in a position where we can genuinely "see the future" as we provide (with Symantec) 
a solution set that will involve an architecture for "securing the Internet."  Our broadband access 
solution with our partners Calix and ECI has resulted in nine wins in the last nine months, and 
while it will be a challenge as competition stiffens, I think this will be a very important initiative in 
2005. All of our business presidents have been leading our business to a very good close for 
2004. 
 
We are well on our way to resetting the business model with the reduction of over 3,200 of our 
people. This has been painful for me and all of us. These people are in general very respected 
employees, and we will miss them. By the end of the year about 2,200 will have departed, and we 
will complete the remaining 1,000 reductions in the first few months of 2005. The senior 
management team has spent considerable time to develop the 2005 plan, and we are optimistic 
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about the new year. We must now commit our efforts to closing 2004 successfully and making 
2005 the year that will be the demonstration of our successful transition.  
 
As for me, I have been on the road a lot and have enjoyed visiting the great majority of you in 
your locations. I have also taken important decisions on Ethics and Integrity. Scot McCauley has 
done a superb job in setting up the position of Corporate Ethics and Compliance Officer (CE & 
CO), which will report in to the Chairman of Nortel and to me. Scot has put in place a core 
organization, charter, and an understanding of how we can ensure that our organization is 
standing at the forefront in this important area. Scot is the acting CE & CO, and we are indebted 
to him for his work on our behalf.  
 
I've also been traveling to be with the CEOs of our major customers around the world, many of 
them multiple times. I tell analysts that I spend 40 percent of my time on the activities associated 
with the restatement and the actions to make our financial accounting first-class going forward, 40 
percent on implementation of 2004 business and development of the 2005 business plan, and 20 
percent on the strategy for the future. I meet with our 16 senior executives two hours a week, and 
we have an in-person meeting for a full day every other month. With our executive team, I'm 
spending a lot of my time on the technology and geographic strategy as we see (1) Asia and 
China emerging, (2) the marketplace in significant turbulence as Carriers convert to VoIP and 
evolve to broadband access, and (3) our Enterprise customers starting to appreciate the fact that 
their business efficiency can be truly enhanced with "solution packages." We are well placed and 
very well prepared to play successfully in this changing marketplace.   
 
Also, I have spent a lot of time on "processes." I've brought the consulting firms of Bain and 
McKinsey on board to help us study the processes of (1) administering R&D for optimal returns 
and (2) overall cost reduction in the $6B of business we do with our vendors. We have also done 
a lot of work on a CEO dashboard (an approach to look at how we roll up the principal 
parameters to allow me and the Senior Leadership Team to manage our business). 
 
Our board of directors is standing strongly behind our efforts from the restatement to the broadest 
new initiatives. We are fortunate to have such a special group of men and women with us as we 
transition this company. I know that if you could be present in the boardroom, you would share 
the great satisfaction I have in their stalwart presence for the best interests of Nortel. In over 80(!) 
board and committee meetings in the last year, they have shown a special dedication and 
commitment to doing the right thing for us and our shareholders. When you see one of our board 
members, I hope that you'll express your thanks for their service.  
 
Much has happened, much has been done, and we are on a journey that will put this company 
where it should be... at the forefront of our marketplace. I think of you, our greatest asset, a lot. 
You have remained loyal without condition, and you have delivered well throughout this period. I 
have learned of the many wonderful things that you do to make our business successful, and you 
embody the credo "capability with character."  You are the major part of my satisfaction as the 
CEO of this great company. And under Bill Donovan's  
Human Resources leadership, we will continue the focus on our employees -- moving forward 
with people programs, leadership training and a focus on diversity in 2005. 
 
I extend to you and your families my warmest wishes for a blessed Holiday Season.  
 








From:  CEO, OfficeOf (NASHF:8442) 
Sent:  July-17-06 11:17 AM 
To:  All Nortel Employees 
Subject: Impressions from the Road 
 
We spend a lot of time in the corporate world talking about our responsibilities to our 
shareholders, and about generating shareholder confidence and value.  
I have been on the road, as usual, over the last few weeks. But my participation in a few, very key 
activities has really made the challenges and the opportunities we face in earning that confidence 
and delivering that value much more tangible. 
 
It began with a day spent with a hundred or so of our most important Enterprise customers at our 
annual CIO Forum. I then made the rounds to potential investors for the $2B debt offering we 
recently closed. More recently, I stood up and talked to hundreds of our most engaged 
shareholders, in the flesh, at our Annual General Meeting in Toronto. And most recently, I began 
visiting and talking with some of our most important customers, the ones that I have not 
previously been able to engage due to my separation agreement with Motorola. 
 
Armed with the keen insight these impassioned individuals have provided to us, I remain 
confident that we’re on the right track with our short- and long-term plans. Let me share with you 
some of my impressions, and more importantly, the realities of our current situation. It is easy to 
get frustrated with our progress and/or to expect that our company can become hugely successful 
overnight. The reality of our starting point is different (note my comments below on the investor 
road show). But make no mistake, I am very confident that we are moving forward, and the 
magnitude and speed of our progress will be dependent solely on the sum of all of our 
performances.  
 
Here then are my impressions and key takeaways:  
 
Let me start with my favorite stakeholders, the customers. They remain firmly committed to Nortel 
and the company’s success. It would be disingenuous to tell you that there are no skeptics out 
there. There are, both for some of our performance issues -- quality, delivery, and plan of record 
for new products and releases -- and for our longer term plans. But the vast majority has 
expressed strong confidence that we are doing the right things not only to put this company back 
on track, but also to deliver on a vision of convergence that will provide them with the mobility and 
productivity they need to propel their business. Our customers want us to succeed, and they are 
really pulling for us. We can't ask for anything more. But, of course, we have to deliver for them, 
including very specifically on the identified operational and product issues that are receiving 
appropriate investments and high visibility. Non-performance for our customers is not an option. 
 
Let me move to the investors in the "high yield" market, the ones who invested in our $2 billion 
debt offering. This is not a warm and fuzzy crowd. They provide financing to what are considered 
high-risk companies, and of course, they charge high rates. For your information, at our current 
credit rating of B-, we are fifteen notches below the top AAA rating, and only three notches above 
the lowest CCC- rating. Companies with high ratings can typically raise funds more quickly and 
easily, maybe with a conference call and a brief road show. For our team, including CFO Peter 
Currie, Treasurer Kate Stevenson, Investor Relations leader Terry Glofcheskie and me, it took 
seven full working days traveling to many locations for more than 25 meetings with individual 
investors, five group presentations, and three teleconferences. We presented our story, and we 
tried to answer all their questions, including the three most frequently asked ones: 
311 
 
1. Are you really committed to profitability and to the $1.5 billion business transformation 
initiative?  
2. Are you really committed to turning cash flow positive -- which you haven't achieved since 
1998? And,  
3. With all that has transpired in your company and its impact on your employees, are they 
committed for the big job ahead? 
 
We answered the questions in a straightforward and transparent way. The results of the road 
show were good. We secured the $2 billion in senior notes that will give us the additional financial 
flexibility we need in the coming years. We had an excellent track record in converting our 
meetings with investors into orders. They had confidence in our story. But I look forward to the 
day when we are healthy enough to deal with the "low yield" crowd.  
 
Lastly, what I’ve heard from our shareholders. We are starting to make progress in earning back 
their confidence (and I know you can't tell that by looking at our stock price, not yet anyway). Last 
year’s AGM was quite contentious. Shareholder lawsuits were very much in the air; we were in 
the middle of financial restatements; and we hadn't reported our earnings on a timely basis. I 
found it quite humbling to talk to a number of individual investors at this year’s AGM who are still 
reeling from post-bubble losses and then our restatements. They asked tough questions ranging 
from what happened to their investment to my resolve and long-term commitment to the 
company. The last question was much easier to answer -- they and you have my full commitment. 
At all the meetings with our customers, the debt investors and our shareholders, I told the story 
that we’ve developed together and that we are ALL now in the process of implementing.  
 
I told them that it will be a three-to-five-year process to bring us back to greatness. That we are in 
month eight of that process, and it will be a combination of short- and long-term actions to make it 
happen. I explained that we have a roadmap, and that we are intensely focused on executing. It’s 
a plan that you’ve helped create and that you’re familiar with: 
 
 Our conviction is that we can and will re-create a great company. Our commitment is that 
we will be transparent, that we will show unmatched drive, and that we will be driven by a 
high "say/do" ratio.  
 Our litmus test is the financial strength of the company. We are aiming for double-digit 
margins, strong cash generation and credit rating, consistent revenue growth that’s better 
than the market, and a better share price.  
 There's no silver bullet on the near horizon that will promise in one swoop to transport 
this company past our challenges. Our transformation is a careful mix of organic growth, 
continued commitment to innovation and R&D, our extensive ecosystem of partnerships 
and other opportunities designed to maximize our effectiveness, and successes in the 
market.  
 
I was impressed, quite frankly, by how well this straight-forward approach was received and by 
the confidence that our shareholders are still willing to give us to deliver on these promises. Our 
slate of directors was accepted by overwhelming majorities, and we were given permission for a 
reverse stock split to make our shares more attractive to institutional investors.  
 
Over the past few weeks, we have made a tremendous amount of progress. We have also made 
some difficult decisions that are key to our roadmap, namely the changes to the North American 
pension plans and the reductions in managerial and other positions. They will affect many of you 
who have been giving your best efforts toward the re-creation of this great company. Thanks to all 
of you who provided me with candid feedback concerning these changes. The decisions were not 
made quickly or easily. But in the end, they are essential to our competitiveness in this industry, 
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and they are a measure of the resolve that our customers, the investment community, and the 
shareholders I met at the AGM expect from us.  
 
As always, I thank you for all you’re doing as we continue to drive the momentum for this 
company’s transformation. The period ahead of us is very important. To use a sports analogy, I 
am looking forward to active participants rather than idle spectators. And please, continue to 







From:   PaviBinning, OfficeOf (TORWM:0197) 
Sent:  August-10-09 9:46 AM 
To:  All Nortel Employees 
Subject: Today’s Organizational Announcement 
Today Nortel announced important organizational changes, including a new organizational 
structure. These changes are a critical step on our path to maximizing value through the sale of 
our businesses. The new structure will ensure we continue on the direction that has been laid out, 
effectively close sales transactions as they occur and enable a smooth transition to the 
purchasers of our businesses. 
 
With sale agreements for our CDMA and LTE Access business in place, as well as a stalking 
horse agreement for our Enterprise business, the Board of Directors decided the time was right to 
transition to a smaller Board of Directors and a streamlined management team focused on driving 
key areas of the business. We therefore announced today the departure of President and CEO 
Mike Zafirovski and the reduction in size of our Board of Directors from nine to three members. 
As well, Executive Vice President, Corporate Operations, Dennis Carey is also leaving Nortel. I 
would like to thank Mike, our outgoing board members, and Dennis for their tireless dedication to 
Nortel. We wish them all the very best for the future. 
 
Furthermore, we have also decided to further decentralize corporate functions. All corporate roles 
will transition into either specific business units, Nortel Business Services or the newly formed 
Corporate Group. The new organizational structure, effective concurrently with the changes noted 
above, will consist of four pillars: 
 
 Nortel’s business units – Wireless Networks, Enterprise Solutions, Metro Ethernet 
Networks, Carrier VoIP and Application Solutions and the LG-Nortel joint venture. These 
will report to me in my role as Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Financial Officer. 
Also reporting to me is the Business Transformation team led by Bill Donovan; Darryl 
Edwards will work with me to ensure we remain focused on our Global Carrier customers, 
and he will also play a leadership role in EMEA. 
  
 The Mergers and Acquisitions teams will continue to report to Chief Strategy Officer 
George Riedel.  
  
 Nortel Business Services (NBS) will continue to provide efficient and flexible support for 
the ongoing shared needs of Wireless Networks, Enterprise Solutions, Metro Ethernet 
Networks, Carrier VoIP and Application Solutions and the LG-Nortel joint venture. NBS 
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consists of Human Resources Shared Services, Finance Shared Services, Information 
Technology, Global Real Estate, and Procurement and Manufacturing Support. Joe 
Flanagan will continue to lead NBS.  
  
 A core Corporate Group is established that will be primarily responsible for the 
management of ongoing restructuring activities during the sales process as well as post 
business dispositions. This group will include the following teams: Treasury, Legal, 
Corporate Control, Tax, Pensions, Government Relations, Corporate Communications, 
Corporate FP&A and Internal Audit. The responsibilities and structure of the team will 
evolve as we progress through the overall restructuring efforts. John Doolittle will lead 
this group. 
 
As stated in the press release, the company will be seeking court approvals for Ernst & Young 
Inc., the company’s Monitor, to take on an enhanced role with respect to the oversight of the 
business, sales processes and other restructuring activities under the CCAA proceedings. 
Further, Nortel is in the process of identifying a principal officer for the Nortel companies in U.S. 
Chapter 11 proceedings who will work in conjunction with the U.S. Creditors’ Committee (UCC), 
ad hoc bondholders group and the Monitor. George, Joe, John and I will report to the NNC and 
NNL Boards of Directors, the Monitor and the proposed U.S. principal officer. 
 
The UK Administrators, who have ultimate executive responsibility for the 19 EMEA companies to 
which they are appointed, will assess the need for alterations to the EMEA management structure 
to align with these changes. 
 
Over the next few days, OSM will be offline while the HR team updates the database. In the 
meantime, I encourage you to review the organizational charts, which provide the structure for the 
new organization. Teams that have been moved or changed as a result of today’s announcement 
can expect to hear from their leaders over the course of the week.  
 
These are challenging times for everyone in the company, and I want to assure you that we will 
continue to share information and provide more clarity as we move forward. There is much work 
to be done in the coming months to ensure we continue to support our customers, place the 
businesses into safe hands and importantly protect as many jobs as possible.  
 






APPENDIX C.   CEO Narratives First Order Concepts
Accountability, ownership 
Actors - Analysts & 
Shareholders 
Actors - Board 
Actors - CEO 
Actors - Customer 
Actors - Economy 
Actors - Employees 
Actors - Industry 
Actors - JVs 
Actors - Media 
Actors - R&D 
Actors - Sales and channels 
Actors - TMT 
AGM - Reference to 
Alignment 
Analyst Calls 
Analyst calls, comment to 
analyst 




Audit, audit reviews, controls 
Bankruptcy 
Board member announcement 










CEO emotion negative 
CEO Emotion positive 
CEO Employee Expectation-
request 




Code/Guide Bus conduct/ethical 
bus practices 
Collaboration, teamwork 





Core Values (corporate) 
Corporate behaviour 
Corporate CA - actual use of 
term 








Corporate marketing, brand 
mgmt 
Corporate Mission 
Corporate operations, NBS 
Corporate opportunity 
Corporate planning (op rhythm) 
Corporate Reputation 
Corporate strategy, plan, S2 
Corporate synergy 
Corporate Vision 
Corporate Vision Infostructure 
Corporate, social responsibility 
Customer's support, loyalty 
Customer benefits 










Customer thank you 
Customer value 
Customers 




Divestiture, sale, sale process 
Employee attributes-behaviours 
Employee career dev, trg, SI 
Employee Communications 







Employee thank you 
Employees 
Ethics and compliance 
Execs (Sr), cabinet, team 
Execution of the work 
External non-market event 
External speculation about 
company's success 




Financial Balance sheet 
Financial Book2Bill FIX by 
checking book-to-bill 
Financial Break-even 
Financial Capital / equity 
Financial Cash flow / 
management / position 
Financial Cost reduction, spend 
Financial Cost structure, budget, 
S4 
Financial Credit / support facility 
Financial Credit rating, 
downgrade 
Financial Creditor protection, 
process 
Financial Creditors, committees 
Financial Debt 
Financial Deferred Revenue 




Financial Margin, gross, 
operating 
Financial market event 
Financial market reference 
Financial Objectives (FIX) 
Financial performance 
Financial Reporting 
Financial Restatement activity 
Financial Results (check that this 
works) 
Financial Results Accuracy 










Global, world wide 
Government 
Growth, speed 
Guidance adjusted down 






Industry position, Nortel's? 




Key success factors 
Leader bio, character, 
contribution 





Leadership reporting structure / 
team 
Leadership Value Forceful 
Optimism 
Leadership Values 
Legal, litigation, settlements 
Long-term outcome, perf, results 
Market achievements 
Market share / position 
Markets 
Mechanisms of Strategy 
Media engagement 
Media reference 
Media support for firm 
Network Transformation 







Partners LG Joint Venture 




Priority initiative BIG 
Priority initiative 
CashCostRevenue 
Process, procedures, guidelines, 
programs 
Product introduction, TTM, 
Productivity 




Quality, 6 sigma, reliability 
R&D 
Ref to event - future 
Ref to event - past 
Ref to time period - future 
Ref to time period - past 
Reference to ext experts 
Reference to more information 
Reference to other texts 
Regions 
Regulatory & Legal 





Sales, sales force, conference 
Services, software, apps 
Shareholder thank you 




Stakeholders, stakeholder value 












Workforce and reductions 
Z - AC Presentation Quote 1 - 
FD 
Z - AC Presentation Quote 2 - 
WO 
Z - AC Presentation Quote 3 - 
MZ 
Z - AC Q&A Quote 1 - FD 
Z - AC Q&A Quote 2 - WO 
Z - AC Q&A Quote 3 - MZ 
Z - Annual Letter - Subtitle 
CODE 
Z - Annual Letter 1 - Title 
Z - Annual Letter 2 - Salutation 
Z - Annual Letter 3 - Opener 
Z - Annual Letter 4 - Close 
Z - Annual Letter 5 - Comp 
Close 
Z - Email 1 - Title 
Z - Email 2 - Salutation or 1st 
line 
Z - Email 3 - opening paras 
Z - Email 4 - closing paras 
Z - Email 5 - Comp Close or 
signature block (if no CC) 
Z - Media Quote 1 - FD 
Z - Media Quote 2 - WO 
Z - Media Quote 3 - MZ 
Z - News Release Quote 1 - FD 
Z - News Release Quote 2 - WO 
Z - News Release Quote 3 - MZ 
Z - News Release Quote 4 - PB 
Z - Shareholder Letter 1 - FD 
Z - Shareholder Letter 2 - WO 





APPENDIX D.   Pilot Study Workshop Letter 
Strategic Discourse Days/ Les journées du discours stratégique (HEC – Oct 31, 
2011) 
Gwyneth Edwards, PhD Candidate (JMSB) 
Data Workshop Submission 
 
The following submission is an extract of my thesis on Strategy Texts and Path 
Dependence. In my thesis I am investigating the role of strategy texts in organizations 
and how they influence the organization’s evolution. The thesis investigates three main 
questions (which I am still developing): 
 
1. What is the content and form of CEO/employee strategy texts and how does it 
change over time? In this question, I will investigate the content and form of 70+ 
CEO strategy texts (emails) that were issued to employees over a 4 year period, 
including employee (retrospective) sensemaking of the strategy texts. 
2. How do the media influence a firm’s strategy texts? In this question, I will study 
the influence of media texts on the evolution of the firm’s internal strategy texts, 
using the CEO Emails and articles published in the media. 
3. How do strategy texts contribute towards path dependence? Here I will study the 
infrastructure of strategy texts that were produced over a 4 year period, by the 
organization, to include the CEO Emails, annual reports, press releases, 
interviews and keynote addresses. I am interesting in understanding the 
interconnection of texts over time and space. 
 
The thesis is a narrative study on the use of strategy texts in organization, and the role of 
these texts in path dependency. It is a longitudinal study on the use of texts, and therefore 
I consider the data to be process data. I will use a grounded theory approach, whereby I 
will perform comparative analysis on a large number of small units of data (text) to create 
descriptive categories. I will then categorize them in ways to elucidate the phenomenon. 
The thesis is a single case study, using embedded units of analysis. The primary unit of 
analysis is the strategy text. The research site is Nortel, with a particular focus on the 
period in which Mike Zafirovski was CEO (November 2005 to August 2009). I intend to 
use critical discourse analysis as the methodology and Atlas TI software. 
 
For this workshop, I am grateful for input on the first research question, specifically the 
analysis of the CEO strategy texts. I have included 3 examples of the emails, for 
discussion purposes. 
 







APPENDIX E.   Nortel Event History 2002-2010 
Method:  This event history is based on information found within reports filed by Nortel 
Networks Corporation on the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval 
(SEDAR). All Canadian public companies use SEDAR to file legal documents stipulated 
by the Canadian Securities Administrators. Nortel Networks filed documents for both 
Nortel Networks Corporation and its principal operating subsidiary, Nortel Networks 
Limited, in two separate sections on SEDAR. The following history uses the Nortel 
Networks Corporation documents and not the Nortel Networks Limited documents; 
however, variance (minimal) between these two documents is limited only to the 
financial reports, from 2005 onwards. The documents were sorted based on date and then 
type. Each document was read and summarized (in the event database, an excel 
document). The following event history, by quarter, is based on a review of the document 
summaries.  
 
Note:  Nortel’s fiscal year is the same as the calendar year. All amounts in US dollars 
unless indicated otherwise. Stock price history accounts for the 10:1 reverse stock split 
affected on December 1, 2006 
 
Nortel Corporate History 
 1985 - Northern Electric and Manufacturing Company, Limited, a subsidiary of Bell 
Canada 
 January 5, 1914 – The Northern Electric Company, Limited 
 March 1, 1976 – Northern Telecom Limited 
 April 29, 1999 – Nortel Networks Corporation 
 January 4, 1982 – corporate amalgamation of wholly-owned subsidiaries 
 March 7, 2000 – Incorporation of New Nortel Inc. 
 May 1, 2000 – New Nortel Inc. divested from Bell Canada Enterprises (BCE), Inc. 
and becomes Nortel Networks Corporation. Nortel Networks Limited becomes 
principal operating subsidiary.  
 
2001 Summary  
 By year end, organized into three businesses: Metro and Enterprise Networks, 
Wireless Networks and Optical Long-Haul Networks.  
 Gross profit fell from $12.8B in 2000 to $3.1B in 2001, and gross margin from 25.1% 
to 18%. 
 In response to slow growth within the industry and overcapacity of networks, focused 
on streamlining operations 
 Workforce:  
o January 2001: 92,900 employees.  
o December 2001: 51,600 employees  
o Located around the world in 276 building sites. (18,700 USA; 13,700 Canada; 
13,700 Europe; 5,500 other).  
o Goal to reduce workforce to 48,000 in 2002 
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 Liquidity:   
o On June 14, 2001, entered into a 364-day $2B credit agreement. In December, 
reduced the size to $1.575B and extended the term to December 13, 2002. 
o On February 8, 2001, completed an offering of $1.5B (6.125%) notes due 
February 15, 2006. 
o On August 15, 2001, completed a private offering of $1.8B (4.25%) 
convertible senior notes, due September 1, 2008 
o Amendments to credit agreements now contain covenants requiring minimum 
net worth and EBITDA thresholds 
o Total cash obligations at year end: $2.7B long term debt; $2.5B outsourcing 
contracts; $1.2B operating leases 
 Businesses: discontinued access solutions operations; outsourced non-strategic 
manufacturing and sold non core business for $500M in cash inflows. 
 Intangible assets: wrote down $2B 
 
2002 – Q1 
 Note: Frank Dunn became President and CEO in November 1, 2001 
 Reports 2001 results, significantly lower than 2000 
 Holds investor conference in New York City; provides outlook for 2002. 
 Projects return to profitability by Q4 2002, but concerned customer spending even 
slower than expected, effecting Q1 outlook. 
 Declares dividends on Series 5 & Series 7 preferred Class A shares, consistently, until 
May 2008. 
 Amends registration statement on 4.25% convertible senior notes 
 Calls AGM for April 25th in Halifax, Nova Scotia 
 Terry Hungle (CFO) resigns after trading outside of authorized trading window; 
Frank Dunn takes on interim role of CFO (in addition to being President and CEO). 
 Class action lawsuit launched against Nortel for material misrepresentation in 
investment plan 
 Office of the Chief Executive (including Chairman, Red Wilson, Frank Dunn and 
John Roth) dissolved; Frank Dunn considered ready to lead company. 
 William Owens joins Board of Directors 
 
2002 – Q2 
 Moody lowers ratings on securities to below investment grade, leading various Nortel 
liens, pledges and guarantees to come into effect; Nortel blames industry conditions 
but states that downgrade possibility was factored into liquidity plans. 
 Q1 results down 50% since Q1 2001, points to customers’ resolve to contain spending 
 Must re-file financial statements for 3-year period ending Dec 2001 based on Moody 
downgrade. Must provide supplemental financial disclosure for subsidiaries that 
guaranteed credit agreements 
 Announces intention to file a shelf registration statement for $2.5B of securities; files 
short form prospectus 
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 Reconfirms Q2 revenue growth at flat or down 5%, will realign optical business, 
target a break even cost structure and consider further opportunities to raise capital 
 Performs public offering of equity units and common shares, raises $1.3B for general 
corporate use 
 
2002 – Q3 
 Nortel removed from S&P100 because (as per Nortel) not a US company. Position on 
the S&P/TSX 60 and S&P Global 1200 not affected 
 Doug Beatty appointed CFO 
 Reports Q2 results down 50% from Q2 2001 
 Revises Q3 outlook lower than guidance; will restructure to 35,000 employees by 
year end (from previous target of 48,000) 
 Revises Q3 outlook again and announces that it will address overall liquidity needs.  
 Announces proposal to consolidate outstanding shares since share price below NYSE 
minimum listing requirements 
 Will offer series 7 shareholders option to convert to series 8 shares, on a one to one 
basis 
 
2002 – Q4 
 Restructures into four business units: Wireless Networks, Wireline Networks, 
Enterprise Networks, and Optical Networks. Frank Plastina leaves Nortel 
 Files 8-K explaining, in detail, Frank Dunn’s internal email to all employees on Q3 
results and break-even model. (WHY?) 
 Reports Q3 results: revenue down 15%, strong cash performance, cost structure 
significantly improved, continuing to target profitability; revises Q2 results due to 
change in business structure – separates reporting of Wireline and Enterprise business 
units 
 Malcolm Collins becomes President Enterprise Networks 
 Terminates $1.175B undrawn credit facility set to expire in April 2003. $750M April 
2005 facility remains undrawn and available. 
 
2003 – Q1 
 Reports 2002 results: revenues down to $10.56B from $17.51B in 2001; 36,000 
employees (instead of planned 35,000) 
 Enters into a $750M EDC (Export Development Canada) Master Facility agreement 
to Jun 30, 2004. $300M committed for performance bonds; $150M uncommitted for 
receivables sales/securitizations; $300M uncommitted for performance bonds and 
receivable sales/securitizations. 
 Annual general meeting called for April 24, 2003. 
 
2003 – Q2 
 Issues amended and restated securities registration agreement for common shares 
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 Reports Q1 results. Positive net earnings. Achieves profitability one quarter earlier 
than expected 
 Shareholders approve (at AGM) reverse stock split for between 5:1 and 10:1.  
 
2003 – Q3 
 EDC Master Facility Agreement maturity date extended to Dec 31, 2005. 
 Reports Q2 results: revenues down by 3%, net loss of $14M 
 
2003 – Q4 
 Preliminary results for Q3 indicates net earnings of $179M.  
 Announces plan to restate financials for 2000, 2001, 2002 and 1H 2003. Expect 
reduction in net losses and increase in shareholders' equity and net assets; not 
expected to impact cash balance or future operations. 
 Request 5 day extension for filing of Q3 10-Q 
 Files Q3 10-Q on November 19, which includes restated financials for previous years 
 Reissues reports for 1Q, 2Q and 3Q, 2003 and annual report for 2002 
 
2004 – Q1 
 Announces supply chain strategy:  will keep core supply chain activities (New 
Product Introduction; deployment, integration and support on complex, multi-
technology network solutions) and outsource remaining manufacturing activities, 
potentially to Flextronics. 
 Reports Q4 2003 results: revenues up 12% from Q4 2002;  and 25% from Q3 2003; 
$499M net earnings 
 Announces AGM and special meeting of shareholders for April 29, 2004, in Toronto, 
Ontario. 
 Delays filing of 2003 results due to audit review of previously issued restatements. 
Additional restatements expected. Review based on establishment, timing of, support 
for and release to income of certain accruals and provisions in prior periods. 
 Not in compliance with obligations related to public debt indentures 
 Doug Beatty (CFO) and Michael Gollogly (controller) placed on paid leave of 
absence pending completion of independent review. William Kerr and MaryAnne 
Pahapill appointed CFO and Controller (respectively) on interim basis.  
 AGM delayed until 2003 financial statements are available 
 EDC issues waiver until May 29, 2004 
 
2004 – Q2 
 SEC issues formal order of investigation in connection with previous financial 
restatements and current need to restate; OSC Enforcement Staff launch investigation 
for same reason 
  April 28, 2004 
o William Owens appointed President and CEO.  
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o William Kerr (CFO) and MaryAnne Pahapill (controller) permanently 
assigned 
o Frank Dunn terminated with cause, along with Doug Beatty (CFO) and 
Michael Gollogly (controller) 
o Four other senior finance business line executives placed on paid leave. 
 Announce need to restate 2001, 2002, 2003 financials; net losses expected to decrease 
in early years, while net earnings expected to become net losses in 2003. 
 Q1 2004 preliminary results indicate cash down by $400M party due to bonus 
payments (return to profitability bonus from 2003) and restructuring costs 
 Dr. Manfred Bischoff appointed to Board of Directors 
 Intends to file a 25 month shelf registration statement 
 Receives Federal Grand Jury Subpoena for documents prepared from Jan 1, 2000 to 
date - in relation to ongoing criminal investigation by US Attorney Office for 
Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. 
 OSC issues temporary order to stop all trading by directors, officers and certain 
current and former employees; follows with permanent order 15 days later. Company 
must provide bi-weekly status updates. 
 Receives resignation from Frank Dunn as director of NNL and NNC. 
 Hon. John Manley, Former Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, appointed to Board of 
Directors.  
 EDC issues waiver until Aug 30, 2004 
 Requests to schedule AGM past Jun 30th deadline; OSC allows for a delay up until 
Dec 31, 2004. 
 RCMP conducting a review of accounting situation and need for criminal 
investigation 
 27 class action complaints filed in Southern District of NY and one Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) class action in Middle District of 
Tennessee - against (mostly) Dunn, Beatty and Gollogly - for making materially false 
and misleading statements in violation of US security laws. ERISA against Dunn and 
Board because members suffered losses in retirement accounts 
 TSX advises on late filings but does not take action 
 Expects to provide update on impact of restatements by Jul 2004, and limited 1H 
2004 results by August. Expects to file 2003 and 1H 2004 in 3rd quarter of 2004 (will 
be late with 2004 Q2).  
 Tennessee class action suit amended to expand period and named defendants.  
 Agreement reached with Flextronics on manufacturing outsourcing.  
 
2004 – Q3 
 Expected impact of restatements:  elimination of 2003 full year net earnings from 
continuing operations; no material impact on revenues or cash balance.  




 Class of shareholders request Nortel take action against listed individuals within 14 
days or class of shareholders will. 
 RCMP (Integrated Market Enforcement Team) advises Nortel that it will commence a 
criminal investigation into accounting situation. 
 First half 2004 results $5.1B, net earnings of .00 to .02$.  
 Announces strategic plan to grow market share and leverage strength in high 
performance, high reliability networks. Will reduce workforce by 10% (3500) and 
consolidate 2M square feet of real-estate. 
 7 finance employees terminated with cause (4 of which were on leave on leave), in 
addition to Dunn, Gollogly and Beatty. All 10 will be asked to repay bonuses and 
further action may be taken. 
 Class proceedings start in Ontario Superior Court for CDN$250M in damages related 
to the return to profitability bonus program.  
 EDC extends waiver to Sep 30, 2004, then to Oct 31, 2004, then to November 19, 
2004. 
 Details of Owens agreement published:  based salary of 1M, target bonus of 170% of 
base. Special pension benefit that will result in ~33,540 per month, payable over 5 
years after retirement. 
 Now expects to file 2003 and 1H 2004 by October (instead of end of Q3) 
 Hires Accenture to help transform finance org's structure, processes, and systems.  
 3Q revenues expected lower than Q2 but up on full year basis.  
 
2004 – Q4 
 Completes transfer of Ottawa/Monkstown Flextronics assets; delays Montreal to mid-
2005; blames financial activity is taking away resources 
 Notifies late filing for 2004Q3 - backlog due to all the other restatements 
 Delays filing of 2003 and 1H 2004 restatements from Oct 2004 to mid Nov 2004. 
Modifies expected revenue adjustments for 2001, 2002 and 2003.  
 Seeks order to delay AGM to Mar 31, 2005, and then to May 31, 2005. Ontario 
Superior Courts of Justice approves requests 
 Delays reporting of 2003 and 1H 2004 results by another 30 to 60 days. Will release 
preliminary Q3 2004 results in December 2004. Modifies (again) expected revenue 
adjustments for 2001, 2002 and 2003. Expect 2004 growth to be lower (single digits) 
than expected due to increase in 2003 revenues (from restatements). Restatement 
work has identified revenue adjustments for 1999 and 2000, based on revenue 
recognition principals. 
 Office of the Chief Accountant of the SEC doesn't rule either way about how Nortel 
recognized software revenue, so Nortel not changing accounting method.  
 Stock exchanges verbally confirm that no delisting currently in process. 
 Expects to file 2003 and 1H 2004 statements by Jan 10, 2005. Expects to provide 
updates to unaudited 2004 results and limited results for 2001, 2002, 2003 and 3Q 
2004 - the week of Dec 13, 2004. Further adjusts revenue for all years and related 
impacts (details provided) 
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 Announces limited estimated unaudited results for Q3 2004 and updates ones for Q1 
Q2 2004, 2003, 2002, and 2001. Will hold conference call to discuss after statements 
filed on Jan 10, 2005. Net loss in Q3 2004. Adjust 2004 outlook due to restatement 
results. Details provided. 
 EDC extends waiver to Dec 10, 2004, and then to Jan 15, 2005. 
 
2005 – Q1 
 2003 and Q1, Q2, Q3 2004 financial restatements; 2005 reporting delayed as a result 
 EDC extends waiver to Feb 15, 2005, then to Mar 15, 2005, and then to April 30, 
2005. 
 Board directs management to implement all changes recommended by independent 
review 
 Hires Ethics and Compliance officer, Susan Sheppard 
 Five Board members choose not to stand for re-election 
 Executives offer to give back their bonuses received in 2003 
 CFO change: William Kerr (becomes advisor to CEO) to Peter Currie 
 Controller change: MaryAnne Pahapill (resigns) to Karen Sledge 
 William Owens appointed CEO (no longer President), Gary Daichendt President and 
COO 
 Class action suit filed against Nortel for false reporting (Apr 2003-Apr 2004) 
 AGM set for June, to review 2003 and 2004 results 
 
 
2005 – Q2 
 Buys PEC US Government Solutions for $448M 
 Amends Flextronics contract, delays end date of transfer of manufacturing facilities 
 Controller change: Karen Sledge to Paul Karr 
 Reports 2004 FY (and Q4) results (late)  
 At 2003/2004 AGM, shareholders approve amended Nortel Stock Incentive Plan and 
Nortel Stock Purchase Plan 
 Publishes substantial previously confidential document as part of exhibits to the 2004 
10-K (due to OSC rule change) – includes stock option plans, success plans, 
executive offer letters, director pay increase, etc... 
 Q1 2005 quarterly report issued, about a month later than usual. 
 EDC extends waiver to Apr 30, 2005, then to May 31, 2005 
 Gary Daichendt resigns as President and Chief Operations Officer along with Gary 
Kunis (both came from Cisco) – after less than 3 months. Conflict of opinions on 
corporate strategy, with CEO. 
 Harry Pearce replaces Lynton Red Wilson as Chairman of the Board; directors get a 
pay increase 
 Board approves corporate performance objectives as part of Success plan: revenue, 
management operating earnings before taxes, cash flow, financial accountability, 
leadership in ethics and integrity, and revenue from new business. Also, for 
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executives, (i) Progress on SAP implementation; (ii) Sarbanes Oxley Compliance; 
and (iii) addressing remediation items identified in the Summary of Findings and of 
Recommended Remedial Measures  
 
2005 – Q3 
 No SEDAR filings in July 
 Code of Ethics published 
 2005 Q2 results issued on time 
 Nicholas De Roma, Chief Legal Officer, leaves 
 Monkstown withdrawn from Flextronics contract, establishing a Regional Supply 
Chain Centre 
 
2005 – Q4 
 Stephen Pusey, President EMEA, offered a £525,000 2 year retention package 
 Mike Zafirovski (MZ) replaces William Owens as President and CEO; both packages 
outlined in detail 
 Motorola sues MZ over breach of contract; Nortel pays settlement of $11.5 Million 
 Nortel Toronto Headquarters sold for CDN$100M; headquarters relocated to smaller 
Toronto facility 
 EDC extends support facility maturity date for an additional year, to Dec 31, 2007  
 Q3 2005 results issued on time 
 
2006 – Q1 
 AGM schedule for May 2nd 
 Credit facility of $1.3B established 
 Calgary transfer to Flextronics postponed a quarter, to Q2 
 Pascal Debon, former President of Wireless and current Sr Advisor, leaving; Brian 
McFadden, Chief Research Officer leaving 
 Filling of 2005 annual report delayed; will restate 2003, 2004, 2005 (Q1-Q3) results 
due to incorrect revenue recognition procedure (not improper conduct). Postpones 
AGM. 
 Announces Business Transformation Plan (as material matter) – looking for 
expansion of $1.5B in 2008 operating margin and at least 20% market share 
 Board approves 2006 corporate performance objectives for Success plan as revenue, 
earnings and cash flow. 
 OSC issues order prohibiting trading for certain current/former Nortel personnel 
 
2006 – Q2 
 AGM rescheduled to June 29th, and also considered a “special” meeting 
 Account process changed from percentage-of-completion to individual contract 
deliverables – additional financial restatements may be required. 
 2005 annual results issued (late) 
 Board approved a Success bonus of 1/3 the target level 
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 Q1 2006 results issued – late; re-files 2003, 2004 and 2005 financial reports 
 Settlement of the Class action suit; $575M and 628.7M common shares (14.5% of 
equity) 
 Issues $2B of senior notes 
 Changes in the Board of directors 
 MZ voluntarily reduces his special lifetime annual pension benefit by 29%, to $355K 
(per yr.) 
 
2006 – Q3 
 Microsoft and Nortel form 4 year strategic alliance (non-equity?) for advanced 
unified communication solutions and systems integration 
 2006 Q2 results issued on time 
 
2006 – Q4 
 2006 Q3 results issued on time. 
 Consolidates shares 10:1; now 433M shares outstanding 
 Dr. Kristina Johnson appointed to Board. Susan Sheppard resigns as Chief Ethics 
Officer, no reason provided. 
 Sells UMTS (radio) business unit to Alcatel for $320M; 1700 employees to transfer 
 EDC extends master facility agreement for another year, to end of Dec 31, 2008. 
Total of $750M. 
 
2007 – Q1 
 2006 filings delayed. Will have to restate results for 2005, 2005, and Q1-Q3 2006, 
along with adjustments to 2004. (This is the third series of restatements) 
 Re-issues Code of Business Conduct 
 Sets AGM for May 2nd  
 Peter Currie leaves as CFO; no reason provided 
 New Business Transformation Plan to include reduction of 2900 positions, shifting of 
100 more 
 2006 results reported towards end of quarter. Deloitte also withdraws audit reports for 
previous years, due to changes.  
 Board approves 2007 corporate performance objectives for Success: revenue, 
operating margin and free cash flow; customer satisfaction and quality 
 Announces $1B senior notes offering; expects $980M proceeds to be put into money 
market funds 
 
2007 – Q2 
 David Drinkwater appointed CFO (was the Chief Legal Officer) 
 OSC sets hearing with Nortel on allegations about fraudulent accounting practices in 
2000, Q3/Q4 2002, Q1/Q2 2003. 
 Q1 2007 results issued on time 




2007 – Q3 
 Dion Joannou, President of North America, leaves to pursue personal interests 
 Q2 2007 results issued on time, highest operating margin since 2004 achieved 
 Joel Hackney appointed President, Enterprise Solutions 
 Paviter Binning appointed CFO, replacing David Drinkwater 
 
2007 – Q4 
 EDC extends master facility agreement to Dec 31, 2011 
 Nortel settles with OSC – to pay $35M civil penalty for violations 
 
2008 – Q1 
 William Nelson appointed EVP of Global Sales 
 AGM scheduled for May 7th (in Ottawa vs Toronto) 
 Amends the Stock Purchase Plans and Stock Incentive Plans 
 2007 results issued on time  
 Announces reduction in workforce by 2100, shifting 1000 to lower cost locations. 
Reducing real-estate by 750,000 square feet. 
 
2008 – Q2 
 Q1 2008 results issued on time 
 Strategic WiMax agreement with Alvarion 
 
2008 – Q3 
 Q2 2008 results issued on time 
 Revises 2008 full year outlook based on pressure by customers to cut back 
investments. Will explore divesting Metro Ethernet Networks business (Core 
business). Announcement made Sep 17, 2008. 
 
2008 – Q4 
 Reports Q3 results and 2008 revised outlook. Announces the “2009 Restructuring 
Plan” to reduce 1300 positions, shift 200 to lower cost locations. 
 David Drinkwater, Chief Legal Officer, to retire Feb 2009. 
 New operating model announced; dividends on preferred shares suspended. 
 NYSE gives Nortel 6 months to bring stock price back above $1 
 Nortel downgraded to CAA2, in default on EDC support facility. Receives 30 day 
waiver, which becomes permanent in 2009.  
 
2009 – Q1 
 Jan 14th:  
o NNC and NNI (Canada and US) file Chapter 11 creditor protection to 
preserve liquidity and fund operations.  
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o EDC provides $30M support facility and continues to extend throughout 
Chapter 11.  
o Over $4B of direct financial obligations triggered 
o NYSE delists Nortel; TSX considering. 
 2008 results issued on time 
 EDC extends support facility on an ongoing basis;  
 OSC extends stay of proceedings to May 1, 2009. 
 Bank of NY Mellon resigns as trustee of sr notes. 
 Announces further workforce reduction of 3200 positions, incremental to 1800 
announced previously  
 
2009 – Q2 
 Q1 2009 results issued on time 
 Dr. Kristina Johnson resigns from Board to be Under Secretary of Energy to President 
Obama. 
 Stalking horse agreements and auctions begin 
 OSC extends stay of July 30, 2009. 
 TSX delists Nortel shares. 
 
2009 – Q3 
 Caribbean and Latin America subsidiary seeks Chapter 11 
 Ericsson buys CDMA business and LTE assets for $1.13B; 2500 employees to 
transfer 
 Aug 10: MZ and Dennis Carey resign. Business units restructured as SBUs, Board 
drops from 9 to 3 members. Paviter Binning appointed Chief Restructuring Officer. 
George Reidel stays as Chief Strategy Officers. John Doolittle in charge of SBU 
sales. 
 Q2 2009 results issued on time 
 Board approves corporate performance objectives for Quarterly Annual Incentive 
Plan payout: revenue, cash and cash equivalents and reserve fund, savings plan 
(headcount reduction, outage recovery). SBUs: revenue, operating expense, 
headcount reductions, management operating margin, outage recovery 
 Avaya buys Enterprise Solutions, Government Solutions and Diamondware, for 
$915M 
 Paul Karr resigns as Controller. Clarke Glaspell appointed. 
 OSC extends stay of proceedings to October 30, 2009. 
 
2009 – Q4 
 Hitachi buys Next Generation Packet Core Networks, for $10M 
 Delay in filing Q3 2009 results due to changes in reporting format (but filed this 




 Incentive plan eliminates corporate performance and moves direct to quarterly 
business unit performance objectives – except of one executive: Paviter Binning – 
who is rated on a composite average. 
 Ericsson/Kapsch buy GSM for $103M; 650 employees to transfer 
 Ciena buys Optical networks and Carrier Ethernet for %30M and $239M convertible 
notes; 2000 employees to transfer 
 John Ray becomes Principal Officer of US debtors 
 OSC extends stay of proceedings to January 29, 2010 
 Final Canadian Funding and Settlement Agreement between NNI (US) and NNL 
(Canada), with respect to internal corporate transfer pricing and pre-filing claims 
($2B by NNI to NNL). 
 IRS settles a $3B claim against NNI for $37.5M 
 
2010 – Q1 
 OSC extends stay to April 23, 2010 
 Nortel reaches certain agreements with former and disabled employees for health 
benefits coverage. Also pays $3000CDN to former employees as advanced 
termination proceedings. 
 Since January 14, 2009: Net proceeds from assets sales = $2B; 13,000 jobs 
transitioned. Remaining in corporation: 2300 positions in Network Business Solutions 
and Corporate functions 
 GENBAND buys CVAS for $182M; most employees moving. 
 Nortel withdraws notice of intention to be qualified as a short form prospectus issuer 
 2009 results issued on time 
 Files Form 15 which suspends reporting requirements under the SEC 
 Paviter Binning to step down Mar 21, 2010. John Doolittle to become CFO Officer 
(as his replacement) but Chief Restructuring Officer position will not be filled. 
 
2010 – Q2 
 OSC extends stay of proceedings to July 22, 2010. 
 George Riedel (Chief Strategy Office) – appointed President Business Units 
 Ericsson buys Nortel’s ownership (50% plus 1 share) in the Nortel LG joint venture 
for $242M 
 Performance metrics for first half of year approved: cash, cost management and asset 
mgmt/corp operations. 
 Q1 2010 results issued on time. 
 
2010 – Q3 
 OSC extends stay of proceedings to October 29, 2010. 
 Q2 2010 results issued on time 
 Ericsson buys MSS business for $65M; all employees to move 
 
2010 – Q4 
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 Carling Ottawa campus sold to Public Works and Government Services Canada of 
$208M CDN. 
 OSC extends stay of proceedings to February 28, 2011 
 Q3 2010 results issued on time. 
 November mediation session on the disposition of asset sale proceeds is inconclusive. 






APPENDIX F.   Nortel Self-Reported History 
(Downloaded from www.nortel.com on May 15, 2011) 
 
From Alexander Graham Bell's original telephone patents to the anywhere, anytime 
connections of today, Nortel has been at the forefront of innovation in the ever evolving 
history of communications. Since its 1895 founding as Northern Electric and 
Manufacturing, supplying telecommunications equipment for Canada's fledgling 
telephone system, Nortel has grown to become a global leader in delivering 
communications capabilities that enhance the human experience, power global 
commerce, and secure and protect the world's most critical information.  
 
Early Years  
 Manufactures the portable commutator, a one-wire telegraphic switchboard for 
military field service in World War 1. 
 Produces first dial equipment in Canada - a dial PBX - for a brewery in Montreal. 
 Manufactures first vacuum tubes in Canada which are also eventually used on 
repeater apparatus for long-distance lines. 
 Trans-Canada telephone toll system goes live in 1932 based on Northern switches. 
The system covers Toronto, Montreal, Quebec City, Hamilton, and Windsor. 
 Produces the #19 wireless set for two-way telephone communications in tanks and 
other military vehicles. It becomes the standard for Canada, Britain, and Russia in 
WW2. 
 Develops electromechanical switch in 1950s, which also allows push-button phone 
dials and direct inter-city dialing. Using photo-transistors, this automated system is 
the company's first advancement towards computerized switching and is the 
company's staple switch for the next 20 years. 
 Implements the Trans-Canada Skyway in 1958, the world's longest microwave 
system covering 6114.2 kilometers (3,800 miles). 
 
The Telephony Era  
 A pioneer in communications-satellite business in the 1960s, Northern develops 
satellite and antenna equipment, serving as prime subcontractor with Hughes Aircraft 
for the electronics used in Canada's ANIK communications satellite. 
 Launches the Contempra or "Princess" telephone with the dial in the handset - a 
design that influences telecommunications products around the world. 
 Introduces world's first X.25 data switch in 1976, representing the first standard-
based commercial application of packet switching, the technology that is the 
foundation of today's Internet. 
 First to announce a complete line of fully digital telecommunications products. In 
1979 the first Digital World product -- DMS-100 - goes into service. It is a fully 
digital central office switch serving as many as 100,000 lines. 
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 Introduces the first cellular telephone system in North America to provide subscribers 
with such features as call forwarding, call waiting and three-way calling. 
 First in the world to use 64 quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) in microwave 
radio system, allowing more information to be put into the same frequency band. 
 Introduces "Fiber World" initiative for systems based on fiber-optic technology that is 
much faster and more cost-effective than copper wires. 
 Develops world's first billing system to use speech-recognition technology to 
automate collect calls, calls billed to a third party and calling-card calls. 
 
The Internet Revolution  
 Celebrates its first 100 years with introduction of "Nortel" brand, reflecting the 
company's evolution from telephony to multiservice Internet and IP-based global 
communication solutions. 
 Introduces the world's first 1-Meg modem for "always on" Internet connections; 
orders exceed US$1 billion in only eight months. 
 Redefines speed of networking with 6.4 trillion bits per second (terabit) optical 
technology. The technology increases Internet networking speeds and capacity by 640 
times with an amplification system that supports 28 million simultaneous Internet 
connections over a single fiber. 
 Installs world's first commercial 3G (UMTS) wireless network in Spain. 
 Completes series of landmark next-generation wireless calls, including the industry's 
first wireless packet data sessions using CDMA2000 1xRTT technology. 
 First networking company to complete the University of New Hampshire 
InterOperability Laboratory (UNH-IOL) phase II test regimen for IPv6 - the next-
generation Internet Protocol. IPv6 will enable the Internet to continue to grow. 
 First networking vendor to provide an end-to-end VoIP solution certified by the U.S. 
Defense Department Joint Interoperability Test Commande (JITC). 
 The convergence of the communications and IT industries takes a significant step 
forward as Microsoft Corp. and Nortel announce a strategic alliance based on a 
shared vision for unified communications. By combining Nortel's world-class 
network quality and reliability with Microsoft® software's ease of use, the alliance 
will accelerate the availability of unified communications. 
 BT selects Nortel to play an important role in its 21st Century Network (21CN) 
program. Nortel will be one of two suppliers of a carrier-scale Ethernet solution for 
21CN that exploits Ethernet in a fundamentally new way. 
 
Today's networked world was unimaginable when this company was born, yet much of it 
has been created by the imagination of our people. As you browse the major milestones 
of our corporate history, you'll see this ongoing spirit of innovation, coupled with the 




APPENDIX G.   CEO Email Textual Analysis 
1.1 Introduction 
 Research in CEO narratives has included sources such as analyst calls, Letters to 
Shareholders, news releases, and media articles. Due to issues with access and its relative 
newness, research on the content and form of CEO Emails does not exist. The purpose of 
this appendix is to gain further understanding on the CEO Emails used in the larger 
research project. The analysis borrows from genre theory and compares the CEO Email 
to a data set constructed by  Cornut, Giroux, and Langley (2012). In particular, the CEO 
Email is considered, for this purpose, as a source of strategy narrative and therefore is 
directly compared to strategic plans, which were central to Cornut et al.’s (2012) analysis. 
The objective is to understand if the CEO Email presents distinct narrative characteristics 
and, if so, to position these characteristic within the greater body of CEO narratives used 
for the main research project. 
 This appendix is laid out as follows. First, a brief theoretical background is 
provided to position the purpose of the research. Follows is an explanation of the research 
methods used to study the tone and macrostructure of the CEO emails. The analytical 
results and discussion are then presented, followed by a conclusion.  
 Notably, although this appendix is structured similar to an academic paper, its 
main focus is on the research methods employed to understand both the tone and 
macrostructure of the CEO Email. This appendix does not have, as purpose, a distinct and 
separate academic contribution, per se, although the potential exists for further research 
in this area, with the given dataset. 
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1.2 Theoretical Background 
 Short and Palmer (2008) argue that content analysis of managerial narratives is an 
unobtrusive method that can be used to understand the beliefs and cognitions of top 
managers. Given the difficultly in gaining access to executives, and especially CEOs, 
analyzing the content of written or recorded narratives can provide insight into CEO 
mental models. These results can then be associated to not only the behaviour of 
executives but also overall firm performance. For example, Short and Palmer (2008) 
provide a review of research that used content analysis on narratives (e.g. press release, 
emails, speeches, written statements mission statements, Letters to Shareholders, and 
annual reports) to study variables such as organizational identity, leadership, image 
management, communicative action, corporate culture, and firm performance. 
 Content analysis can also be a useful method to distinguish between sources of 
narratives such as financial reports, Letters to Shareholders, analyst calls, and corporate 
news releases. Crawford Camiciottoli (2010) most recently studied not only the 
macrostructure of earnings calls but also the intertextuality of the calls. By studying the 
content of earnings call, Crawford Camiciottoli (2010) was able to identify how a 
financial reporting narrative was created through recurring situations. Through this 
analysis of intertextuality, she determined that the financial disclosure process included 
the earnings call announcement, the release of earnings, the earnings call itself, and the 
quarterly (and/or annual) report.  
 Cornut et al. (2012) investigate the strategic plan as a specific type of narrative 
that exists within the larger set of strategy plans. The purpose of their research was 
descriptive in nature. Using textual analysis, they compared the tone of strategic plans to 
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similar types of narratives (using a process defined by Hart, 2001) and looked at the 
macrostructure of the plans, through the analysis of rhetorical moves. The latter approach 
is similar to Crawford Camiciottoli’s (2010) analysis, which investigated the 
macrostructure of the earnings calls. 
 Although Cornut et al. (2012) originally intended to study the strategic plans of 
both private and public organizations, only the latter was included in the final dataset 
because “it proved extremely difficult to have access to the former; even after repeated 
contacts with senior managers from several organizations, we could not obtain a 
sufficient number of plans to make any statistically valid comparisons” (p. 26). Problems 
in gaining access to organizational narratives are common among strategy researchers, 
especially narratives produced by senior managers (Short & Palmer, 2008); but without 
insight into internal executive discourse, a gap remains.  Although research on various 
types of texts has included CEO-authored texts, there is no evidence of research on the 
emails issued by CEOs to their employees. As part of the thesis, therefore, the following 
analysis was undertaken to gain further insight into the textual characteristics of the 
Nortel CEO Emails. 
1.3 Methodology 
1.3.1 Data Sample 
 The analysis included the 168 CEO Emails originally identified in the Research 
Methods chapters and summarized in Table G1. The detailed list of emails is also 
available in Appendix A.  
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Table G1: Summary of CEO Emails 
Author Period Emails Analyzed Total Words 
Frank Dunn May 2002 – March 2004 22 14701 
Bill Owens April 2004 – October 2005 26 12962 
Mike Zafirovski November 2005 – August 2009 109 69110 
Paviter Binning August 2009 – February 2010 11 3480 
 
 As part of the overall research project, the emails were sorted by date, author, and 
type. Each email was given a descriptive file name and then loaded (with the other texts) 
into the ATLAS.ti database. Each email was then read, in order, from Dunn’s initial 
email in April 2002 to Binning’s last email in 2010.  From this reading, a short narrative 
was prepared on each group of emails, by CEO, as follows. 
 Frank Dunn.  Dunn’s emails were relatively long (668 words on average). 
Compared to the other authors, his tone was more formal. His emails were informative in 
nature. He referred frequently to the past and the future. He spoke often of corporate 
finances, return to profitability objectives, and market conditions. Dunn was less personal 
in his emails, referring seldom to himself. 
 William Owens. Owens’ emails were shorter than Dunn’s (499 words on average) 
but he communicated more consistently and more often than Dunn. He was more 
personal in his emails, using pronouns such as I, we, you, us, etc... He used negative 
terminology less than the others, thanked employees, and spoke mainly of the present and 
the future. His focus was on the financial restatements and the restructuring of the finance 
organization. Owens referred to the external environment less frequently than the others, 




 Mike Zafirovski.  Zafirovski’s emails were almost as long, on average, as Dunn’s 
(628 words). He communicated the most frequently, compared to the others. As with 
Owens, he was inclusive in his writing and personal. He expressed emotion often and 
used words that suggested a sense of urgency and need for change. He was focused both 
internally on the operations and externally on customers, the industry, and the market. He 
emphasized corporate efficiency using words such as revenues, margins, operations, 
quality, processes, and Six Sigma.  
 Paviter Binning.  Binning’s emails were the shortest of the four authors (316 
words on average). His emails were issued in conjunction with news releases that were 
material in nature. In his emails, Binning was informative, detailing the action that the 
company had taken or was going to take. He thanked employees for their efforts. He 
made little mention of the team. 
1.3.2 Types of Emails 
 In addition to the computerized coding, a hard copy of each email (in their 
original form) was read and coded based on content, to determine the types of emails 
produced by the CEOs. Through the analysis of the grounded codes, supplemented by the 
individual reading of each email, the emails were classified into three categories: 
strategy, organizational announcements, and non-market event (see Table G2). Dunn 
began the tradition of issuing CEO Emails to communicate strategy when he became 
CEO in 2002. Owens followed the tradition, as did Zafirovski and Binning. 
 Organizational announcements were issued by the CEOs, to all employees, and 
included reference to corporate strategy or earlier strategy emails. Some strategy emails 
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also included organizational announcements. The non-market emails spoke of external 
events such as natural disasters and the 911 anniversaries; they were not related to 
corporate strategy, performance, or organizational announcements.  
Table G2: CEO Emails by Type 
CEO Strategy Organizational 
Announcement 
Non-Market 
Frank Dunn 19 2 1 
William Owens 17 2 7 
Mike Zafirovski 85 21 3 
Paviter Binning 10 1 0 
Total 131 26 11 
 
1.3.3 Analytical Methods –  Tone 
 To characterize the tone of the emails, a textual analysis was performed on the 
narratives and compared to strategic plans and other narratives included in Cornut et al.’s 
(2012) research. The data from their research was obtained through their published article 
(which they included as an appendix to their paper) and used within this analysis, for 
comparative purposes.  In their research, Cornut et al. (2012) used Hart’s (2001) 
computerized approach to textual analysis, which involves individual word count systems 
and dictionaries created from linguistic theory. The dictionaries and methodology are 
available through Hart and Carroll’s (2012) DICTION software.  
 DICTION is content analysis software that includes 31 dictionaries developed 
from business texts (Hart & Carroll, 2012). With no repeated words, these dictionaries 
facilitate the analysis by tapping into the characteristics of narratives (see Table G3). 
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Table G3: DICTION Dictionaries (Hart & Carroll, 2012) 
Dictionary Codes (each include a series of words) 
Accomplishment Communication Hardship Passivity Spatial Awareness 
Aggression Concreteness Human 
Interest 
Past Concern Temporal Awareness 
Ambivalence Cooperation Inspiration Praise Tenacity 
Blame Denial Leveling Present 
Concern 
 
Centrality Diversity Liberation Rapport  
Cognitive Terms Exclusion Motion Satisfaction  
Collectives Familiarity Numerical Self Reference  
 
 Cornut et al. (2012) used the DICTION dictionaries to study strategic plans, but 
not the DICTION software application itself. Instead, they recreated the dictionaries in 
WordStat and performed a content analysis on a large data set of strategic plans, annual 
reports, business articles, research articles, project plans, executive speeches, State of the 
Union addresses, horoscopes, and religious sermons; a total of 663 texts.  
 To perform the textual analysis on the CEO Emails, the same approach was 
undertaken but with ATLAS.ti software (as opposed to WordStat). The 31 dictionaries 
from DICTION were provided by one of the authors from the Cornut et al. (2012) paper 
(in word format) and were subsequently loaded into ATLAS.ti using the auto-coding 
feature, one dictionary at a time, to create a new code (for a total of 31 codes). Each code 
was then run against the emails (summarized in Table G4). The results of the coding were 
then transferred into Excel, producing a master data set that included the word count for 
each dictionary, by email. To determine the frequency of usage for each dictionary, the 
word counts were divided by the total word count of each text. These results were then 
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loaded into statistical analysis software, EQS (a multivariate software), to produce mean 
frequency usage for each dictionary. These means were then used to understand which 
characteristics (from the dictionaries) were significant within the emails, not only in 
totality, but also by author (CEO) and by email type (strategy/organization 
announcement/non-market). The results were compared to the results from Cornut et al.’s 
(2012) research. 
Table G4: CEO Email Textual Characteristics, by CEO 
Textual Characteristic 
(DICTION Dictionary) 
Frequency of Word Occurrence 
All 
Emails 
Dunn Owens Zafirovski Binning 
Accomplishment 6030 1049 720 4027 234 
Aggression 806 140 102 553 11 
Ambivalence 1508 202 166 1101 39 
Blame 164 39 12 109 4 
Centrality 1024 181 133 681 29 
Cognitive Terms 2220 325 291 1542 62 
Collectiveness 2270 422 344 1445 59 
Communication 1703 310 209 1121 63 
Concreteness 2682 408 422 1742 110 
Cooperation 1862 362 322 1080 98 
Denial 444 86 28 319 11 
Diversity 305 52 25 221 7 
Exclusion 291 38 29 214 10 
Familiarity 25355 4004 3378 16994 979 
Hardship 276 33 75 164 4 
Human Interest 7753 1213 1112 5233 195 
Inspiration 1573 296 179 1075 23 
Leveling 1694 294 203 1130 67 





Frequency of Word Occurrence 
All 
Emails 
Dunn Owens Zafirovski Binning 
Motion 590 85 92 408 5 
Numerical 3426 495 383 2339 209 
Passivity 1302 252 155 821 74 
Past Concern 768 118 95 529 26 
Praise 1357 230 171 928 28 
Present Concern 2952 480 415 1980 77 
Rapport 363 67 61 222 13 
Satisfaction 823 105 105 577 36 
Self Reference (I) 1569 196 235 1114 24 
Spatial Awareness 1555 182 284 1036 53 
Temporal Awareness 3450 546 427 2338 139 
Tenacity 6178 825 874 4329 150 
TOTALS: 82513 13094 11068 55496 2855 
 
1.3.4 Analytical Methods –  Macrostructure 
 To determine the macrostructure of the emails, and as part of the larger research 
project, a content analysis in ATLAS.ti was performed on each email using grounded 
coding methods. These results formed the basis of the analysis to understand the moves 
within the emails, which (if consistent) define the macrostructure. As part of the coding, 
and based on a recommendation from a researcher during the pilot study, each email was 
also coded by title, salutation, opening paragraph, closing paragraph and complementary 




1.4 Results – Verifying for Individual Level Differences 
 As indicated in the previous section, the textual analysis (using the DICTION 
dataset) was used for two purposes: to determine the tone of the emails and if there was 
significant variance between the groups of emails. More specifically, the analysis verified 
if the differences between groups was greater than differences between the individual 
emails, which would prevent further analysis taking place on the body of the emails in 
total, suggesting that the narrative form varied significantly from CEO to CEO (or from 
type to type). 
 For this purpose, the 168 emails were divided into two groups: by author (CEOs) 
and by email type (strategy, organization announcement, non-market). Descriptive 
statistics were first run on the data set as a whole, and then on each group. Using the 
frequency of word usage by email (word count of characteristic divided by total words in 
the email), descriptive analysis was performed using EQS, a structural equation 
modelling software. Descriptive results for each of the 31 characteristics, by CEO, are 
presented in Figure G1, while the results by email type are presented in Figure G2. As the 
figures suggest, there were minimal differences for each characteristic, between CEOs 
and between email types.  
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Figure G1: Mean Usage Frequency by CEO 
 
Figure G2: Mean Usage Frequency by Email Type 
 
 To confirm this descriptive finding, intraclass correlations (ICC) were performed 
with EQS on the word usage data, for each characteristic, using two clusters: CEO and 
email type. ICC represents the ratio of the between-group variance to the total variance at 
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the individual level. An ICC greater than 10% is considered significant. In this case, an 
ICC
21
 was performed to determine if there was significant variance between the CEO 
Emails, for all types, and between the email types, for all CEOs.  
  The ICC results indicated that variance between CEOs, for all email types, was 
significant for nine of the 31 characteristics. Of the nine, six of the characteristics had 
mean usage frequencies greater than 1.3% while the other three were below 0.4%. 
Although these results suggest that the variance is mostly at the individual email level, 
further analysis was undertaken to see if less between group variance could be obtained. 
 ICC tests were performed on all permutations and combinations of groups for the 
CEOs (pairs and triplets), along with email type (pairs). Of all ICC tests, the combination 
that provided the most variance at the individual level, and least variance at the group 
(CEO/type) level, included the Strategy and Organizational Announcement emails 
authored Dunn, Owens, and Zafirovski. Intuitively this makes sense as the non-market 
emails were not related to strategy or organization. Binning’s emails were specific to the 
liquidation process; all of his emails were in reference to the sale of a particular business 
unit. Variance between his emails and the other emails was significantly high.  
 Based on the results, the non-market emails (11) and Binning’s emails (11) were 
removed from the dataset, reducing the number of texts to 146. The mean values of the 
revised set were calculated and used for the remainder of the analysis. 
                                               
 
 
 21 The ICC results are elaborate and not included here, however they are available upon request.  
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 As part of the ICC test using EQS, an analysis of covariances was performed on 
the characteristics at the individual and group levels. For the individual and group levels, 
covariances were insignificant (less than 0.001), confirming that the DICTION 
dictionaries were discriminate (i.e. no repetition of words). 
1.5 Results – Tone 
 Using the word count statistics (i.e. mean usage frequency, in percent) from the 
CEO Emails (discussed above) along with the data made available thought Cornut et al.’s 
(2012) research, the CEO Emails were compared to the larger body of narratives. These 
results are presented graphically in Figure G3 and numerically in Table G5. The results 
suggest that CEO Emails have a unique usage pattern compared to the other types of 
narratives. Follows is a more detailed discussion on sets of the characteristics, with a 
particular emphasis on attributes that are relevant to strategic management. Notably, the 
characteristic familiarity is included in the discussion, even though it cannot be compared 




Figure G3: Cumulative CEO Emails Word Usage Comparison  
 
Note: Familiarity is not included in this figure as Cornut et al. (2012) did not include it in their research, 




Table G5: Cumulative CEO Emails Word Usage Comparison 
 Thesis 
Data 
























Accomplishment 6.23% 5.44% 3.26% 3.50% 3.29% 3.25% 4.26% 2.70% 4.29% 2.57% 1.24% 
Aggression 0.83% 0.55% 0.45% 0.56% 1.39% 0.77% 0.60% 0.79% 0.93% 0.64% 0.64% 
Ambivalence 1.56% 0.73% 0.63% 0.85% 1.89% 2.41% 0.83% 2.51% 1.79% 4.86% 3.00% 
Blame 0.17% 0.05% 0.07% 0.12% 0.40% 0.30% 0.05% 0.36% 0.23% 0.43% 0.52% 
Centrality 1.06% 1.26% 0.92% 1.44% 0.66% 0.73% 1.00% 0.53% 1.25% 0.54% 0.34% 
Cognitive Terms 2.30% 3.37% 1.97% 1.61% 1.33% 2.02% 4.06% 1.39% 3.26% 1.83% 1.67% 
Collectives 2.35% 1.96% 1.88% 1.32% 1.45% 0.97% 1.71% 1.00% 0.66% 0.28% 0.50% 
Communication 1.76% 0.86% 1.03% 1.14% 1.06% 1.52% 1.49% 1.59% 0.95% 0.87% 2.05% 
Concreteness 2.77% 3.74% 4.78% 4.03% 4.39% 3.34% 3.42% 4.13% 2.27% 1.32% 2.55% 
Cooperation 1.93% 2.20% 1.90% 2.53% 1.00% 0.97% 1.96% 0.81% 1.79% 0.88% 0.41% 
Denial 0.46% 0.16% 0.20% 0.51% 0.92% 0.76% 0.33% 0.67% 0.59% 0.75% 1.31% 
Diversity 0.32% 0.52% 0.36% 0.42% 0.27% 0.48% 0.51% 0.39% 1.46% 0.55% 0.28% 
Exclusion 0.30% 0.28% 0.21% 0.35% 0.19% 0.20% 0.33% 0.20% 0.38% 0.18% 0.16% 
Familiarity 26.21% Did not investigate 
Hardship 0.29% 0.26% 0.31% 0.47% 0.96% 0.56% 0.37% 0.56% 0.39% 0.57% 1.22% 
Human Interest 8.02% 2.22% 1.73% 2.05% 7.21% 5.47% 0.73% 4.05% 1.68% 8.89% 9.10% 
Inspiration 1.63% 1.84% 1.13% 0.48% 1.43% 0.81% 0.89% 0.39% 0.48% 0.69% 0.94% 
Leveling 1.75% 0.71% 0.66% 0.89% 1.37% 1.34% 0.78% 1.17% 0.81% 1.41% 1.50% 
Liberation 0.23% 0.17% 0.18% 0.28% 0.49% 0.27% 0.21% 0.21% 0.34% 0.23% 0.19% 
Motion 0.61% 0.12% 0.21% 0.16% 0.32% 0.44% 0.16% 0.59% 0.13% 0.58% 0.59% 
Numerical 3.54% 0.68% 0.95% 1.76% 1.00% 1.16% 0.54% 1.36% 0.98% 0.38% 0.55% 
Passivity 1.35% 1.03% 0.93% 1.16% 1.43% 0.91% 1.09% 0.85% 0.80% 1.33% 1.11% 
Past Concern 0.79% 0.37% 0.48% 0.63% 0.58% 0.72% 0.75% 0.99% 0.55% 0.37% 0.85% 
Praise 1.40% 0.87% 0.66% 0.59% 1.41% 1.43% 0.49% 0.97% 0.80% 1.88% 1.46% 
Present Concern 3.05% 2.25% 1.72% 1.69% 2.92% 2.83% 2.07% 2.36% 1.99% 4.45% 2.88% 
Rapport 0.38% 0.35% 0.33% 0.31% 0.54% 0.39% 0.47% 0.36% 0.49% 0.33% 0.33% 
Satisfaction 0.85% 0.93% 0.61% 0.24% 0.85% 0.78% 0.14% 0.64% 0.17% 1.27% 1.12% 
Self Reference 1.62% 0.10% 0.21% 0.16% 1.38% 1.33% 0.12% 0.51% 0.20% 0.19% 1.69% 
Spatial 
Awareness 
1.61% 3.61% 2.91% 1.27% 3.13% 2.16% 1.60% 1.74% 1.77% 1.39% 1.55% 
Temporal 
Awareness 
3.57% 1.94% 2.59% 2.56% 3.90% 3.43% 1.96% 3.59% 1.80% 4.53% 2.77% 




1.5.1 Temporal and Spatial Awareness 
 Strategy-as-narrative (Barry & Elmes, 1997) suggests that strategy is a form of 
fiction, standing “somewhere between theatrical drama, the historical novel, future 
fantasy, and autobiography” (p. 432). To tell the strategy story, authors need to draw on 
past events, potentially using rhetorical history (Suddaby et al. 2010), and link these 
events with the present. Additionally, authors need to consider the future, as strategy is 
forward thinking. Collectively, strategy narratives contribute towards a narrative 
infrastructure, and can provide insight on how the trajectory of the firm is established 
over time and space (Barry & Elmes, 1997; Fenton & Langley, 2011; Kuhn, 2008), 
suggesting that narratives will have both temporal and spatial references.  
 Grounded coding using ATLAS.ti suggested that all CEOs were consistently 
concerned about time. They referenced past events such as firm performance, earlier 
narratives (CEO Emails, and other), and historical events. They also referenced the future 
in terms of upcoming events, milestones, and performance objectives. 
 Based on strategic management theory and the findings from the grounded 
coding, further analysis was undertaken on temporal awareness defined by Hart and 
Carroll (2012) using the following textual characteristics: temporal awareness, past 
concern, and present concern. As indicated Figure G4, the CEO Emails were relatively 
more concerned with time than many of the others. The emails appear closer to speeches 
than to reports and documentation, suggesting that the CEOs were trying to tell a story, as 
opposed to report information. Although the CEOs were discussing strategic issues in the 
emails, the emails had greater temporal awareness than strategic plans. 
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Figure G4: Temporal Awareness and Concern 
 
 Grounded coding results also suggested that the CEO Emails were equally 
focused on both the past and the future; although the emphasis changed over time, the 
overall usage in both cases is significant. Cornut et al. (2012) investigated future concern 
by creating their own dictionary for the characteristic and found that all narratives 
emphasised both the past and present significantly more frequently than the future.  
 In addition to temporal awareness, spatial awareness, defined as “terms referring 
to geographical entities, physical distances, and modes of measurement” (Hart & Carroll, 
2012: 8) was also investigated. As Nortel was a self-described global company, operating 
in over 150 countries and many different continents, it would be expected that the CEO 
Email narratives would include significant spatial references, similar to State of the 
Union Addresses, strategic plans, or Annual reports. However, as Figure G5 suggests, the 
CEO Emails, although high on temporal awareness, were relatively low on spatial 
awareness. It is possible that authors purposely avoided spatial terms as means to 
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personalize the email to each individual employee. The emails were sent to all employees 
around the world. The focus on temporal awareness, suggesting a “concern for concrete 
and practical matters” (Hart & Carroll, 2012: 8) may be a way for CEOs to incite 
individual action. 
Figure G5: Time and Space  
(Frequency, as a % of total words) 
 
1.5.2 Monological Tone  
 Barry and Elmes (1997) suggested that, at the turn of the century, strategy 
narratives would have to deal with organizations that had become less monological in 
nature, allowing for “blurred organizational boundaries, dispersed intelligibilities, diverse 
realities, disrupted chains of authority, and erosion of organizational autonomy” (p. 442). 
Accompanying that argument, they believed that authors would move from a 
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monological tone to a dialogical tone, whereby the varied and potentially conflicting 
opinions of the readers would be represented.  
 The CEO, however, continues to be considered the lead strategist in the firm 
(Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012).  To test Barry and Elmes (1997) proposition, the frequency 
of self-references in each of the narrative types was compared. As Figure G6 suggests, 
the CEO Emails had the greatest frequency of self-references, even compared to the State 
of the Union Address, where it would be expected that the President would refer to his 
role in the presidential process. The high usage of self-reference suggests that, contrary to 
Barry and Elmes’ (1997) argument, in the case of CEO strategy narratives, the CEO still 
takes the position as grand narrator of the firm’s strategy. The high self-reference also 
reaffirms the notion that CEOs interpret the email as a personal communication between 
the CEO and the reader. 
Figure G6: Monological Authorship (Self-reference) 
 
1.5.3 Optimism 
 Cornut et al. (2012) explain how certain narratives, such as Letters to 
Shareholders and annual reports, are characteristically more optimistic in nature, which 
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they found applies to strategic plans. As the CEO Email is primarily focused on strategic 
issues, it would be expected that the narratives would be more optimistic than negative. 
Using the characteristics for optimism (praise, satisfaction, inspiration) and negativity 
(blame, hardship, denial), as defined by Hart and Carroll (2012), the CEO Emails were 
compared to the other 11 types.  
 As indicated in Figure G7, and as expected, the CEO Emails contained similar 
levels of optimism as strategic plans and State of the Union addresses. In addition, the 
CEO Emails contained minimal use of negative terms, only second to strategic plans. 
This is somewhat surprising given that, throughout the case, Nortel was experiencing 
significant challenges both financially and strategically, and yet, CEOs employed 
minimal use of blame, hardship, or denial in their narratives. Figure G8 indicates that 
CEO Email narratives were the most optimistic of the 11 types and were of similar nature 
to strategic plans, suggesting that CEO strategy narratives have similar constitution to the 
plans in regards to optimism for the future. 
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Figure G8: Net Optimism 
 
1.5.4 Commonality 
 In strategy-as-narrative, Barry and Elmes (1997) proposed that strategy narratives 
would move away from rhetoric that positions the company as being at war with other 
companies, towards more communitarian ideals, where groups and collectives are valued 
as a way of doing business. Hart and Carroll (2012) define commonality as “language 
highlighting the agreed-upon values of a group and rejecting idiosyncratic modes of 
engagement” (p. 9) through the difference between the following characteristics: 
centrality, cooperation and rapport (i.e. commonality); and, diversity, exclusion, and 
liberation (i.e. idiosyncratic). Given that strategy is based on the idea of cooperation 
(Barnard, 1938) and core values (Selznick, 1957), it would be expected that all strategy 
narratives would contain a tone of commonality.  
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 As expected, the CEO Emails and the strategic plans both gravitated towards 
commonality within their narrative, with minimal mention of idiosyncratic characteristics 
(see Figure G9). In fact, most texts, with the exception of the research articles, centred on 
themes of commonality. The difference between types was the extent of the usage of 
commonality characteristics, being greatest with the S&P annual reports and fewest with 
religious sermons (see Figure G10). 






Figure G10: Net Commonality 
 
 Cornut et al. (2012) further investigated the relationship between net optimism 
and net commonality, arguing that strategic plans were significantly different from the 
others, as they were the only source of narrative that scored high on both attributes. As a 
future-oriented document, it is not surprising that the strategic plan emphasizes both a 
collective approach to strategy and an optimistic outlook. Figure G11 indicates that, as 
with strategic plans, the CEO Email also encourages a communitarian approach, with an 
optimistic outlook. Again, this is an interesting finding, given the specific case of Nortel 
and the associated challenges. The CEOs used the email as a means to motivate 
employees, more so than executive speeches and State of the Union addresses, which are 
similar in their attempt to reach out to the individual reader (or listener). 
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Figure G11: Commonality and Optimism  
(Frequency, as a % of total words) 
 
1.5.5 Activity 
 Activity is defined by Hart and Carroll (2102) as “movement, change, the 
implementation of ideas and the avoidance of inertia” (p. 1). Since strategy is activity-
based, investigating the degree of activity characteristics in CEO Emails may provide 
insight into the purpose of the emails.  
 Activity includes seven textual characteristics: aggression, accomplishment, 
communication and motion; and (representing inertia), cognitive terms, passivity and 
embellishment (Hart & Carroll, 2012). Embellishment is calculated by DICTION using a 
ratio of adjectives to verbs of praise, blame, present concern, and past concern. Because 
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ATLAS.ti was used for the textual analysis (and not DICTION), embellishment had to be 
dropped from the equation.  
 Figure G12 indicates that CEO Emails rate high on activity, specifically on the 
accomplishment characteristic. The emails were laden with references to 
accomplishments and future objectives, using words related to task-completion, 
capitalism, organization, expansion, and programs. Although use of cognitive terms was 
also high for the CEO Emails, the net activity score for CEO Emails was the highest of 
all. This result suggests that the CEO Emails were specifically focused on 
accomplishments and objectives. 
Figure G12: Activity 
 
 To further investigate the CEO’s emphasis on activity, through their email 
narrative, net activity (activity less inertia) was mapped against present concern. As 
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Figure G13 demonstrates, CEO Emails are in a unique position whereby they emphasize 
activity and the present jointly, further suggesting the action-oriented nature of the 
narrative, more so than strategic plans, which are closer (in this case) to executive 
speeches and business articles in their present action orientation. 
Figure G13: Net Activity and Present Concern  
(Frequency, as a % of total words) 
 
1.5.6 Certainty 
 Dealing with uncertainty is an ongoing managerial problem; executives try to 
manage uncertainty by trying to buffer the organization’s technical environment from the 
external (Thompson, 1967). Hart and Carroll (2012) define certainty as “resoluteness, 
inflexibility, and completeness and a tendency to speak ex cathedra” (p. 5) by measuring 
the certainty characteristics – tenacity, leveling, collectives and insistence – and the 
ambivalence characteristics – numerical terms, ambivalence, self-reference and variety. 
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Although variety and insistence are calculated by the DICTION software and therefore 
dropped, the other characteristics were considered sufficient to investigate the degree of 
certainty within the CEO Emails. 
 The results of the analysis are shown in Figure G14. CEO Emails not only score 
high on the certainty characteristics but also on the ambivalence terms, specifically the 
use of numerical terms and self-reference. As a result, net certainty (Figure G15) for the 
CEO Emails is just over 3%, whereas strategic plans are over 4% and project plans over 
5%. It is important to note that the measure of certainty is not a direct measure of a 
CEO’s reference to an uncertain environment. Rather, the characteristics (in addition to 
numerical terms) include ambivalence (not willing to commit to what has been written), 
and high self-reference (suggesting limited vision) (Hart & Carroll, 2012). 




Figure G15: Net Certainty 
 
1.5.7 Realism 
 Realism is defined as “tangible, immediate, recognizable matters that affect 
people’s everyday lives” (Hart & Carroll, 2012: 8). Realism is of interest specifically 
because of the nature of the CEO Email. The CEOs at Nortel chose to communicate 
strategy and organization concerns to employees directly, through a broad email 
distribution system. Employees received these emails in their personal email inboxes. 
When the email was sent, it took a half day (at most) for the technical system to distribute 
the emails to all employees (they were sent in batches). Employees could read the emails 
at their leisure – alone, with colleagues, during work hours, outside of work hours. The 
email served as a one-way communication by the CEO and was arguably timely, as it 
referenced both past and future events, and was grounded in present activity. Making the 
emails real to employees could be important. 
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 Realism can be measured with eight of the textual characteristic through the 
following formula: the addition of familiarity, spatial awareness, temporal awareness, 
present concern, human interest, and concreteness, less past concern and complexity 
(Hart & Carroll, 2012). Complexity is a DICTION-measured variable that calculates the 
average number of characters per word within the file. It was not used in this calculation. 
Additionally, familiarity results were not included in Cornut et al.’s (2012) study, and 
therefore were dropped here as well. Notably, the familiarity measure for the CEO 
Emails was the most pervasive of all characteristics, suggesting that the emails were 
highly informal.  Figure G16 shows that the CEO Emails narratives were high on realism.  





 As the analysis indicates, the CEO Email is similar to strategic plans, state of the 
union addresses, religious sermons, horoscopes, and executive speeches. However, as 
shown in Table G6 and Figure G17, differences suggest that the CEO Email is a unique 
narrative. Similar to speeches and horoscopes, the emails have a temporal awareness and 
concern for the past, present and future. However, unlike strategic plans, CEO emails 
have limited spatial awareness. The emails score high on realism, as do other narratives 
that aim to speak directly to the individual reader / listener (speeches, horoscopes) but 
CEO Emails (more than any other) are activity-based, with an emphasis on present 
action.  
 Authorship is monological. The CEO Emails score high on optimism and 
commonality, much like strategic plans. Above all others, CEO Emails are high in 
realism. Notably, for CEO Emails, certainty falls more towards the median, and is 
significantly lower than its counterpart, strategic plans. 
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Realism Activity Monological 
authorship
Optimism Commonality Certainty Realism
CEO 
EMAILS
7.59% 1.56% 18.02% 5.55% 1.75% 3.25% 2.67% 3.32% 27.92%
Strategic 
Plans
4.55% 3.61% 13.39% 2.57% 0.10% 3.17% 2.83% 4.26% 17.79%
State of the 
Union 
Address
7.39% 3.13% 20.96% 3.30% 1.38% 1.42% 1.25% 3.98% 24.33%
Executive 
Speeches
6.99% 2.16% 16.50% 3.04% 1.33% 1.40% 1.15% 2.70% 20.73%
Horoscopes 9.35% 1.39% 20.20% 1.51% 0.19% 2.10% 0.78% 2.76% 22.02%
Religious 
Sermons
6.50% 1.55% 18.00% 1.73% 1.69% 0.48% 0.45% 3.53% 18.81%
Business 
Articles
6.93% 1.74% 14.88% 3.43% 0.51% 0.41% 0.91% 2.57% 17.57%
Research 
Articles




4.79% 2.91% 13.25% 2.05% 0.21% 1.81% 2.40% 3.60% 16.13%
S&P Annual 
Reports
4.89% 1.27% 10.97% 2.59% 0.16% 0.22% 3.24% 2.32% 14.85%
Project 
Plans
4.77% 1.60% 9.03% 1.37% 0.12% 0.78% 2.37% 5.43% 8.24%
364 
 
Figure G17: CEO Email as a Unique Type of Strategy Narrative 
 
1.6 Results – Macrostructure 
1.6.1 Descriptive Results 
 This section provides a description of the CEO Emails, using the data set of 146 
emails (i.e. all strategy and organizational announcement emails from the Dunn, Owens, 
and Zafirovski).  
 Authorship. Although it has not been confirmed if the CEOs themselves wrote 
every email, all CEOs were required to provide final approval; the emails were 
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distributed from the CEOs’ email account and they electronically signed each email. 
“Even when authorship of the text is uncertain (e.g., a shareholder letter), there is 
widespread agreement that executives are heavily involved in their preparation (Barr 
et al., 1992)” (Short & Palmer, 2008: 729). 
 Distribution. The emails were issued with an information technology system 
created by Nortel, called ‘webalert.’ Webalert allowed for the mass distribution of an 
email and was linked electronically to the firm’s organizational structure manager (OSM) 
application. From within the webalert system, the user was able to select the audience of 
the email, based on criteria included in OSM. Since OSM contained demographic 
information of all employees, along with their position profile, their salary level, and their 
reporting structure, it was possible to send to a wide variety of user-defined groups. For 
example, the user could choose to send an email to specific segments of the employee 
population such as: employees in a particular country, city, or region; employees 
reporting to a particular manager, executive, function; employees above a certain 
managerial level, below, or a combination thereof; only women; etc...  
 The CEO Emails were sent to all employees through the webalert tool. Once the 
content of the email was finalized by the CEO, it was sent to the corporate 
communications manager responsible for webalert distribution. The manager was able, 
through webalert, to associate the email to the CEO’s email account, so that the official 
sender of the email was the CEO. This also meant that any reply to the email would be 
sent directly to the CEO’s email account (and not the corporate communications 
manager). Depending on the size of the employee population, the email distribution could 
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take up to a few hours to complete, as they were distributed in batches (to avoid 
overloading the internal telecommunications network).  
 Language. Emails were written and distributed in English to all regions, with the 
exception of Quebec. Emails to Quebec employees were translated into French and sent 
in a separate batch, as a bilingual email (i.e. both English and French versions combined). 
If translation was not possible for the initial distribution, the French translation followed 
when available, while the original English email was sent at the same time as the rest of 
the company. The English emails were used for the analysis. 
 Intended audience. The webalert tool automatically inserted a first line into each 
email to identify the audience. Up until March 2005, the first line of every email began 
with “Audience:” followed by an expression that indicated the email was being sent to all 
employees. Dunn’s emails (with one exception) indicated that the email was being sent to 
either “All Employees” or “All Nortel Networks Employees.” Owens’ emails were 
addressed to “The People of Nortel.” None of Zafirovski’s emails had this formal 
designation, however, in all cases, the “TO” line of the email indicated that the message 
was sent to all employees. It can be confirmed, therefore, that the emails used in this 
research were issued through webalert and to all employees in the organization.   
 Header format. The header format included the TO line, the FROM line (Office 
of the CEO, or similar), DATE and TITLE. 
 Body format. When Dunn first began issuing the emails, the webalert tool did not 
support HTML formatting, therefore his emails and many of Owens’ emails were written 
in basic text. Subtitles were identified through capitalization of whole words and asterisks 
served for bulleted lists. By the time Zafirovski became CEO, the webalert tool supported 
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HTML formatting. His emails included different font types (typically Arial 10), 
bolded/underlined characters, bulleted lists, tables, etc... He also named his strategy 
emails “Zmails,” which included both a picture and a mustard yellow background as part 
of the format. Since ATLAS.ti was used for the analysis, the emails were all converted 
into rich text format and loaded into the software stripped of their original formatting. 
This was considered inconsequential, given that the analysis was on the texts themselves. 
1.6.2 The Macrostructure 
 The macrostructure of the emails is based on the analysis as described in the 
methods section and as presented in Table G7. Follows is a discussion on each move. 
Table G7: CEO Emails Macrostructure (Moves) 
Move Communicative Purpose 
1. Email Title - Passivity Signal the nature of the email to the employee. 
2. Opening Paragraph(s) – Heroes 
and Villains 
Establish the email’s context and set the tone. Position the 
employee within the narrative. Create a sense of importance 
and urgency to make the email relevant. 
3. Body – The Story Inform the employee of current events/decisions. Identify 
specific ways in which the employee will be affected or is 
expected to behave.   
4. Background  Paragraph(s) – 
Rhetorical History  
Through rhetorical history, identify both internal and external 
events to confirm organizational identity and to legitimize 
decisions/actions. 
5. Closing Paragraph – The Ask Reinforce urgency and importance. Summarize organizational 
values and define expectations of employees. 
6. Complementary Close – 
Levelling 
Level the CEO-employee relationship through personal 
connections (expressions of emotion). Summarize the need 




1.6.3 Move ‘Email Title’ – Passivity 
 With few exceptions, each email had a unique title, where major words were 
capitalized and minor words (e.g. articles, prepositions, and coordinating conjunctions) 
were in lower case. Of the 146 emails, all but 16 had descriptive titles. The remaining 16 
were issued by Zafirovski during the bankruptcy protection process. 
 Email titles typically summarized the content of the email. Strategy emails that 
focused on results usually included a reference to the financial quarter in the title. For 
example, Dunn used titles such as: A Financial Update, Return to Profitability Bonus, 
2003 Results and 2004 Priorities, Update on Restatement of Financial Results. Owens’ 
titles were equality descriptive, however less focused on financial results and more 
focused on the restatement process and employee engagement. Zafirovski’s emails had a 
mix of both. Most email titles used nouns and the passive voice.   
1.6.4 Move ‘Salutation’ – Inconsistent 
 As indicated previously, the webalert tool automatically inserted a form of 
salutation, with the first line being “Audience: xxxx.” These appeared in most of Dunn’s 
and Owens’ emails, but not Zafirovski’s. In addition to the standard inserted line, Dunn 
and Owens also added personal salutations such as “Fellow Employees” and “The People 
of Nortel.” For the most part, however, any consistent use of a salutation was absent from 
the CEO Emails. The lack of personal salutation is similar in structure to an internal 
company memorandum, which has a standard header format similar to the CEO Emails 
(To, From, Date, Title) and no salutation. 
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1.6.5 Move ‘Opening Paragraph(s)’ – Heroes and Villains 
 Both types of emails – strategy and organizational announcements – began with 
the introduction of a hero, villain, or both, to establish narrative context. Organizational 
announcements began with details on the leadership change, followed by the recognition 
of both the outgoing leader and the incoming leader. In most cases, both leaders 
(incoming and outgoing) were presented as heroes in the narrative. Occasionally, an 
outgoing leader’s accomplishments would be downplayed and, in one instance, the leader 
was positioned as a villain (departure of Daichendt).  
 In the strategy emails, the heroes and villains were either actors or groups of 
actors, as shown in Table G8. For example, the economy and the industry were often 
portrayed as villains, along with the media and analysts, and (at times) even Nortel’s own 
employees. Executives were often portrayed as the heroes, both individually and as a 
group, along with employees (when performance improved). 
Table G8: Move ‘Opening Paragraph’ – Heroes and Villains 




On my way home from a business trip to India at the end 
of November, I reflected on the events of the past year. 
My conclusions? Without question, 2002 was an 
extraordinary period of challenge and change for 
telecom. Sweeping changes in industry structure touched 
every player in every corner of the sector. The stakes 






CEO Email Opening Paragraph Hero, Villain 
Owens, June 
18, 2004 
I wanted to give you a bit of an update on my thoughts and 
activities of the last couple of weeks since I last wrote to 
you. Life has been pretty busy for me as I continue my 
early agenda of (1)getting to know the people of our 
company, (2)engaging our major customers,  
(3)evolving Nortel's presence with the media and the 
investment community, and (4)starting down the path of 
putting new initiatives in place to make our company 
stronger. I'll talk to you more in detail about all of these 
as time goes on, but I have been very pleased with our 
progress in the 7 weeks I've been your Chief Executive.  
Hero: Owens 
Zafirovski, 
June 9, 2006 
Earlier this week, we announced the results for the first 
quarter of 2006. It was a difficult quarter -- flat sales and 
higher loss than last year -- and our performance must 
improve substantially to achieve our stated full-year 
2006 targets (growth in high single digits; 300-500 basis 
point improvement in operating margin). Our internal 
plans that are in place are to meet/surpass these targets, 
but many external, and arguably some internal, skeptics 
would say there is a catch. Namely, we will have to 
deliver on those plans (and the naysayers will point to 









August 1, 2007 
After 12 extremely productive and successful years, Dion 
Joannou, our North American President, has decided to 
leave Nortel to pursue other personal interests, effective 
August 31, 2007. 
Dion has been a strong contributor and a key member of 
our leadership team for many years. From his tenure as 
Chief Strategy Officer and CALA President, through to 
his present responsibilities in the North American 
region, he has helped strengthen our company and build 
our business - particularly in the Enterprise space where 
he has made a strong contribution in recent years.  
We are sorry to see him go, and wish him much success 
wherever his career takes him. In the interim, we hope 
that he will fulfill his wish of spending more quality 








These are unprecedented times and the path forward for 
Nortel is filled with challenges. The world economic 
situation has deteriorated and it is impacting our 
business and customers deeply. Today, we are acting 
swiftly and decisively to strengthen our financial 
position, navigate this uncertain environment and build a 








 The communicative purpose of the opening paragraph(s) was to establish context 
for the employee in a clear and succinct manner. The CEOs consistently used the opening 
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of the email to identify the central theme of the narrative, position the employee within 
the story, and establish a sense of urgency and importance.  
1.6.6 Move ‘Body’ – The Story  
 The body of the emails contained specific information on the relevant events 
and/or decisions being communicated. If the decision was complex (e.g. a major 
organizational announcement), the body of the email would consist of numerous 
paragraphs and bulleted items, outlining each decision and the impact to employees. If a 
new program was launched, the details of the program would be included in the email, 
including the owner, the structure, the objectives, the timing of the launch, and the 
employee’s responsibility within the program (see Table G9 for examples). Often, the 
body of the email would contain links to other narrative sources such as news releases 
and financial reports posted on the company’s external website, internal Q&A 
documentation, videos, PowerPoint presentations, earlier CEO Emails, corporate values, 
and other websites dedicated to employee communication.  
Table G9: Move ‘Body’ – The Story 
CEO Email Body The Story 
Dunn, November 
13, 2002 
This bonus has two objectives that are interrelated and 
that, from my perspective, serve the interests of the 
company, its employees and shareholders, who have felt 
the economic consequences and impacts of the telecom 
collapse that's occurred over the past several years.  






You will see evidence of our new marketing and 
advertising campaign in our buildings, on your desktop, 
on our external and internal websites, and in the 
materials that are making their way to all of you. Please 
take time to familiarize yourself with our messages and 
recognize the very important role all of you play in 
being brand ambassadors for Nortel. Playing that role is 
a tangible way all employees can contribute to the 
success of our company. 





CEO Email Body The Story 
Zafirovski, March 
28, 2007 
As I have previously communicated, meeting our financial 
targets is our number one “Must-Do” for 2007. And one 
of our key financial objectives is to reduce our level of 
debt, while maintaining a strong balance sheet.  
Following up from my email last week, today we closed 
on issuing $1.15 billion of convertible senior notes. The 
proceeds will be used to proactively refinance a large 
portion of our existing $1.8 billion convertible notes, 
which mature in September of 2008. By taking this 
action, we are increasing our financial flexibility so that 
we can move with greater agility to execute on our 6-








Driving best practices will accelerate our success. Like 
our new ads say: "Why make it hard, when you can 
make it simple?" It will be critical for us to drive best 
practices across the company. We have many "one-off" 
successes -- both in terms of significant customer wins 
and in select world-class practices -- but we are not 
adopting and spreading them quickly enough. One thing 
all great companies have in common is an ability to 
learn from each other and leverage and multiply the 
impact of good ways of doing things. We have started 
sharing customer successes in the "Anatomy of a Deal" 
initiative and can point to several efforts to streamline 
our processes. But, we need to move much faster and we 
need to make success a habit at Nortel. This will 
ultimately strengthen our ability to build a true culture of 
excellence and execution. 






 The communicative purpose of the email body was to inform employees of the 
decision and/or event and to ultimately influence behaviour (norms, values, beliefs, or 
actions). Although in some instances no immediate action was required of employees, the 
body of the email focused (at the very least) on influencing beliefs. Throughout the case, 
CEOs were faced with the task of communicating bad news, such as poor financial 
performance, market challenges, workforce reductions, or programs to change culture; 
the change efforts were substantial. The body of the emails reflect the efforts of the CEO 
in trying to influence employee behaviour. 
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1.6.7 Move ‘Background Paragraphs’ – Rhetorical History 
 Once the purpose of the email was established, the CEOs drew on the past to 
recreate history, through the sequencing and sensemaking of events. This method of 
using history as a resource is known as rhetorical history, where strategists reconstruct 
the past to “motivate, persuade and frame action, both within and outside an 
organization” (Suddaby et al., 2010: 147). As outlined in the examples of Table G10, 
Dunn drew on Nortel’s historical capabilities to substantiate the firm’s ability to succeed 
(e.g., we led through innovation in the past, we can and will do it again). Owens used 
rhetorical history to indicate success in developing and following a strategic plan. In 
relation to the restatements, Zafirovski positioned them as a blip in the corporation’s 
history; an exception to its proud heritage. He also positioned Nortel not only as an 
industry leader but also as being responsible for major industry transformations. 
Table G10: Move ‘Background Paragraphs’ – Rhetorical History 




As I look back, a few things really stand out, foremost 
being the fierce resolve, energy, and commitment of 
our people. A superior ability to adapt to and lead 
disruptive, fast-moving change has been a Nortel 
Networks strength for a long time, and it was on full 
display this past year. Many no-turning-back 
decisions were made in 2002 to keep the company 
together and move it in new directions, and we 
needed a lot of hands-on work -- an execution culture 
-- and passionate leadership throughout the company 





Owens, April 26, 
2005 
As I communicated to the market last summer, Nortel 
will continue its strategy of partnerships and alliances 
to speed solutions to market and strengthen our 
competitive advantage. This is the way we are 
executing aggressively on our strategy of developing, 
acquiring, and making alliances to achieve rapid time-












 The attention this settlement will get will no doubt be a 
temporary distraction as pundits and industry 
watchers may use it as an opportunity to re-tell the 
circumstances around the financial restatement and 
recent challenges facing the Company. It's important 
to recognize that the settlement is in relation to 
activities that are a part of our past, and a big part of 
moving forward is in closing this unfortunate chapter 









We believe that it marks a seismic change in the 
industry, and it can be added to the long list of Nortel 
innovations that have transformed networks over the 
years - including Digital World (the world’s first line 
of fully digital telecom systems), FiberWorld 
(telecom systems based on fiber optic technology), 
and successive waves of next-generation wireless 
technology. 





 With rhetorical history, the CEOs were able to shape organizational identity, 
legitimize decisions and actions, and decouple the identity from undesirable 
characteristics.  
1.6.8 Move ‘Closing Paragraph’ – The Ask 
 All of the CEO Emails included a final paragraph that closed the narrative in a 
similar way: through the summation of the story, the email would close with a request to 
employees on what they should believe and how they should act (see Table G11). The 
communicative purpose was to reinforce urgency and importance of the issue, emphasize 
relevant organizational values, and define expectations of employees. 
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Table G11: Move 'Closing Paragraph' – The Ask 
CEO Email Closing Paragraph The “Ask” 
Dunn, January 29, 
2004 
This is a rigorous set of priorities, but each is critical and, if we 
are successful in meeting them, extremely powerful. The 
bottom line is Nortel Networks is on the move again. We are 
well positioned to go on the offensive and continue to create 
new realities for ourselves, our customers and our industry in 
2004 and beyond, just as we did in 2003. I look to each of you 
to be a leader in working to move these priorities forward. 
Do your job 
Owens, December 
7, 2004 
Please get behind this and other strategic relationships that will 
help define the new Nortel going forward. Today's news, 
combined with our announcement that we will provide Sprint 
with enhanced wireless infrastructure equipment and 
professional services to support the Nortel portion of their 
nationwide 3G wireless network, are further proof points that 





What makes this company great is the way all of you have 
created new innovative market solutions while rising to meet 
the challenges of the past. Today marks another challenge; 
however, rest assured, today's restatement announcement is 
not going to slow down our commitment to rebuilding a high-




August 1, 2008 
If we stay true to these values, we will transform with purpose, 
we will grow and we will succeed. As we discussed at the 
June analyst meeting, I am very excited about moving our 
transformation to the growth stage. Great companies grow or 
perish. The most successful organizations are those that have a 
strong sense of who they are, what they value and how they 
bring it to the world. Nortel is no different. Even during the 
toughest of times, by pulling together, we can be part of 





1.6.9 Move ‘Complementary Close’ – Levelling 
 Each of the CEOs included a complementary close of a few lines (small 
paragraph) that would include a personal message and a thank you to employees (see 
Table G12). It appears that the communicative purpose of the close was to establish a 
personal connection with the employee and to downplay the authoritarian role of the 
CEO. The close often included a personal reference of emotion. The complementary 
close acted as a levelling mechanism by signalling to employees that the CEO was 
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accessible, understanding, and caring about all employees. This move represents a 
migration from a monological to a polyphonic narrative approach (Barry & Elmes, 1997), 
although most of the remaining email narrative had a monological tone. 
Table G12: Move ‘Complementary Close’ – Levelling 
CEO Email Complementary Close Levelling 
Dunn, January 30, 
2003 
Once again, thank you -- and keep your e-mails 
coming.  
You can communicate 
directly with me, no 
chain of command 
Owens, June 10, 
2005 
Thanks for all that you do to strengthen Nortel day-
in and day-out. 
You matter, you matter 
to Nortel and to me 
Zafirovski, August 
15, 2006 
 If you haven't already, be sure to take some 
vacation this summer. I certainly enjoyed the 
time off last week with my wife and our three 
sons. Each one of us needs to be fully charged to 
drive a successful second half. 
We are all human, even 
me, and I allow you 




 I truly wish all of you a healthy, happy and 
enjoyable holiday season. Thank you again for 
all you are doing for Nortel. 
I mean what I say, I 
really do care about 
you 
 
1.7 Summary of Findings (for the purpose of the thesis) 
 The CEO Email represents a unique form of organizational discourse, whereby 
the CEO attempts to establish an individual connection with each employee. With 
rhetorical history, the CEO defines, develops and confirms organizational norms, values, 
and beliefs to shape employee behaviour and reconstructs past events to legitimize 
executive decisions and actions. With the ability to reach all employees quickly and 
easily, the CEO Email is an important tool in the process of strategizing, providing CEOs 
the opportunity to communicate directly with employees, bypassing all levels of 
management and establishing a direct rapport.  
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 The informal and personal nature of the emails also allows CEOs to develop their 
own individual identity within the organization, in context with the organization’s 
identity. However, with the communicative purpose being to shape employee thinking 
and behaviour, the CEO Email retains a monological authorship that reaffirms the CEO’s 
role as the master architect of the firm’s strategy, even with CEO attempts at levelling in 
the complementary close. 
 As with strategic plans, CEO Emails are both optimistic and inclusionary, but 
unlike strategic plans, CEO Emails are highly temporal (present and future), realism-
based, with an emphasis on present-day activity.  Although similar to executive and 
presidential speeches, the CEO Email is a concrete document; the intertextual nature of 
the CEO Email, both in texts that it draws upon, and texts that draw upon it, embed the 
email into the narrative infrastructure in a purposeful way. 
